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 I 
 
Een doctoraat als zoektocht naar jezelf. Het klinkt niet vanzelfsprekend, zeker niet 
binnen het vakgebied ‘landbouweconomie’. Maar toch heeft dit doctoraatsonderzoek 
een licht geworpen op de reden waarom ik zelf nooit gedurfd heb om mijn 
kinderdroom waar te maken… Reeds als kleine meid was meehelpen met het 
schapen vangen, het hooi binnensteken, stallen uitmesten, lammeringen doen,… 
vanzelfsprekend. Je groeit er mee op, en stillekes aan groeit de liefde voor de 
landbouw in je hart. Maar tussen die kinderdroom om ooit zelf ‘boerinneke’ te 
worden en het werkelijk overnemen van een landbouwbedrijf liggen mijlen van 
verschil…  
Deze zoektocht was niet mogelijk geweest zonder de steun van een aantal mensen, 
daarom eerst graag een paar woordjes van dank: 
In de eerste plaats wil ik mijn promotor prof. Van Huylenbroeck bedanken. Steeds 
weer was er in zijn drukke agenda ruimte voor discussie en verduidelijking. Zijn visie 
op de wereld leerde me om verder te kijken dan het vanzelfsprekende. Door zijn 
altijd aanwezige steun durfde ik mijn eigen grenzen te verleggen... 
In het kader van dit doctoraat wil ik alle landbouwers, en zonen en dochters van 
landbouwers die aan dit onderzoek meegewerkt hebben, van harte danken. Harde 
cijfers over de Vlaamse landbouwsector gaven me twijfels over de toekomst van de 
Vlaamse landbouw, maar de gedrevenheid die ik bij jonge landbouwers gevonden 
heb, zeggen me dat er zeker nog hoop en toekomst is voor de Vlaamse 
landbouwsector! Daarnaast wil ik ook het Instituut voor Landbouw- en 
Visserijonderzoek danken voor het beschikbaar stellen van data die nodig waren 
voor de analyses en de verschillende bevoorrechte getuigen voor het geven van extra 
uitleg. 
Aangezien kritische vragen de bouwstenen zijn van vooruitgang, dank ik de 
recensenten van artikels en de leden van de juryleden voor de terechte opmerkingen. 
Het kijken door verschillende brillen geeft je een meer objectief beeld op de 
werkelijkheid, hoewel afstand nemen niet altijd even gemakkelijk is. 
Daarnaast wil ik ook alle collega’s bedanken voor de vele gesprekken, de intense 
discussies, het luisterend oor als het even moeilijk ging... 
Ook de vele studenten over de verschillende jaren heen mogen in dit rijtje niet 
ontbreken, want ze hebben me getoond dat niet alles altijd even vanzelfsprekend is, 
maar dat je mensen vleugels kan geven door ze in zichzelf te laten geloven... 
Vervolgens wil ik alle vrienden en familie bedanken voor hun luisterend oor, voor de 
vele gezellige momenten en het gevoel van geborgenheid. Meer specifiek wil ik mijn 
ouders danken voor de manier waarop ze mij naar de wereld hebben leren kijken, 
Preface 
Preface   
II 
voor de kansen die ze mij gegeven hebben (ook al waren ze niet altijd 
vanzelfsprekend), voor de steun als het even moeilijker ging, en voor de vele 
gesprekken over ‘de landbouw’ zodat ook de link met de praktijk niet verloren ging. 
Dank voor de morele steun, maar zeker en vast ook voor de praktische 
ondersteuning, want zonder hen waren de laatste loodjes een stuk zwaarder geweest. 
Tenslotte wil ik ook Peter in de bloemetjes zetten en danken voor de levensweg die 
we samen volgen. Het is niet de makkelijkste weg, maar het is een schitterende weg 
die ons steeds weer doet stilstaan bij de kleine dingen van het leven. Een weg die ons 
allebei de mogelijkheid geeft om onszelf te ontplooien zonder daarbij elkaar uit het 
oog te verliezen. En op die weg lopen twee vrolijke meisjes die ons leren om alles te 
relativeren...  
Peter, bedankt voor alle steun de afgelopen jaren!  
Jolien en Marie, bedankt voor de vele ontspannende momenten: het leven is meer 
dan werken alleen ...  
 
Mieke Calus 
13 februari 2009 
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 1 
1.1. Rationale 
The family farm is a cornerstone of the European agricultural model on which the 
present Common Agricultural Policy is based (Table 1.1) (Blanc and Perrier-Cornet 
1993). The family farm is said to have contributed to economic and social 
development while adjusting its structures, production and management methods 
(Economic and Social Committee 1994). 
 
Table 1.1 Importance of family farms in Western European agriculture (2005) 
 Total number 
of agricultural 
holdingsa 
% family farms % of total 
agricultural 
area utilised by 
family farms 
% family 
labour units in 
agriculture 
Belgium  51,540 93.1 91.3 80.4 
Denmark  51,680 99.2 97.2 63.2 
France  567,140 75.6 50.9 49.4 
Germany  389,880 94.0 70.5 69.9 
Ireland  132,670 99.9 99.5 93.0 
Italy  1,728,530 98.3 72.4 82.0 
Portugal  323,920 97.9 76.0 82.8 
Spain  1,079,420 95.2 61.3 65.4 
The Netherlands 81,830 92.9 90.1 63.1 
United Kingdom  286,750 95.6 84.8 68.6 
Source: Eurostat 2007 
a According to Eurostat, an agricultural holding is ‘a single unit both technically and 
economically, which has single management and which produces agricultural products. 
Other supplementary (non-agricultural) products and services may also be provided by the 
holding’.  
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Despite variation in size, outputs and production methods, family agriculture1 
represents some characteristics, linked to the shortage of space, the common needs 
and preferences of European people, and the historical and cultural background of 
farming in Europe, which are important enough to preserve: competitiveness, 
sustainability and multifunctionality (Economic and Social Committee 1999). 
The long term survival of this cornerstone at macro level, is however based on the 
transfer of viable and competitive family farms at micro level. The last 25 years, the 
number of farms reduced and family farms became highly capital-intensive 
production systems (Chapter 2). This trend certainly may have positive effects for 
the young farmer (e.g. scale effects), but the financial burden must not be neglected.  
Although scientists and policy makers recognise the role of farm transfer in the 
development of agriculture, there are still some lacks in scientific literature related to 
farm transfer. Most research focuses on the moment of farm transfer itself (Blanc 
and Perrier-Cornet 1993, Kimhi 1994, Errington 2002, Glauben et al. 2002, Corsi 
2004), but less attention is given to the process that has to be followed before the 
effective farm transfer is effectuated.  
1.2.Research objective 
The overall objective of this research is to analyse the farm succession cycle with 
emphasis on the dynamic long-term aspects of farm transfer, taking into account the 
current changes in the agricultural landscape such as an increasing capital need, a 
shift from labour to capital as production factors, and an increase in legislation and 
administration. Based on a farm succession cycle model, different social, economic 
and legal aspects explaining intergenerational farm transfer are analysed. 
The focus of this research is the intergenerational farm transfer, i.e. the transfer of 
the family farm from the parents to (one of) their children. This is one of the most 
common possibilities for successors to enter the business (Carlson and Dillman 
1983), although the definition of the European Commission clearly includes the 
possibility of succession by a sib as well as (Fennell 1981). Figure 1.1 indicates the 
different types of farm transfer: besides intergenerational farm transfer, we 
distinguish intragenerational farm transfer (farm transfer between brothers and 
sisters), external farm transfer (transfer of the family farm to a person that not 
belongs to the core family) and limited farm continuation (sale of part of the 
production factors, e.g. production rights, but continuing the family farm to a smaller 
extent; at the limit, the farm family still lives on the homestead but the agricultural 
                                                 
1 Within this research the concept ‘agriculture’ refers both to agricultural and horticultural 
production. 
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production is transferred to another farm). If no successor is available, then the farm 
stops, the farm properties are sold and the leaving farmer and his family have no link 
with the farm any more.  
 
 
Figure 1.1 Possible trajectories of farm continuation  
Source: own compilation based on Fennell 1981, Carlson and Dillman 1983 
1.3. Thesis outline 
The outline of this thesis is as follows. 
Chapter 2 analyses the importance of the family farm, it opportunities and threats. 
Within this chapter the different rationales for the existence of the family farm are 
discussed.  
Chapter 3 puts the intergenerational farm transfer in the foreground. A conceptual 
framework is elaborated and hypotheses are stated. The conceptual framework leads 
to a methodological model based on the farm succession cycle. 
The decision to continue the family farm has major consequences for a person and 
his family, as there will mostly be a lifelong connection with the farm. Chapter 4 
elaborates a succession intention model for farm succession, inspired by theory of 
planned behaviour of Ajzen (1985, 1988, 1991). The model makes it possible to 
analyse the process of succession intention already years before the farm transfer 
takes place. It reveals the factors that influence the decision to take over the farm in 
the different stages of the succession intention model. 
Farming 
family 
Children 
No 
children 
On-farm 
successor(s) 
No on-farm 
successor 
Farm exit 
External farm 
transfer 
Intergenerational 
farm transfer 
Intragenerational 
farm transfer 
Limited farm 
continuation 
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Chapter 5 explores Total Farm Assets (TFA) as an indicator to identify farms with a 
higher probability of farm transfer. In the first part of this chapter, the theory of 
asset fixity and the theory of transaction cost economics are used to explain 
theoretically why higher TFA should reflect a higher intention to transfer the farm to 
the next generation, independent of farm type. The second part estimates the 
influence of the designation of a successor on the farm management by means of an 
econometric model. 
In Chapter 6, the emphasis is put on the financing of farm transfer and the influence 
of financing farm transfer on farm practice. The importance of external financial 
loans is highlighted. An econometric model analyses the influencing factors of the 
external financing leap. The consequences of financing the farm transfer on the farm 
management are analysed.  
The business legal structure of a farm also influences the farm transfer process. 
Taken all aspects of agricultural firms into consideration, a farmer will select the best 
solution under present conditions for the future of his farm. But this is only possible 
if he possesses all the necessary information on legal structures. Chapter 7 analyses 
first which legal structures exist in different Western European countries (France, 
Belgium, the Netherlands) related to agriculture. The comparison with neighbouring 
countries makes it possible to detect the shortcomings in the Belgian legislation 
related to legal farm statuses. Next, the knowledge and perception of farmers 
regarding the advantages and disadvantages of both natural persons and business 
entities with separated legal personality are analysed. The relation between the 
knowledge and the perception towards different legal structures in Belgium reveals 
the attitude related to different legal structures. 
Chapter 8 integrates the findings of the research using the conceptual framework. 
The chapter composes a summary of the research, and gives recommendations for 
policy makers to increase the number of farm transfers by removing the main 
obstacles. The contribution of the research is twofold. On the one hand, the 
methodology based on the farm succession cycle, contributes to knowledge on the 
explaining factors of farm transfer. On the other hand, the results of the research can 
be useful to assist policy makers to improve the policy related to farm transfer. 
Finally, recommendations for further research are outlined. 
Within the different chapters, some real-life examples are given to illustrate the farm 
succession and farm transfer in practice.  
 
 5 
2.1. Introduction 
Within the European political institutional approach, the family farm is regarded as a 
cornerstone. This chapter analyses whether this is really the case, and if yes, what are 
the opportunities and threats of the family farm within a changing agricultural 
landscape.  
Section 2.2 gives the definition of the family farm. Section 2.3 indicates the 
importance of the family farm based on facts and figures at both European and 
Belgian level. In section 2.4 we analyse the reasons of persistence of the family farm 
from a socio-economic and historical point of view.  
2.2. Definition of the family farm 
Based on a literature review (among others Loyns and Kraut 1992, De Haan 1993, 
Gasson and Errington 1993, Knutson et al. 1998) a definition of family farming 
encloses following elements: 
• Both business ownership and managerial control are in the hands of family 
or near-family members; 
• Business ownership and managerial control are transferred within the family 
over different generations; 
• A majority of the labour is provided by the Principal Decision Maker2 (PDM) 
and his/her family; 
• A substantial part of the capital is furnished by the PDM and his/her family; 
• The family lives on the farm;  
• The family obtains a major share of its income from farming; 
• The principals are related by kinship or marriage. 
 
From sociological perspective, the family farm is associated with family virtues, such 
as solidarity, continuity and commitment; from economic perspective, the family 
                                                 
2 This research refers to the PDM for decision making related to farm management and 
investment decisions, but in case of a family farm, often the partner will have an important 
influence in the decision making of the farm. 
Chapter 2 – The family farm 
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farm may be identified with entrepreneurial skills, choice, risk and individual 
achievement (De Haan 1993). The interaction between these two perspectives entails 
that family farming is more than a professional occupation. It reflects a lifestyle, 
based on beliefs and traditions about live and work. The family may be seen as the 
interface between the farm and the non-farm environment, filtering energies, 
resources and ideas between them (Arkleton Trust 1985, Bollman 2005).  
The primary goal of the family farm is often not only profit maximisation as assumed 
in neo-classical models (Gasson et al. 1988), but also other goals such as maintaining 
control and passing on a secure and sound business to the next generation 
(Errington 2002) are important objectives for the farming family. It means, among 
others, that the business has a longer planning horizon, measured in generations 
rather than in years, and that securing long-term survival may be more prominent 
among the firm’s objectives than maximizing short-run gains.  
Family farms can be distinguished from family-owned business and industrial farms 
based on the fact that both the management and entrepreneurship are in the hands 
of the farming family and not shared with other persons (Table 2.1). The farming 
family provides labour, land and capital. Additional labour may be hired, most often 
on a seasonal basis (Gasson and Errington 1993), while land may be rented for 
expansion of the operation (Table 2.2). Further extra capital may be borrowed for 
supplies, machinery, and improvements. 
 
Table 2.1 Different forms of agricultural production 
 Labour Management Entrepreneurship 
Family farm Family Family Family 
Family business Family or hired labour Family or hired manager Family shareholders 
Industrial farm Hired labour Hired manager Shareholders  
Source: own compilation based on Gasson and Errington 1993 
 
A main feature is that the family owning the farm takes the (financial) risks, even if 
others deliver part of the production factors. This is not the case in the family owned 
business and industrial forms of farming where risks are shared among shareholders 
whether they have family ties or not. Besides the three models mentioned in Table 
2.1, other farming structures of course exist such as cooperative farming (in which 
different families work together within a co-operative structure), collective farming 
and state farming. However, these types of farms are rare in Western Europe and are 
therefore not discussed. 
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Table 2.2 Proportion of agricultural land farmed by owners in 2000 (%)  
Belgium 33 
Denmark 75 
France 37 
Germany 37 
Ireland 81 
Italy 77 
Portugal 74 
Spain 73 
The Netherlands 72 
United Kingdom 66 
Source: European Communities 2003 
2.3. Facts and figures 
2.3.1. The Western European perspective 
During history, agriculture, as part of the broader society, experienced a lot of 
changes. The concept of the ‘family farm’ has changed over time. This is reflected in 
the evolution in the three production factors: land, labour and capital (Reinhardt and 
Barlett 1989). Not only there was a change in the used quantity of the different 
factors (especially an increase of capital), but there was also a shift between the three 
production factors, e.g. a shift from labour to capital.  
When looking at European statistics in the period 1990-2005, the number of farms 
decreased in most of the countries, but there was an increase in the average 
agricultural area per farm (Table 2.3, Table 2.5). This process of reducing the number 
of productive units has fuelled an increase of professional businesses (Table 2.6). 
Due to labour saving technologies, the increase in farm size and economic size is not 
always reflected in a similar increase in labour units per farm (Table 2.4).  
Small and very small farms still form the majority of farms in the European Union 
agriculture, particularly in the Southern and Eastern European countries. In these 
countries, the social base of agriculture remains strong and widespread. It should be 
noticed that these smallholdings still guarantee a large number of jobs. Many of these 
PDMs are full time employed, and in many other cases it is a matter of disguised 
unemployment, with all the social repercussions this has (Economic and Social 
Committee 2002). 
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Table 2.3 Total numbers of farms  
 1990 1995 2000 2005 ∆ 1990-2005 
Belgium 85,040 70,980 61,710 51,540 -39% 
Denmark 81,270 68,770 57,830 51,680 -36% 
France n.a. n.a. n.a. 567,140 n.a. 
Germany 653,550 566,910 471,960 389,880 -40% 
Ireland 170,580 153,420 141,530 132,670 -22% 
Italy 2,664,550 2,482,100 2,153,720 1,728,530 -35% 
Portugal 598,740 450,640 415,970 323,920 -46% 
Spain 1,593,640 1,277,600 1,287,420 1,079,420 -32% 
The Netherlands 124,800 113,200 101,550 81,830 -34% 
United Kingdom 243,060 234,500 233,250 286,750 18% 
Source: Eurostat 2007 
n.a. : not available 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.4 Total labour input in fulltime labour units per farm  
 1990 1995 2000 2005 ∆ 1990-2005 
Belgium 1.10 1.11 1.20 1.35 23% 
Denmark 1.17 1.53 1.15 1.17 0% 
France n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.51 n.a. 
Germany 1.58 1.25 1.31 1.65 5% 
Ireland 1.46 1.42 1.19 1.15 -22% 
Italy 0.72 0.73 0.63 0.80 10% 
Portugal 1.41 1.30 1.26 1.23 -13% 
Spain 0.72 0.85 0.84 0.92 28% 
The Netherlands 1.80 1.86 2.02 2.13 18% 
United Kingdom 1.95 1.64 1.52 1.18 -39% 
Source: own calculations based on Eurostat 2007 
n.a. : not available 
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Table 2.5 Average utilised agricultural area (ha) per farm b  
 1990 1995 2000 2005 ∆ 1990-2005 
Belgium 27.4 31.8 36.9 41.1 56% 
Denmark 35.5 48.0 60.9 71.0 100% 
Germany 30.7 54.1 61.5 74.9 144% 
France 47.1 59.7 68.0 76.4 62% 
Ireland 39.6 37.5 39.7 40.0 1% 
Italy 10.3 11.7 11.8 16.0 55% 
Portugal 11.6 12.5 13.1 22.5 94% 
Spain 20.4 29.4 28.0 29.5 45% 
The Netherlands 22.0 24.1 27.5 32.6 48% 
United Kingdom 117.7 132.2 128.2 154.1 31% 
Source: European Commission 2008 
b The total utilized agricultural area of holding does not include areas used for mushrooms, 
land rented for less than one year on an occasional basis, woodland and other farm areas 
(roads, ponds, non-farmed areas, etc.). It consists of land in owner occupation, rented land, 
land in share-cropping (remuneration linked to output from land made available). It includes 
agricultural land temporarily not under cultivation for agricultural reasons or being 
withdrawn from production as part of agricultural policy measures. It is expressed in 
hectares (10,000 m²). 
 
Table 2.6 Average economic size unit c of farms  
 1990 1995 2000 2005 ∆ 1990-2005 
Belgium 54.7 67.1 79.7 96.1 83% 
Denmark 44.9 66.9 78.7 96.4 115% 
France 38.7 49.0 69.5 77.8 101% 
Germany 33.6 48.0 69.0 80.8 140% 
Ireland 18.8 19.1 22.8 20.4 9% 
Italy 12.9 15.6 17.2 29.6 129% 
Portugal 5.7 6.8 7.8 12.9 126% 
Spain 10.0 13.3 17.3 24.0 140% 
The Netherlands 81.5 106.6 121.7 137.1 68% 
United Kingdom 65.9 70.4 86.4 111.6 69% 
Source: European Commission 2008 
c Economic size of holding expressed in European size units (on the basis of the Community 
typology) (Formula: Total standard gross margin in Euro / 1200) 
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2.3.2. The Belgian perspective 
In the period 1980-2007, the number of farms in Belgium has been halved while the 
total agricultural area remained more or less constant. As consequence, the total 
agricultural area per farm has doubled (Figure 2.1). Figure 2.2 indicates that there was 
a reduction of 72 per cent of farms smaller than 5 ha. The large farms (> 30 ha) on 
the other side increased with 44%. The agricultural landscape changes and farms 
become more capital intensive (Table 2.6). The standard gross margin of the average 
Belgian farm increased with 83 per cent or €49,680 between 1990 and 2005. As most 
of the farms in Belgium are family farms in sole proprietorship (87%), this means 
that family itself has to deal with a highly capital-intensive production system.  
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Figure 2.1 Evolution of farms and farm size in Belgium  
Source: Federal Public Service Economy SMEs Self-employed and Energy 2007 
 
In the period 1990 – 2005, the labour productivity on the farms increased, as there 
was a high increase in economic size and a small increase in labour units on the farm. 
In 2005, the average amount of full time labour units on Belgian farms was 1.35 
(Table 2.4). Translated to the family farm, this implies that on the majority of farms, 
the PDM and his/her partner or child(ren) will be involved in farming, sometimes 
supplemented with an off-farm job. But on the other hand, increasing incomes in 
non-agricultural sectors of the economy make agricultural activity comparatively less 
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attractive for prospective successors3, unless it provides comparable incomes. In 
Belgium, the average farm income is 70 to 90 per cent of the average income outside 
agriculture (Vilt 2008), the PDMs have a high burden of debt and these small 
independent farms have to bear the entrepreneurial risk.  
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Figure 2.2 Changes in number of farms, related to farm size  
Source: Federal Public Service Economy SMEs Self-employed and Energy 2007 
 
The fall in the number of farm transfers started some decades ago, but from 1994 
on, as showed by Figure 2.3, it has sharpened. The sharp decrease in the years 1999 
and 2000 is ascribed to a sharp decrease in farm transfers in Flanders. The decrease 
from the year 2001 is attributed to a decrease in farm transfers in the Walloon 
provinces (Table 2.7). In 2006 and 2007, the absolute and relative number of farm 
transfer in Flanders and the Walloon provinces has increased. The increase in 
Flanders can partly be explained by a change in the regulations of the establishment 
support (Section 6.2.2.3), but also a new trust in the future of agriculture can 
stimulate farm transfer. The study of Gellynck et al. (2007) confirms this positive 
tendency by means of increasing target figures in the different Flemish agricultural 
sub sectors (e.g. expected increase of end production value of potatoes, vegetables in 
2013). 
                                                 
3 Within this research, we refer to the successor as a male person because the majority of 
successors in Flanders are male, but by doing so, we want to include both male and female 
successors. 
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Table 2.7 Comparison of farm transfer in Flemish and Walloon part of Belgium  
 Flanders The Walloon provinces 
 Total 
number of 
farms 
Absolute 
number of 
farm 
transfers 
Relative 
number of 
farm 
transfers 
Total 
number of 
farms 
Absolute 
number of 
farm 
transfers 
Relative 
number of 
farm 
transfers 
1995 48,104 1,223 2.5% 24,719 654 2.6% 
1996 46,062 1,225 2.7% 23,652 673 2.8% 
1997 44,529 1,094 2.5% 22,829 666 2.9% 
1998 43,509 1,035 2.4% 22,128 563 2.5% 
1999 42,377 754 1.8% 21,510 512 2.4% 
2000 41,047 699 1.7% 20,843 543 2.6% 
2001 39,276 631 1.6% 19,776 386 2.0% 
2002 37,895 666 1.8% 18,989 389 2.0% 
2003 36,681 658 1.8% 18,505 354 1.9% 
2004 35,486 667 1.9% 17,712 367 2.1% 
2005 34,519 494 1.4% 17,274 314 1.8% 
2006 33,272 608 1.8% 16,557 325 2.0% 
2007 31,984 700 2.2% 16,008 366 2.3% 
Source: own calculations based on Federal Public Service Economy SMEs Self-employed and Energy 2007 
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Figure 2.3 Number of farm transfers per year  
Source: Federal Public Service Economy SMEs Self-employed and Energy 2008a 
 
The number of PDMs under age 35, has decreased enormously since 2000 (Figure 
2.4). In the period 1980 – 2005, the absolute number of PDM older than 50 that 
reported to have a successor has halved (Figure 2.5). Regarding the farm succession 
pressure, there are no significant differences over time: on average 17 per cent of the 
PDMs has designated a successor, 58 per cent of the PDMs states not to have a 
successor, and 24 per cent is still in doubt about the succession perspectives of the 
farm (Figure 2.6). The farm succession pressure indicates that the minority of the 
family farms will be transferred within the family to the next generation. The land of 
the PDMs exiting the farm sector will be absorbed by the remaining farms, 
increasing the average farm size and the capital intensity of the farm (Figure 2.7). 
The increased farm size, the intensive labour demand and the capital intensity of the 
family farm, make it not evident for farmers’ children to take over the family farm. If 
fewer successors take over the family farms, the average farm size will continue to 
increase, leading to improved farm viability, but the question is whether a sole owner 
can still carry the financial burden.  
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Figure 2.4 Changes in number of farms, related to age of PDM  
Source: Federal Public Service Economy SMEs Self-employed and Energy 2007 
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Figure 2.5 Evolution of the designation of a successor on Belgian farms in absolute numbers 
Source: Federal Public Service Economy SMEs Self-employed and Energy 2008a 
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Figure 2.6 Farm succession pressure on Belgian farms  
Source: own calculations based on Federal Public Service Economy SMEs Self-employed and Energy 2008a 
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Figure 2.7 Relative amount of farms, related to farm size and age of PDM  
Source: Federal Public Service Economy SMEs Self-employed and Energy 2006 
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2.4. Rationale behind family farming 
The persistence of the family structure in farming is not evident and inconsistent 
with predictions made in literature. Karl Marx (1818-1883) was among the first to 
predict a further concentration and scale increase of farm structures and thus the 
gradual disappearance of peasant agriculture in capitalistic societies. Family farms 
would be absorbed by the large farming industry using modern technologies and 
employing hired labour (Orwin 1930, Schmitt 1991, Gasson and Errington 1993). 
Also the Fordist model of industrial development was used to explain further scale 
increases and industrialisation of farming (Boyer 1989, Sauer 1990). However in 
practice, we observe that in industrialized countries family farms have not only 
survived, but even relatively expanded. In stead of the development of a main stream 
modern farming model, we observe today a wide range of multifunctional family 
farming models (Van der Ploeg et al. 2002). 
In the section 2.4.1 and section 2.4.2 we review the main arguments and rationales 
that have been used to explain the existence and persistence of family farming: the 
socio-economic rationale on the one hand, and the historical rationale on the other 
hand. Although this may also be discussed from philosophic, sociological or other 
point of views, we limit our analysis to the two most common but complementary 
explanations used. 
 
2.4.1. The socio-economic rationale  
2.4.1.1.The agricultural household model 
In the family farm, household and enterprise are combined in one institutional entity 
(Aït Abdelmalek 2004). No separation of the domestic family life from the work 
responsibilities exists, as is common in modern industrial organisations (Pfeffer 
1989). Chayanov (1888-1939) in his famous writing on peasant agriculture described 
the family farm as an economic form which differs from capitalist farming, especially 
because it is run by a family without hired outside wage labour (Shanin 1986). This 
was in a time when farming was mainly labour based and not technology based as is 
now the case. But still his ideas remain valid because based on his Theory of Peasant 
Economy (Chayanov 1923, 1986) an agricultural household model can be developed 
which provides a framework for analysing the behaviour of the farming family 
related to decisions of consumption, production and the allocation of time between 
farm work and home time (family maintenance, reproduction, social obligations, 
sleep and leisure). In his most simple form the economic household model assumes 
that the family farm maximizes utility taken into account a number of constraints 
(Singh et al. 1986, Findeis et al. 2003, Taylor and Adelman 2003). 
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Max U(CF , CNF , l )         [1] 
 
Constraints : 
• Production: Q = f(L, X)       [2] 
• Time: T = H + l        [3] 
• Full Income: PF (Q – CF ) + W(H – L) = PX X + PNF CNF   [4] 
 
With: 
U = Household utility 
CF  = Food consumption  
CNF  = Non-food consumption  
l  = Leisure  
Q  = Output  
L  = Labour used in production (both household labour and hired labour)  
X  = Other input used  
T  = Total time available to the household  
W  = Wage rate  
H  = Household labour  
Pi  = Price of commodity i (i = F, NF, X)  
 
The household utility U (see [1]) is a function of the household food consumption 
(CF), the household non-food consumption (CNF) and household leisure (l). Utility is 
maximized subject to the production function [2], the household total time 
constraint [3] and the household income constraint [4]. The family farm produces 
with the labour and other inputs available for production. The amount of labour 
available for farm production depends on the amount of labour provided by the 
family members, the amount of hired labour, the amount of labour sold in the 
market, and the desired amount of leisure time (Figure 2.8). Taken into account the 
farm production and the time constraints, the full income of the household consists 
of the market surplus and the labour surplus that are used to pay the other input 
used and the non-food consumption. In case of relative low wages the PDM can 
increase his income level by making use of hired labour. In that case, the amount of 
own labour at income level I1 is lower than the amount of own labour at income 
level I0: more leisure time is available. In case of relatively high wages, the PDM can 
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increase the income level by selling his own labour on the market (LLs). By doing 
this, the total amount of labour has increased (OLs) and the amount of leisure time 
has decreased, compared to the situation at income level L0. Although a profound 
discussion is out of the scope of this thesis, it shows the usefulness of the framework 
to provide insight in the decision making of PDMs with respect to labour and other 
input allocation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a. Net buyer of labour (relatively low wages) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b. Net seller of labour (relatively high wages) 
Figure 2.8 Chayanov model with labour market4  
Source: Department of Agriculture and Resource Economics - NC State University 2007 
 
The Chayanovian approach takes into account an opportunity cost of family labour 
(Findeis et al. 2003). However in practice, the internal resources of the family farm 
are not valued at the prevailing market prices but at an internal price leaving a 
surplus that can be used for the remuneration of family labour, but also for 
reproduction or expansion investments of the farm or savings (Friedmann 1978, Van 
der Ploeg 2000). PDMs have a greater flexibility than other structures to distribute 
the net returns of the family farm among (1) expansion of production, (2) family 
consumption or (3) investment in production factors, allowing them to compete 
successfully with industrial forms of farming focussed on returning a profit. In this 
way, family farms have a higher ability to withstand less prosperous times.  
                                                 
4 TVP: Total Value Product (production function); I: income level 
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2.4.1.2. Family labour versus hired labour 
The fact that labour is mainly provided by family members is a major characteristic 
of family farms. With modernisation of farms, the prevalence of family farming has 
been strengthened due to the greater substitution of the hired labour input by 
machinery relative to family labour input by machinery (Schmitt 1991). This 
contraction of hired work-forces has been a function of the cost-price squeeze in 
agriculture, the increasing cost of labour, and the technological advance in the 
farming industry where expansion of individual firms is highly limited by availability 
of land (Winter 1984), but also of the higher transaction cost of hired versus family 
labour (Section 2.4.1.3.2): hired workers have to be considered as an imperfect 
substitute for family labour and family farms are a response to the difficulty of 
supervising workers who, for obvious physical and geographical reasons, cannot be 
gathered in a single location (Schmitt 1991). These evolution made that agriculture 
has been gradually more dominated by family farms in terms of labour input (Hill 
1993). 
Table 2.8 analyzes as an example the evolution in Belgium from the end of the 
nineteenth century. At that moment hired labour made up to 41 per cent of total 
agricultural employment in Belgium. This was favoured by the relative low wages in 
agriculture leading to a pull effect as illustrated in Figure 2.8a. However, between 
1880 and 1980, due to technological evolution, the importance of hired labour in 
agriculture declined, whereas the family labour still increased until 1950. It is only 
from 1950 due to a pull effect from industry that family labour in farming has 
decreased because the rise in industrial wages increased the opportunity cost of hired 
labour as predicted in Figure 2.8b. Further, the reduction of the official working 
hours due to labour regulations made that people are less willing to provide hired 
labour outside the official working hours, but reduced on the other side the 
opportunity cost of labour and thus the competitiveness of part-time farming. 
Another factor is that improved schooling and transportation enabled members of 
the farming family to work outside the farm, making the labour market less 
imperfect and closing the gap between market wages and opportunity cost of farm 
labour (Swinnen et al. 1993). Although after 1980 the total number of farmers 
declined further, the relative and even absolute amount of hired labour on the 
remaining farms increased. The decreased family size and the decreased amount of 
unpaid labour by neighbours need to be compensated by hired labour of which the 
market wages are closely linked to the opportunity cost of farm labour.  
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Table 2.8 Labour share in Belgian agriculture 
  Wage 
labour units 
Percentage 
of total 
labour (%) 
Family 
labour units 
Percentage 
of total 
labour (%) 
Total 
labour units 
(1880= 
100%) 
1880 230,600 37.1 391,600 62.9 622,200 100.0 
1895 262,400 41.1 376,900 58.9 639,300 102.7 
1910 217,300 34.0 421,300 66.0 638,600 102.6 
1920 120,600 25.6 350,200 74.4 470,800 75.7 
1929 95,600 18.9 410,500 81.1 506,100 81.3 
1937 77,300 15.8 410,600 84.2 487,900 78.4 
1950 43,700 8.9 445,100 91.1 488,800 78.6 
1960 22,100 6.6 312,400 93.4 334,500 53.5 
1970 11,700 6.1 178,900 94.9 190,600 30.6 
1980 5,300 3.9 130,200 96.1 135,500 21.8 
1990 5,900 5.7 98,400 94.3 104,300 16.8 
2000 7,300 9.3 71,100 90.7 78,400 12.6 
2005 14,100 20.1 55,900 79.9 70,000 11.3 
Source: Swinnen et al. 1993, Federal Public Service Economy SMEs Self-employed and Energy 2006 
 
The advantage of using family labour (supplemented by unpaid labour provided by 
neighbours) is that family labour can adjust to changes in labour demand resulting 
from (seasonally) changes in production. This provides an essential buffering system 
that is not available to non-family farm businesses (Wallace et al. 1994). By doing so, 
family labour overcomes the structural requirements for surplus production, but at 
the same time, it increases flexibility in personal consumption.  
Within the family farm, wages are not fully paid out or at least only for short periods 
of the family life cycle, enabling the family farm to reduce fixed costs (Winter 1984, 
Gray 1998). The balance between labour costs and consumable income is more in 
favour of family labour compared to hired labour. When the family members are 
getting older, it is also more rational to remain in the agricultural sector, as the 
marginal benefit of the off-farm employment will be lower than the marginal benefit 
of the on-farm employment.  
In general, family farms use highly flexible and different strategies to survive under 
changing market and production conditions. Attention has been drawn to the 
capacity of the small family farm to survive under adverse conditions by 
supplementing farm income or simply by tightening belts and accepting a lower 
income (Gasson et al. 1988). However at the present, cheap family labour, willingness 
to accept a low standard of living in return for unremitting hard work, acceptance of 
traditional authority, lack of clear division between work and leisure and an emphasis 
  The family farm 
21 
on values like independence, may be less appropriate for survival than they were in 
the first half of the twentieth century (Gasson et al. 1988). 
 
2.4.1.3. Scale effects and transaction costs 
Not only labour cost plays an important role in the survival (or non survival) of the 
family farm. According to economic theory, the optimal farm structure minimizes 
production costs in a competitive environment. If a farm structure cannot meet 
these conditions, it will disappear. In this context, scale effects and transaction costs 
are two major economic forces playing a determining role in the optimal farm 
structure.  
 
2.4.1.3.1. Scale effects 
In economic theory, the increase in outputs related to the increase in farm scale, is 
indicated as economies of scale. Scale effects tend to increase the optimal farm size, 
but at diminishing rate (Hallam 1991). Literature on scale economies suggests that 
scale economies are linked to an increase in capital inputs, but diseconomies occur as 
a result of increases in farm area (Visser 1999).  
Since the 1950s, there has been a strong increase in capital-intensive farm 
technology. Within the framework of a limited budget, the PDM has been able to 
improve returns to farming by investments in the efficient application of technology 
rather than by acquiring more land (Swinnen et al. 1993, Blanc 1994). Although, the 
increase in income related to the technological improvements was limited or even 
non-existing for the average farmer, referred to as the treadmill theory of Cochrane 
(Cochrane 1958): at moment of introduction of a new technology, the first few 
farmers who adapt it, can benefit by lowering their production costs, and the overall 
production does not increase to that extent that the selling prices lower. Early 
adopters can benefit from these technological improvements. When more farmers 
take up the new technology, the total production increases and the selling prices fall. 
The average farmer is forced to adopt the technology in order to survive, but not 
necessarily to increase his profitability.  
According to Schmitt (1991), the gains achieved by increasing farm size due to 
economies of scale are relatively small compared to the size that can be achieved by 
optimal use of farm household labour as labour efficiency has increased enormously 
over the twentieth century due to technological innovations.  
Within the context of family farming, we cannot assume that ‘small’ and ‘family’ are 
interchangeable labels (Hill 1993), but we do observe that family farms are mostly of 
sub optimal size as compared to sizes providing maximum profits, although the 
economies of scale cannot be neglected. The economies of scale in European 
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agriculture are reflected in the increase of the average economic size unit (Table 2.6), 
the average utilised agricultural area per farm (Table 2.5), in combination with a 
limited increase of the average labour input per farm (Table 2.4). The increased 
capitalisation of the family farm, related to the increased scale of the farms, entails 
that especially at the moment of farm transfer high amounts of capital are needed to 
continue the family farm. 
Economies of scale open perspectives to non-family based agricultural production 
systems, e.g. agricultural cooperatives and super large farms in former socialist states. 
But these production forms are not of major importance in Western European 
agricultural production as the economic rationale of these non-family based 
agricultural production systems seems to be solely due to economies of scale and 
important factors like management and human resources are omitted in this 
traditional view (Levay 1983, Johnson and Ruttan 1994, Gorton and Davidova 2004, 
Jambor 2007). In agricultural cooperatives, producers can better exploit potential 
economies of scale from their shared use of pooled factors of production, than if 
they remained individual farmers. But the major difficulties in the production 
cooperatives are problems of performance motivation and free-rider behaviour – 
which are generally not faced by family farms – and the conflict between individual 
interest and group interest.  
 
2.4.1.3.2. Transaction costs 
Transaction costs are defined as ‘the costs that arise when individuals exchange 
ownership rights to economic assets and enforce their exclusive rights’ (Eggertsson 
1990). Among other things, transaction costs include the costs related to monitoring 
and enforcing contracts. In ‘the Nature of the Firm’, Coase (1937) argued that the 
market only functions as the perfect neo-classic market model predicts as long as it is 
able to operate without causing conflicts, thus at zero or low cost. When the market 
use cost start to exceed the costs of organising the exchange within the firm it 
becomes profitable to abandon the market and organise the exchange internally 
(Coase 1937). Figure 2.9 indicates that at the moment that the resource costs to 
make a good exceed the transaction costs of buying the good, the market mechanism 
is used. Opposite, the family farms are expected to produce within the firm if the 
transaction costs to buy the good are higher than the resource costs to make the 
good. If both the resource costs and the transaction costs are high, hybrid 
governance structures will be developed such as e.g. cooperation or other forms in 
between pure market and individual firms.  
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Figure 2.9 Influence of resource and transaction costs on expected transaction governance mode  
Source: own compilation based on Rangan et al. 2006 
 
The trade-off between ‘cost of using the price system’ and the ‘cost of organisation’, 
explains the evolution in the farming sector over the last decades. Until the mid-
nineteenth century, the family farm was involved in all stages of the chain, from 
producing to processing goods for retail consumption. There was limited input from 
the market. The introduction of technology led to the rise of separate specialised 
firms at the beginning and the end of the production cycle (e.g. equipment, fertiliser, 
marketing, processing, transportation). For these production stages, the cost of using 
the price system was lower than the cost of organisation within the family farm 
(Allen and Lueck 1998). Farms may be squeezed upstream and downstream by 
horizontally and vertically integrated capital, but the family farm mainly controls the 
purely biological growth stages of farm production and remains independent and 
small relative to the organization with which they do business (Roberts 1996). 
Where the neoclassical economic theory assumes that the most efficient firm will 
tend to survive, the transaction cost theory states that the most efficient governance 
structure will ultimately prevail in a competitive economy (Williamson 1979, 1996).  
The transaction costs are based on asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency. 
Related to the asset specificity, the following factors explain why the family farm is 
still an optimal institutional solution to the difficulty of monitoring and supervising 
workers in agricultural production: 
• Although farming skills are based on scientific knowledge, they are still very 
location and crop specific: the scientific knowledge has to be adapted to 
heterogeneity of soils, weather conditions,… Beside education, the family 
members acquired this specific knowledge during childhood and it is a by-
product of growing up on the farm.  
Hybrid 
Market 
Firm 
Low 
Low 
High 
High 
Resource costs 
Transaction costs 
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• Due to technical reasons, the workers cannot be gathered in a single location 
and be easily supervised. Family labour does not need supervision, since 
family members are involved in the income it provides (Corsi 2004). 
According to Pollak (1985) the family farm is seen as the organisational 
solution to the difficulty of monitoring and supervising hired workers. This 
implies that transaction costs are increasing with rising farm sizes and greater 
numbers of hired workers per farm. 
• In agricultural production, labour contracting is more difficult because effort 
is harder to observe, while outcome is not directly linked: the outcome of the 
production process is seen at a later stage than the effort itself. Employers 
will rely on the ‘reputation’ of the employee, and this is facilitated when there 
are close links (e.g. family) or loyalty between farm worker and farmer 
(Wiggens 1991). Over time, workers become more socially dependent from 
the farmer, and loyalty and reputation decline as motivating factors, but due 
to technological innovations, the output per worker has increased (Swinnen 
et al. 1993).  
Beside the importance of human asset specificity, family farms can also better 
anticipate the changing consumer demands due to their flexibility and the close 
connection with the agricultural output: 
• At the moment that the consumer demand is changing, the agricultural 
producer has to adapt the production process to remain competitive. The 
flexible family farm structure can effectively anticipate the changing 
consumer demands.  
• In the last decades market trends tend to push towards an increasing quality 
diversification of food. Diversification of agricultural products requires 
location-specific technical skills. 
The asset specificity argument of the agricultural production may explain why the 
argument that production is generally less costly when organised in larger units with 
a considerable number of workers within one location (Bowles 1985) does not apply 
to agriculture. This asset specificity, and in particular the linked control and 
monitoring cost, explains to a large extent why family farms were able to withstand 
the industrial agriculture in the past. 
A second element of the transaction cost theory is uncertainty. Uncertainty is an 
exogenous factor that influences farm production. Random shocks (weather, 
biological factors) influence the production and cause heterogeneity in production. 
Flexibility enables family farms to cope with factors affecting the production and to 
absorb the random shocks. 
Finally, the frequency of transactions has also an influence on the transaction costs. 
Seasonality and the lack of continuous operations are the main features that 
distinguish agricultural institutions from ‘industrial’ organisations. Farm workers 
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need to be flexible and able to shift from one task to another. In farming, it is 
impossible to organise the labour force on the basis of a minute division of labour. 
Seasonal parameters (e.g. production cycles) limit gains from specialisation and cause 
timing problems between stages of production. Greater efficiency due to economies 
of scale is therefore limited. When the production cycle is relatively short or when 
the seasonal factors can be reduced by means of controlled environments, and when 
the production process can be easily monitored in terms of input and output, other 
forms of agricultural organisations often overshadow family farms (e.g. industrial pig 
and poultry production, greenhouse production).  
 
2.4.2. The historical rationale 
Not all authors are convinced of the socio-economic arguments as grounds for the 
persistence of the family farm (e.g. Christensen 1991, Swinnen et al. 1993). Although 
they recognise that there are limits to growth and some economic arguments for 
family farms, they express the opinion that the survival of small family farming is 
mainly a political choice because the growth of farms in many countries is restricted 
by law as the politicians try to protect smaller family farms. To understand the role 
of government in the survival of the family farm, we might have a look in the 
Western European history of farming. The tendencies described are a generalisation 
of recent history, with certainly differences according to the specific prevailing 
conditions and specific political settings in each country. 
 
2.4.2.1. The eighteenth and nineteenth century 
In the eighteenth century, there were already different tendencies related to the 
occurrence of family farming in Western Europe. In Great Britain, the tripartite 
structure of agriculture that emerged, was based on a division between (1) landlords 
providing land and eventual capital, (2) tenants providing capital and labour and (3) 
hired labourers providing a high share of labour. This model was seen as a model for 
other industrialising nations (Gasson et al. 1988, Tracy 1989, Demblon et al. 1990, 
Gasson and Errington 1993). The enclosure in Great Britain enabled large 
enterprises to further expand, and increased the productivity of the farms, but 
smaller farmers lost their right to use to common grounds. There was a high increase 
in population and people started to work in the industry.  
In other Western European countries such as Belgium, there was a fragmentation of 
farms that is explained by the law of inheritance within the Code Napoleon, a rapid 
increase of the population, a slow increase of commercialisation and the limited 
availability of land (Seghers 2008). The farmers were clung to the small family farm 
and the alternatives were limited due to personal attachment with the firm and the 
land. This opened perspectives to intensive production. 
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The nineteenth century is characterised by large possibilities for technical 
improvement in agriculture. However, the Industrial Revolution hardly reached the 
rural areas due to deficiencies in transport and communication systems and the little 
flow of new ideas into the countryside (Tracy 1989). As there was a need for low-
priced food for the industrial workers in order to maintain wages low and as the 
domestic food production was not sufficient to the total demand, food was imported 
from overseas with large imports from 1870 on, referred to as the agricultural 
invasion (Craeybeckx 1980, Tracy 1989). Within this context of free trade, liberal 
legislations replaced protectionist measures. However, grain prices collapsed, farmers 
went bankrupt and independent family farming was doomed to disappear (Gasson et 
al. 1988, Tracy 1989, Demblon et al. 1990, Van Molle 1990). Some governments did 
not continue their liberal legislations, but returned to protectionism, although 
differences occurred between countries: Great Britain and the Netherlands depended 
largely on trade and continued their free-trade system; Belgium needed the import of 
basic commodities, but specialised products were protected; in Germany and France, 
protectionist measures were installed. To overcome this crisis, there was a shift from 
crop production to the small scale livestock production and modern horticulture, 
which was mostly suited for smaller family farms (Tracy 1989). By doing so, family 
farms anticipated the increasing purchasing power. 
It was in this period that the Conservative Catholic movement strengthened his 
power in the countryside. At the end of the nineteenth century, liberal political 
parties relied on support of the industrial entrepreneur and the socialist party 
increased its power by supporting the industrial workers. The establishment of 
democratic voting systems (Belgium: 1893) made that the importance of the small 
farmer increased for conservative catholic groups. In exchange for political support 
the conservative catholic parties in government established policies and regulations 
that benefited farmers. The conservatives supported the family farm because the 
family was regarded as the cornerstone of a religious society and they thought that 
the family farm, as small independent profession, could combat the socialist 
influence on the countryside (Gasson et al. 1988, Demblon et al. 1990).).  
 
2.4.2.2. Around the first and second World War 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, there was a more prosperous situation for 
farmers and a better agricultural environment (Tracy 1989). Different kinds of 
cooperative societies in favour of the small family farm, emerged (e.g. milk and 
fertilisers cooperatives) (Seghers 2008). Farmers’ organisations stimulated 
governments to induce protectionist measures, especially in low competitive sectors. 
This was desired in order to maintain high agricultural prices, compared to the 
international standards.  
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The First World War changed the production environment of Western European 
agriculture. During the war, the agricultural production decreased as the production 
capacity was to some extent destroyed. But nevertheless, the farmers still benefited as 
the price of their produce was relatively high. The first years after the war were in 
general characterised by scarcity, hunger and international food deliveries (Ortmayr 
2007). But farmers were able to invest in land and machinery. The increased 
production in combination with protectionist measures by government resulted in an 
overproduction in the 1930s. At the end of the interbellum period, there was a 
revival of the economy. 
The first years after World War II, the agricultural policy had the aim to end all 
compulsory measures that were established during the war and to liberalise the sector 
(Bublot 1980, Van Molle 1990). The immediate concern all over Western Europe 
was to raise agricultural production as fast as possible to combat hunger and famine. 
Beside the problem of food shortage, there was a general need to save foreign 
exchange by keeping imports as low as possible (Tracy 1989). Due to the American 
help under the Marshall plan, in which agriculture was treated equally as the other 
sectors, the recovery was rapid and successful.  
The post-war years were also important for the increasing influence of farmers’ 
unions in policy making (Tracy 1989, Van Molle 1990). Because of equal 
representation of rural areas, a high number of farmers or people with interest in 
farming and rural areas were elected often with the support of the farmers’ unions 
(Tracy 1989). At that moment, the institution of the family farm became a political 
goal in itself. In theory, agricultural legislation and policies were indifferent regarding 
the kind of farm organisation. In reality, politicians mainly supported independent 
family farming. Governments funded an extensive network of agricultural research, 
extension and education institutions. Extension networks aiming at disseminating 
new agricultural technologies to individual farmers were organised in combination 
with farmers’ organisations (Craeybeckx 1980). The organisation of agricultural credit 
supply through farmers’ organisations and cooperatives was actively supported. By 
doing so, the government improved gradually the competitive position of the family 
farm. At the end of the fifties (and moment of negotiations about CAP and other 
international treatments) agriculture was still mainly dominated by small family farms 
who were organised in strong farmer’s unions.  
 
2.4.2.3. The Common Agricultural Policy  
The need for food self-sufficiency explains why the treaty of Rome (1957) and the 
Stresa agreement emphasized the importance of an efficient agriculture. In 1958 with 
the introduction of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the European 
agricultural policy aimed mainly at making farming more efficient and productive in 
order to protect food supply, while keeping price of food products low and 
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safeguarding farmers’ income. We hereby refer to the five principles of Article 33 
(39) of the treaty of Rome (CAP Monitor 2005): (1) To increase agricultural 
productivity through rational development of agriculture towards the optimum 
utilisation of the factors of production; (2) To ensure a fair standard of living for 
agricultural producers; (3) To stabilize agricultural markets; (4) To guarantee regular 
supplies of food to consumers; (5) To ensure reasonable prices of food to 
consumers. These objectives were attained in the first place by means of market and 
income support measures.  
The CAP favoured the modernisation of agriculture through markets and technical 
improvement and enabled industrialisation of the agricultural production process 
with separation of production and environment (e.g. industrial pig production). But 
for some time, the Mansholt Plan, including a fundamental reform of the CAP, was 
not established due to a well-organised and institutionally entrenched farm lobby 
(Tracy 1989, Murdoch 1995). Some family farms could not counterbalance low 
world market prices by a sufficient increase in production, but the idea, developed in 
the 1960s as ‘the theory of peasantry’ (Mendras 2002), that Europe’s farmers deserve 
a special treatment because they are farmers was never likely to offer a plausible 
long-term rationale for state support.  
During the early 1970s, a combination of falling world market prices for agricultural 
products, a decrease in the job opportunities outside agriculture, and a growing 
appreciation of the cultural significance of the family farm shifted the ‘restructuring 
rationale’ to ‘state assistance’ as dominant policy principle under the CAP (Potter and 
Lobley 2004). Although the CAP did not mention the family farm as a target group 
(Moehler 2003), the lobby of farmers’ unions was attentive to make that the family 
farm was not disfavoured in the agricultural policy. Not only in Europe, but also in 
e.g. America and Australia, policy programs were constantly trying to balance the 
apparently conflicting objectives of encouraging modernisation and scale increase of 
the farming sector and protecting the family farming model (Variyam and Jordan 
1991, Lobao and Meyer 2001, Cockfield and Botterill 2006). Through the CAP, 
Europe became an agricultural welfare state, in which the incomes of millions of 
farmers and their families would be underwritten by the state over the long term 
(Rieger 2005).  
By the end of the 1970s, the European agricultural policy was so successful that it 
resulted in agricultural overproduction. It was expected that the system of price 
subsidies and border protection, covered by the CAP, should be self-financing 
because the costs of price support would be offset by the expenditure raised from 
levies on agricultural imports. But the technological revolution in farming during the 
1960s and 1970s enabled the more efficient farmers to respond to these high price 
guarantees by increasing output (Potter and Tilzey 2007).  
At the end of the 1980s, environmental problems such as manure surplus, 
disappearance of landscape elements, eutrophication, loss of biodiversity became 
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apparent (Merz 1997). Market and competition were capable of attributing economic 
value to commodities, but failed in the remuneration of the value of non-
commodities to farmers (Hagedorn 2003). The concept of sustainability gained the 
attention of policy makers. The Brundtland-definition stated sustainable 
development as ‘development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (WCED 
1987). Around the same time, the European Commission publishes the paper ‘the 
Future of Rural Society’ (CEC 1988) to clarify the rationale for state assistance to 
marginal farmers by linking their vulnerability to market processes with the need to 
underwrite their role as stewards of the countryside. The combination of these two 
concepts is implemented by the European Commission (2004) in one of the recent 
objectives of the Common Agricultural Policy as follows: ‘to have a sustainable, 
efficient farming sector which uses safe, clean, environmentally-friendly production 
methods providing quality products to meet consumers’ demand’. Policy measures 
related to non-commodities were developed. As an example, the manure action plan 
in Flanders was developed (1996), but family farms with animals 
(‘Gezinsveeteeltbedrijf’) got advantages related to e.g. permissions and transfers on 
the manure market (Gabriëls and Van Gijseghem 2003). 
Policy makers gradually started to recognise that agriculture is producing not only 
commodity outputs such as cereals, beef, etc. which can be sold in the market, but 
also non-commodity outputs such as biodiversity, landscape, safeguarding of the 
rural environment, food security and rural viability. The ‘European Model of 
Agriculture’ promotes the idea that farming, and especially family farming, is 
essential for the kinds of landscape and rural social life valued by society as a whole. 
Therefore, policy makers supported public goods and social equity justifications for 
shielding farmers from world market forces and offering them income support 
(Potter and Tilzey 2007). For example, the MacSharry reform of 1992 agreed on 
lower institutional prices, but at the same time, farmers were compensated with 
progressively increasing direct payments (Gasson and Errington 1993, Potter and 
Tilzey 2007). Farmers deserve this state assistance not only because their incomes 
tend to be lower and more volatile than those of other groups in society, but also 
because, without farmers, the communities and environmental endowments of the 
countryside would not longer be sustainable or meaningful in wider social terms 
(Potter and Tilzey 2007).  
To emphasise this ‘jointness of production’, a ‘second pillar’ based around the rural 
development regulation 1257/99 was added to the ‘first pillar’ that was oriented 
towards market support (Matthews and Monnet 2002). The focus on non-
commodity support implies that farmers are regarded important in the realisation of 
these measures. This is emphasised within the Mid Term Review by stating that 
market revenues alone are not enough to ensure an acceptable standard of living for 
many farm households, and that direct payments continue to play a central role in 
ensuring a fair standard of living and stability of income for the agricultural 
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community (Matthews and Monnet 2002). So in all these policies the EU clearly 
accepts the specific value of family farming systems. 
2.5. Conclusions 
The family farm is the cornerstone of the European agricultural system. Family 
farming is an occupation in which capital, land and labour are used to produce 
agricultural output. But it is more than only an occupation: it is a lifestyle based on 
beliefs about living and working on the farm. However the question is why the 
family farm remains so important in Western European agriculture, compared to 
other kinds of production systems.  
Both the socio-economic and historical rationale are based on the importance of an 
efficient farming system that ensures the food availability within countries. The 
socio-economic rationale is based on a micro economic point of view, while the 
historical rationale is formed within a macro economic point of view. Therefore the 
two rationales enhance each other and interact to some extent. 
At the micro level, the success of the family farm is based on the human capital of 
the farming family, low transaction costs for monitoring labour results, the need for 
labour flexibility, the willingness of family members to work more than eight hours a 
day and the ability to withstand hard (financial) times. These socio-economic 
characteristics explain why family farms are still surviving in a capitalist society: 
agricultural production cannot be fully industrialised. Committed people are the 
optimal link between nature and the farm produce, and this is reached to the highest 
extent on family farms as family members are mostly fully engaged in their farm. 
Within the history of Western Europe, the availability of food for the population has 
been one of the major concerns of policy makers. Food is provided by the farming 
sector and different protectionist measures have been developed in order to secure 
enough food over time. Although these measures do not focus on a specific kind of 
farming system, the farm lobby has influenced the legislations in order to safeguard 
the current farming systems, who were, due to history, mainly family farms. From 
1980 on, the governmental focus on food production has broadened to a sustainable 
production in which both commodities and non-commodities are important. Within 
the historical rationale, the family farm has shifted from an implicit to an explicit tool 
to develop the political goals. 
The persistence of the family farm is based on both the socio-economic and the 
historical rationale, but especially the interaction between farm and family enables 
the family farm to remain viable. However, the family farm has also changed as 
production system over time. The change in the family farm structure over the last 
decades indicates that the family farm has become a capital intensive form of 
agricultural production in which the PDM and his family make the capital available 
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for production. Taken this history into account, the continuation of the family farm 
will depend on the availability of a successor, and his ability to cope with this 
changing situation and the increasing capital need.  

 33 
3.1. Introduction 
The family farm as discussed in Chapter 2, is continued over different generations. 
Therefore we will first clarify the process of intergenerational farm transfer. Further, 
the main objective of this chapter is to develop the conceptual framework and 
hypotheses (Section 3.3). Section 3.4 describes the data and the strengths and 
weaknesses of the research design are discussed. The detailed methodologies for 
each explaining factor will then be elaborated in the subsequent chapters 4 to 7.  
3.2. The process of intergenerational farm transfer 
3.2.1. The farm life cycle 
Family farms tend to have a cyclic history in which the early, middle and late stage 
are determined by certain family life cycle events (e.g. the farmer’s marriage, birth of 
children, their later dispersal, retirement), i.e. the farm family life cycle, and the 
evolutions of the farm business, i.e. the farm business life cycle (Potter and Lobley 
1996b) (Figure 3.1). The individual farm business life cycle starts when the farm 
passes from one manager to the next, often with an intergenerational transfer 
(Boehlje and Eidman 1984, Gasson and Errington 1993, Bessière 2004). In the first 
stage of the farm business life cycle, farm succession is likely to be a gradual process: 
the designated successor first shares farm work, then takes part in farm management, 
and eventually becomes the sole owner (Blanc and Perrier-Cornet 1993, Gasson and 
Errington 1993). The consolidation stage is based on production. The 
reimbursement of the debts is also of major importance in this stage. After the 
consolidation stage, the exit stage of the business begins when the farmer starts to 
experience the effect of ageing. Keating and Munro (1989) state that in the exit stage, 
the farmer reduces his management responsibilities and plans for transfer of 
ownership of the farm property. But according to Potter and Lobley (1992), the 
choices available in retirement and old age are determined much earlier in the life 
cycle as PDMs make provision for successors and/or take precautions against 
relative low retirement pensions.  
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Figure 3.1 Farm business life cycle of outgoing PDM 
Source: own compilation based on Keating and Munro 1989, Gasson and Errington 1993, Potter and 
Lobley 1996a 
 
Each stage of the cycle tends to place different pressure on the business, creating 
periods of labour excess and undersupply, and this, together with the changes in the 
farmer’s own ambitions and aspirations, leads to periods of expansion, consolidation 
and finally reduction of expenditures (Evans 1987, Potter and Lobley 1996b). The 
labour productivity will tend to vary with each successive stage in the farm life cycle, 
not only because of variation in labour supply, but also because of investment 
decisions related to the development of the business itself. The significant points in 
the farm family life cycle (marriage, children, death) may be marked by substantial 
changes in farm size, location or farming practice. If none of these solutions is 
pursued, the fluctuating labour supply will lead to considerable variation in labour 
productivity, with family members being overstretched over certain periods of the 
family life cycle and underemployed at others (Errington and Gasson 1994).  
Due to the interaction between the farm family life cycle and the farm business life 
cycle, the synchronising of the cycles is crucial for the continuance of the farm family 
business and the intergenerational succession (Gasson and Errington 1993). The 
timing of the farm transfer is expected to affect farm survival (Väre 2006). As this 
timing determines the value of the assets transferred, it has a major effect on the 
future profitability of the farm, and on the welfare of the farm household (Kimhi 
1994). A good balance between time, labour and management will be important for 
both the parents and the successor because on the one hand, many older PDMs are 
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full owners of their business, but are working less than younger designated 
successors. On the other hand, the younger generation may have taken over much of 
the labour early in their careers, but management and ownership is not transferred 
until late in mid-life (Perry et al. 1995).  
 
3.2.2.  Farm transfer 
The transfer from one generation to the next is recognised as one of the most 
problematic phases in any business operation, especially in those that are family 
owned (Russell et al. 1985, Keating and Munro 1989). The decision of farm transfer 
by the PDM is based on its own decision and strategy, but also on those of the 
child(ren). If no good communication between PDM and child(ren) exists, there will 
be a so-called Nash-equilibrium, i.e. a sub optimal equilibrium in which the PDM 
cannot improve the farm situation because of unclear information on the current 
strategies of the (potential) successor, and vice versa. Both PDM and successor take 
the best decision based on the available information and the decision of the other, 
although this does not include that this is the best cumulative payoff for all partners 
involved in the farm transfer. Good communication can break the Nash equilibrium 
in order to follow the best strategy for both PDM and successor. 
Another factor is that interpersonal friction may arise when the younger generation 
starts to be involved in the farm business and the older generation is phased out. 
There are two potential conflicting interests within this relation: the PDM tries to 
achieve security and comfort in his old age, with his feeling of responsibility for the 
whole family; and the potential successor has ambition for control, for making 
decisions and for wanting to run the business his way (Weston 1977, Rosenzweig 
and Wolpin 1985). The major cause of dissatisfaction among successors is their 
exclusion from management decisions, because they can only climb the succession 
ladder very slowly (Weston 1977, Weigel and Weigel 1987). In a more extended 
family context, also frictions may arise between brothers, sisters and other involved 
family members (e.g. partner). 
The intergenerational transfer of the farm family business involves three distinct but 
related processes: succession, inheritance and retirement (Weston 1977, Thomas 
1980, Gasson and Errington 1993). Succession refers to the transfer of managerial 
control over the use of the business assets (including land and quota); inheritance 
denotes the legal transfer of ownership of these assets; while retirement marks the 
withdrawal of the present manager from active managerial control and/or 
involvement in manual work on the farm.  
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3.2.2.1. Farm succession 
The succession of the farm cannot be seen as a clearly defined package of land, 
buildings, plants, animals and stock that passes from one generation to the next, but 
as a process where the traditions, skills and capital of farming are passed on 
(McCrostie Little and Taylor 1998). The succession process takes a number of years 
during which a gradual transfer of managerial control to the successor is established. 
In this process, the younger generation will strive for self respect, autonomy, and a 
greater share of responsibility, while the older generation is striving to maintain 
control of decision making and respect for past accomplishments (Weston 1977, 
Rosenblatt and Anderson 1981).  
Succession starts with the decision to have a successor and is influenced on the one 
hand by the parent-owners of the farm who have the sole right of designating a 
succeeding child, and on the other hand by the child that has to agree to be 
designated as a successor (Kimhi and Nachlieli 2001). The research of McCrostie 
Little and Taylor (1998) indicates that the first condition for successful succession is 
that families pass the process with open communication among all family members. 
According to Taylor and Norris (2000), the key factor for a smooth succession is a 
similar perception of fairness among family members. A second condition to ensure 
a smooth succession is an early start of succession management (McCrostie Little 
and Taylor 1998). The succession of the farm will depend on both the personality of 
PDM and successor. Taylor et al. (1998) found that participants could be broken into 
two broad types – those who took a conservative, safe approach to business 
(conservators), and those who embraced change, innovation and expansion 
(expanders). The dynamics of succession will be different depending on the 
combination of expander and conservator behaviour in the two generations (Table 
3.1). If both PDM and successor are expander, the continuity of the family farm is 
put central, but the shared need for control hinders a good partnership. The struggle 
for power can hinder a fluent transfer of the family farm. In case of a PDM as 
expander and a successor as conservator, the PDM has a high need for control, but 
the successor does not make problems on this, even if he does not agree. However at 
the moment of farm succession, this can give problems as the PDM has difficulties 
to pass control to the successor, although the PDM will decide when and how 
succession will occur. If the PDM is rather conservative, and the successor is an 
expander, the farm transfer will be driven by the ambition of the successor and the 
PDM will recognise and support the abilities of the successor. In case that both 
PDM and successor are conservators, a consensual decision-making exists and hardly 
any power struggle occurs. The decision to transfer the family farm is a gradual 
decision that grows over the years and is based on consensus (Taylor et al. 1998). 
Parents have the ability to wait and to make the decision when to transfer the farm 
to a succeeding child after a certain period of time, rather than making a prompt 
decision. This option gives the parents an opportunity to enrich their information set 
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and compare more accurately the expected utility and disutility of transferring or not 
transferring the farm during some specified time interval (Miljkovic 2000).  
 
Table 3.1 Farm succession patterns  
  PDM 
  Expander Conservator 
Expander 
• Farm continuity is 
valued 
• High energy, drive, 
vision and need for 
control 
• Power struggle needs 
to be resolved in order 
to work together 
• Expansion and 
diversification are 
driven by the ambition 
of successor 
• Succession unfolds 
in a relatively 
harmonious matter 
Successor 
Conservator 
• No power struggle 
• Only senior farmer 
has need for control 
• Family goals ahead 
of individual goals 
• Succession unfolds 
in a relatively 
harmonious matter 
Source: Taylor et al. 1998 
 
3.2.2.2. Farm inheritance  
The legal transfer of ownership of the business assets (including land and quota) is 
different all over Europe, although three patterns related to farm inheritance can be 
distinguished: (1) equal shares and break-up of the holding (Mediterranean areas); (2) 
equal shares and preservation of the unity of the holding (France, Denmark and 
Belgium); (3) unequal shares and preservation of the unity of the holding (UK, 
Ireland, the Netherlands, Germany). These differences result from three main issues: 
(1) whether or not the farm is kept as one single unit, (2) whether or not the 
inheritance involves equal shares, and (3) the relationship between generations 
(authoritarian – independent) (Blanc and Perrier-Cornet 1993). Related to these 
patterns, the proportion of agricultural land farmed by owners in the European 
Community, is given in Table 2.2. In France and Belgium, the proportion of land 
owned by the PDMs is low in comparison with other European countries.  
In the Belgian system of ‘equal shares and preservation of the unity of the holding’, 
the unity of the farm is preserved and the division among heirs is equal, although 
there are arrangements to ease the successor’s business start. In Belgium, the 
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transaction is made between the parents and the successor, but the latter does not 
have the burden of buying the land because renting is common practice (Table 2.2) 
and the right to lease land does not have to be negotiated on the open market. In 
order to ensure equal shares – despite some infringements – for the heirs while 
preserving the farm as a unit, the successor will buy all or part of the holding passed 
on by the family. This is one of the reasons why young PDMs are far deeper in debt 
than longer established PDMs in Belgium (Blanc and Perrier-Cornet 1993). 
 
3.2.2.3. Farm retirement 
The retirement of the PDM, which can be seen as the withdrawal of the present 
PDM from active managerial control and/or involvement in manual work on the 
farm, is the third factor within the farm transfer. The timing of the retirement is 
influenced by the government regulations related to retirement and the available 
pension schemes (Väre 2006). Even if the managerial control is handed over 
(succession) and the arrangements related to the inheritance are made, the older 
farmer can still be involved in the manual work on the farm. Considerations that may 
affect the retirement decision of the farmer can be the availability of a suitable 
successor among the children, the personal need or preference for retirement, the 
optimal time of farm transfer from the successor’s point of view and health and 
physical fitness considerations (Kimhi and Lopez 1999, Pesquin et al. 1999).  
3.3. Conceptual framework and hypotheses 
3.3.1. Shortcomings in the literature 
In literature related to farm transfer, three main aspects are mentioned: the (1) social, 
(2) economic, and (3) legal aspects. Within this section, we give a short overview of 
the literature related to each aspects and indicate the shortcomings of these 
researches. 
The literature related to the social aspects of farm transfer is mostly descriptive. 
Some scientific papers focus on the behaviour of family members (Russell et al. 1985, 
Herrmann and Uttitz 1990, Gray 1998), fairness and conflict (Taylor and Norris 
2000), the gender issue (Brandth 2002), or the farm transfer process itself (Weston 
1977, Fennell 1981, Keating and Munro 1989, Potter and Lobley 1992, Errington 
2002). Other researchers such as Ballard-Reisch and Weigel (1991) model the 
interaction between the generations of the farm family, or focus on the interaction 
between succession, retirement and inheritance (Kennedy 1991, Kimhi and Lopez 
1999). The relation between intention and behaviour at the end of the process of 
farm succession is modelled by Väre et al. (2005). A shortcoming of these researches 
is that, as far as we can see, no research focuses on the whole long-term process in 
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which a potential successor forms his intention to farm succession and over time 
progresses towards the decision to continue the family farm.  
Related to the economic aspects, a lot of studies investigate farm characteristics 
explaining farm transfer and farm exit (Kimhi and Bollman 1999, Weiss 1999, 
Glauben et al. 2002, Hennessy 2002, Pietola et al. 2003, Mishra et al. 2004, Diwisch et 
al. 2005, 2006, Aldanondo Ochoz et al. 2007). The likelihood of intergenerational 
succession of family farms is studied (Kimhi and Nachlieli 2001). The optimal timing 
of farm transfer is modelled and discussed (Kimhi 1994, Miljkovic 2000, Väre 2005, 
2006). All these researches take into account a number of explanatory variables to 
model the farm succession or the timing of farm succession. A large number of 
variables is identified to have an effect on the final farm transfer. The shortcomings 
of these researches are that the explanatory variables have a static character. They do 
not reflect a dynamic process and the use of such a high number of variables hinders 
a straightforward interpretation of the models.  
The legal aspects receives relatively low attention in scientific literature. Moreover, 
available studies are often country specific (Schmitt and Hoffmann 2001). A study by 
Van der Veen et al. (2002) gives an overview of the financial and fiscal facilities in six 
European countries. The papers of Van der Veen et al. (2004) and Van Bommel et al. 
(2007) emphasise the Dutch problems in farm take-over related to agricultural firms 
such as partnerships, but for the Belgian situation we lack scientific research related 
to the legal farm status.  
The lack of dynamic dimension reflected in the shortcomings within these three 
aspects, in combination with the literature review in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, forms 
the basis for the conceptual framework within this research. 
 
3.3.2. A farm succession cycle model 
The literature review of section 3.2 justifies the inclusion of the farm life cycle in 
which stages of growth, consolidation and transfer take place in our model. Section 
3.3.1 gives a short overview of the literature that refers to the social, economic and 
legal aspects that determine farm succession, but lack the dynamic dimension of 
them.  
For our research purpose, we link the farm succession cycle to the farm life cycle to 
stress the importance of farm transfer during the whole farm life cycle. The farm 
succession cycle model forms the conceptual framework of this research (Figure 3.2). 
Within this conceptual framework, farm succession is regarded as a process and 
therefore, transfer aspects are not only important at the moment of farm succession, 
but need to be taken into account over a longer period. The main hypothesis of this 
research is then stated as follows: 
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The transfer of a family farm is a long-term process, based on social, economic and legal 
drivers. Successful farm transfer is then the result of three interlinked processes: (1) a 
motivating social context, (2) a farm management focussing on the farm future, and (3) a 
legal context that facilitates the transfer of the farm. Insights in these processes support 
decision making at both farm and policy level.  
 
 
Figure 3.2 Conceptual framework: the farm succession cycle model 
Source: own compilation 
 
Before focussing on the different aspects, it is important to notice that at each stage 
of the farm succession cycle, the decision to not continue the family farm can be 
taken, and one can exit the farm succession cycle. Only if the social, economic and 
legal aspects do not hinder farm transfer, the family farm is passed to the next 
generation.  
 
3.3.2.1. Social aspects 
Social aspects have a major impact on the behaviour of farmers’ children, but the 
available literature focuses on the behaviour close to farm transfer, although the 
behaviour is formed over a longer time period. Inspired by the theory of planned 
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behaviour (Ajzen 1985, 1988, 1991), a succession intention model is developed that 
makes it possible to analyse the process of intention to farm succession and reveals 
the factors that influence the decision to take over the farm. Starting from their 
motivation, farmers’ children can have a positive or negative intention to farm 
succession, which can be translated into being designated as farm successor or not. 
The sub hypotheses related to this part are formulated as follows: 
1. Beliefs related to farming and farm transfer have an influence on the intention and 
behaviour of farmers’ children with respect to farm succession  
2. Farmer’s children take personal considerations, farm environment, social environment and 
external influences into account in the decision to continue the family farm  
These sub hypotheses are tested in Chapter 4. 
 
3.3.2.2. Economic aspects 
The economic aspects included in the farm succession cycle model contain different 
elements: (1) the pre-succession effect, (2) financing farm transfer, (3) post-
succession effect.  
The designation or non-designation of a successor might have an influence on the 
farm management before farm transfer (pre-succession effect), and determines the 
further development of the family farm.  
The linked sub hypotheses are the following:  
3. There is a positive relationship between a farmer’s early awareness of whether a successor is 
available and the management of the farm  
4. The discrepancy between the intended succession and the actual succession is smaller on 
farms with a higher TFA 
5. When a potential successor has been identified, current management will be oriented 
towards optimising the viability of the farm. When, instead, an exit from farming is 
envisaged, PDMs start to disinvest 
These sub hypotheses are tested in section 5.3 and part of section 5.5. 
At the moment of farm transfer, the financing of farm transfer is a crucial aspect, 
which has an effect on the rest of the farm life cycle. Different sources of financing 
are used to cover the take-over price of the farm. The modelling of the absolute and 
relative external financing leap is a tool to estimate the importance of different 
influencing factors.  
This is tested in Chapter 6 with the following sub hypotheses: 
6. High total farm assets are positive correlated with a high absolute external financing leap 
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7. High total farm assets are positive correlated with a high relative external financing leap 
8. The way of financing the family farm determines farm management of the next farm life 
cycle 
Finally, the designation of a successor before farm transfer can still have an influence 
on the farm management at the start of a new farm life cycle, referred to as the post-
succession effect. Therefore, the last sub hypothesis within this section is: 
9. The timely designation of a farm successor has a positive effect on the TFA development 
after the start of the new farm life cycle 
This sub hypothesis is tested in section 5.5. 
 
3.3.2.3. Legal aspects 
The legal farm environment is not only of major importance at the moment of farm 
transfer, but a suitable kind of legal configuration is favourable during the whole 
farm cycle and has consequences for different aspects of the family farm. It is also 
related with the financial and fiscal environment of the family farm. 
In order to test the importance of the legal farm environment within the family farm 
and the farm succession, different sub hypothesis are stated: 
10. A limited knowledge of legal configurations is a major obstacle in a positive attitude 
towards other legal constructions  
11. PDMs perceive the natural person configuration as being better than the business entities 
with separate legal personality  
12. Business entities with separate legal personality are reserved for a limited group of farms 
that have a well-considered idea of the future  
These sub hypotheses are tested in Chapter 7. 
3.4. Data 
In order to test these hypotheses, primary and secondary data are collected and 
processed.  
 
3.4.1. Data collection 
Information for which researchers design a survey instrument, collect information 
and enter these data into a database are considered as primary data. Primary data are 
in general expensive, both in time and money. However, these data are often crucial 
in order to verify the research hypotheses. There are several techniques to generate 
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primary data, e.g. questionnaires and focus groups. Questionnaires can be sent by 
mail or post, carried out through telephone or held personally (Malhotra 1999). 
Taken into account the fact that primary data are in general expensive in time and 
money, different ways of primary data collection are used within this research. Two 
different kinds of questionnaires are used. The description of the data collection and 
questionnaires is given in the related chapters (Chapter 4 and Chapter 7).  
Secondary data are data that have already been collected for other purposes. They are 
in most cases easy accessible, relatively inexpensive and quickly obtained. In some 
cases, secondary data can answer research questions and test hypotheses (Malhotra 
1999). The secondary panel data are extracted from the Belgian Farm Accountancy 
Data Network (FADN) database that contains yearly accounting data of farmers all 
over Belgium. Only the data of Flemish farms are used. The use of secondary data is 
discussed in Chapter 5.  
In-depth interviews are used to demonstrate the link between research outcome and 
farm practice. In March 2008, 8 in-depth interviews are done. The respondents have 
the objective to take over the family farm, or have already taken over the family 
farm. They differ in education, legal farm status, kind of farm transfer, farm type, etc. 
The results of these interviews are used to clarify the theoretical concepts and 
outcomes of the analyses with examples from the field. The in-depth interviews 
cannot be generalised, but have to be seen as real-life cases and this will be used as 
illustrations in boxes.  
 
3.4.2. Data processing 
Once the questionnaires were completed, the next task was to code the responses. 
After the datasets had been entered in the statistical program of SPSS for Windows, 
some new variables were created in order to carry out the analyses requested to 
verify the conceptual framework and hypotheses of the research. Frequency tables 
were developed to control for outliners and the data were checked for consistency 
and missing responses (Malhotra 1999). On both datasets, several statistical methods 
were applied to analyse the data including paired t-tests, One-way ANOVA, chi-
square tests, factor analysis, cluster analysis etc.  
As the FADN database consists of an unbalanced panel, the statistical program 
Limdep (Econometric Software Inc. 2002) was used to analyse the pre- and post-
succession effect and the external financing leap. The statistical method of ordinary 
least square regression is used to analyse the data (Greene 2002).  
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3.4.3. Strengths and weaknesses of the research design 
One of the strengths of this research is that it does not focus on one specific aspect 
of farm transfer: the study of the different factors explaining intergenerational farm 
transfer encourages a more holistic view on the topic. Through the use of different 
questionnaires and secondary data, multiple aspects of the research topic can be 
analysed. In the discussion chapter (Chapter 8), links between the different 
influencing factors are established. 
The research makes use of three different databases. The cases in each database are 
however not connected to each other and there might be expected an overlap in only 
a limited amount of cases. This is a limitation as no respondent specific analyses are 
done taking into account the different influencing factors. But it can also be seen as 
strength: the total number of farms involved in the research might be up to 5 per 
cent of the Flemish farm population. 
The secondary data for the analyses related to the economic context, make that a 
high number of data, over a 15-year time period is available. The representation of 
the different farm types is in accordance with the distribution within the Flemish 
agriculture. A limitation of secondary data is that the needed variable is not always 
available and the researcher has to work with the available dataset. Moreover, the 
population of this dataset is not constant: each year some new farmers enter the 
dataset, and others disappear. This hinders the appropriate application of some 
analysing techniques (e.g. lack of balanced panels).  
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Story of a farm transfer 
Farmer Peter (28): 
“It was already clear for some time that I would take over the family farm, although it was not 
a predestination. My wife and I considered the transfer of the family farm, but also taking over 
other farms.  
In the past, I went to see a couple of other farms. In 2000, I looked at some dairy farms, 
because it was not allowed to expand the pig production (stand still). Within dairy production, 
it was possible to take over a dairy farm and to remain producing on that farm during 9 years, 
and afterwards, the milk quota could be included on our farm. But I didn’t do it because I 
didn’t find a good dairy farm: not too far, with enough quota and farm buildings that could 
last for another 9 years.  
At that moment, a company asked me to work for them, and over there, I met my wife. On 
January 9th, 2006, we started to develop a farm vision in order to prepare a good farm 
transfer. We had a talk with a farm adviser to see how we could set about it, because different 
aspects of the farm had to be handled. On the one hand, the cow house was dated, and needed 
replacement. On the other hand we wanted to expand the pig production. Moreover we wanted 
to convert to a BVBA (Private Company with Limited Liability). The first idea was to 
replace the cow house and within 4 to 5 years to start with the sty to increase pig production, 
but the feasibility study made clear that it was possible to do both projects at the same time. In 
this way, the price of the investments was lower and all permissions could be arranged at the 
same time. So the feasibility study gave insight in the cash flow of the actual production, 
compared it with the farm accounting and the averages of similar farms. An investment plan 
was made taking into account the increase of milk quota, increase in nutrients, and the 
building of the cow house and the sty. The estimate of the cost price, new calculations of the cash 
flow and the possible loans showed that the investments were feasible. The bank didn’t make a 
problem of the high loans related to the farm transfer, because the feasibility study showed that 
it was feasible.  
For the determination of the farm transfer price, the advisor made estimation of the valuation of 
the farm, but I also informed in other places to know the standard amount of e.g. a pig place. 
The valuation of the cow house was €0, because we had to demolish it anyway, but for the sties, 
a valuation was done. Finally, the sties were not transferred and they are still property of my 
father. He rents them to the BVBA. I also made an inventory of the agricultural machinery 
and tools, indicating the purchase price and purchase year, and asked somebody to make an 
estimation of the actual value.” 
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4.1. Introduction 
Farm succession is an important issue in agriculture. Although agricultural 
commodity markets and prices tend to increase due to increased demand for food 
and bio-resources, the number of farms in most countries still drops significantly 
(Chapter 2). Even prosperous farms often do not find a successor within the own 
family. From political point of view, both the European Union Development Policy 
2007-2013 as many national policies try to increase the succession rates in farming 
(Departement Landbouw en Visserij 2006, European Communities 2006). An 
important goal of the EU Rural Development policy is to increase the 
competitiveness of the agricultural sector of which a number of measures focus on 
young farmers. The measures aim at an increase of the human capital by means of 
vocational training, information actions and support of young farmers. Also national 
policies try to take measures. At the Flemish level in Belgium, e.g., the Minister of 
Agriculture has made efforts to develop a Farm Youth Action Plan (Leterme 2006) 
that has as main objectives to (1) stimulate the openness for farming among farm 
youth by education and training; (2) guarantee a professional start in case of 
succession by supporting young farmers during farm transfer, by stimulating the 
foundation of separate legal business entities and by improving the system of 
investment subsidies; (3) stimulate innovation and multifunctionality among young 
farmers; and (4) better inform young farmers about changes in European and 
Flemish agricultural policies and the potentials this creates. However, in reality still a 
gap between policy and practice exists. 
Starting from the farm succession cycle model, we focus on the social aspects within 
this chapter (Figure 4.1), as a better understanding of the farm succession intention 
process can remove existing obstacles for farm successors in farm transfer. 
Therefore, we analyse the factors that determine the intention and behaviour of 
potential successors within a Succession Intention Model (SIM), which is inspired by 
the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen 1985, 1988, 1991). Potential successors are 
also clustered in a way to make it possible to focus on the specific needs related to 
farm transfer, as not all potential successors recognise the same farm transfer 
problems. Based on the revealed obstacles within farm succession, policy 
recommendations are formulated in order to increase the possibility of farm 
succession on viable and competitive family farms.  
Within this chapter, we look at the succession problem from the perspective of the 
successor. The focus on farmers’ children does not intend to minimize the role of 
parents and other stakeholders in the process of farm succession, but we want to 
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highlight the critical factors in the succession process from the point of view of 
farmers’ children.  
 
 
Figure 4.1 Social aspects within the farm succession cycle model 
Source: own compilation 
4.2. The theory of planned behaviour 
The theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen 1985, 1988, 1991) explains the evolution 
process that leads to a given particular behaviour. A single behaviour can be viewed 
as involving an action directed at a target, performed in a given context, at a certain 
point in time (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975). In this research for example, the behaviour 
can be the action of farm succession that is directed towards the shift of 
responsibilities of the farm from the present PDM to the successor, within the 
prevailing social, economic and legal context, and during the period that the present 
owner gives the reins to the successor, but it can also be the exit from the farm 
succession cycle.  
The theory of planned behaviour is an extension of the original theory of reasoned 
action (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975) that assumes that human beings usually behave in a 
sensible manner, and that when taking action, they take into account all available 
information and implicitly or explicitly consider the future implications of their 
actions. However, many factors can obstruct the intention-behaviour relations 
among which the bounded information problem. The theory of planned behaviour 
(Ajzen 1985, 1988, 1991, Ajzen and Fishbein 2005) adds this aspect to the theory of 
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reasoned action as degree of control (perceived behavioural control: PBC, actual 
behavioural control: ABC). Figure 4.2 gives an overview of all influencing factors 
that eventually lead to behaviour.  
The foundations of behaviour are the individual, social and information factors that 
determine the background of a person, as well as values and prejudices (Ajzen and 
Fishbein 2005). Once a personal set of beliefs is formed (dotted rectangle in Figure 
4.2), it provides the cognitive foundation from where attitudes (At), perceived 
subjective norms (SNt), and PBC are assumed to follow in a reasonable and 
consistent manner (Fielding et al. 2005).  
The attitude towards behaviour (At) refers to the degree to which a person has a 
favourable or unfavourable evaluation or appraisal of the behaviour in question. The 
subjective norm (SNt) covers the perceived social pressure to perform or to not 
perform the behaviour. The third antecedent of intention – PBC – refers to the 
perceived ease or difficulty of performing the behaviour of interest and is assumed to 
reflect past experience as well as anticipated impediments and obstacles (Ajzen 
1991). The PBC forms the main difference between the theory of reasoned action 
and the theory of planned behaviour. 
These motivational factors that influence behaviour are captured by intentions (It) 
(Ajzen 1991, Beedell and Rehman 1999, 2000). Barring unforeseen events, people are 
expected to act in accordance with their intentions. Clearly, intentions can change 
over time and the accuracy of prediction will usually be an inverse function of the 
time interval between the measurement of intention and the observation of 
behaviour (Ajzen 1985). The outcome of an intention is a person’s attempt to 
perform behaviour (Bt). Behaviour (B) can best be interpreted as the result of the 
above-defined attempt to perform certain behaviour (Bt) and the actual behavioural 
control (ABC). ABC allows the inclusion of non-volitional, or in other words 
external, factors as determinants of behaviour. It refers to the availability of required 
prerequisites in terms of capital, knowledge, skills and opportunities. 
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Figure 4.2 The theory of reasoned action and planned behaviour  
Source: Ajzen and Fishbein 2005 
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4.3. Methodology 
4.3.1. Introduction 
Inspired by the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen 1985, 1988, 1991), a potential 
framework to analyse the intention and behaviour related to farm succession is 
developed. The starting point of the theory of planned behaviour is that a major part 
of the people’s behaviour is considered to be under volitional control: people can 
easily perform the planned behaviour if they are inclined to do so (e.g. lose weight, 
give a gift, search for a job). In the theory of planned behaviour, a person can decide 
either to execute an action, or to reject this action. However, within the process of 
farm succession, not only the volitional control is important. Besides the own 
personal considerations also the farm environment, the social environment (e.g. 
partner), as well as external influences play an important role. For this reason, the 
original concepts of the theory of planned behaviour are used as building blocks for 
a Succession Intention Model (SIM) which is further enlarged to include farm 
environment and external influences.  
Within this methodology, we first focus on the hypotheses and the data. In section 
4.3.4 the SIM is developed. 
 
4.3.2. Hypotheses 
The hypotheses related to the social aspects can be formulated as follows: 
1. Beliefs related to farming and farm transfer have an influence on the intention and 
behaviour of farmers’ children with respect to farm succession  
2. Farmer’s children take personal considerations, farm environment, social environment and 
external influences into account in the decision to continue the family farm  
 
4.3.3. Data  
As the starting point of this research are farmer’s children, our survey focuses on the 
intention and perception of farmer’s children related to farming and farm succession. 
4.3.3.1. Data collection 
The dataset used to test this model is the result of an Internet survey amongst 
children living on a farm. The target group of respondents consists of young people 
whose parents are living on a farm. The sample is restricted to Flemish respondents 
aged between 16 and 40. In order to get in touch with respondents, an Internet 
survey was conducted in the period between the beginning of October 2006 and the 
end of November 2006 (Figure 4.3). An Internet survey has both strengths and 
limitations. Contradictory to the statement of Malhotra (1999), an Internet survey is 
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not expensive: the time devoted to the data collection is reduced as no handling of 
questionnaires takes place and all data are directly stored in a data file (reducing 
human errors in data entry and inconsistencies in the dataset); the financial cost is 
limited as no questionnaires have to be sent by regular mail. A large group of 
respondents is reached if at the start the e-mail database is well considered. However, 
a major limitation related to an Internet survey is that not all possible respondents do 
have Internet access; although Internet and e-mail are now common good for the 
majority of young people and already 38 per cent of all Flemish farms had a 
computer and Internet access in spring 2006 (Federal Public Service Economy SMEs 
Self-employed and Energy 2007).  
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Figure 4.3 Evolution of the number of questionnaires 
Source: own compilation 
 
After pre-testing, the Internet survey was conducted as follows: at the start of the 
survey period, an email was sent to all Flemish schools offering agricultural and 
horticultural education, to all agricultural (youth) associations, to all appropriate 
agricultural media (weekly newspapers and websites) and to a lot of stakeholders in 
the agricultural sector in Flanders. All these potential stakeholders were asked to 
answer the survey if they belong to the intended respondents’ group and/or to 
forward the email to other possible respondents in their network. In this way a 
snowball sampling was realised. This non-probability sampling method enabled the 
surveyors to obtain a reasonable sample of farmers’ children all over Flanders. This 
sampling technique was preferred because it is difficult to have a complete list of 
farmers’ children: data about the total targeted population are not straight forward 
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available. A disadvantage of snowball sampling is that it relies on referrals from initial 
subjects to generate additional subjects, entailing that the technique itself reduces the 
likelihood that the sample will be a representative sample of the population. This bias 
is limited by starting from an enlarged dataset of initial subjects who are connected 
through different networks. During the two months period, 987 persons accessed 
the website, and 504 persons filled out the survey completely.  
The analyses conducted are based on respondents of the survey aged between 16 and 
40 years and who stated that their parents are farmers5. The upper age restriction is 
based on the age limit of 40 years for access to establishment subsidies for young 
farmers given by the Flemish government. Taking these limitations into account, the 
total amount of completed surveys (504) was reduced to 465 surveys. Given the total 
number of 33,272 farms in Flanders in 2006 (Federal Public Service Economy SMEs 
Self-employed and Energy 2007), we may state that we have targeted a rather robust 
sample of the total population6, even if the sample can not be proved to be 
completely representative for the whole Flemish potential successor population. 
 
4.3.3.2. Questionnaire 
An Internet survey among Flemish farmers’ children was used to validate the SIM. 
The questionnaire consists of six modules (Appendix 1). The use of Internet opens 
possibilities to involve only the specific target group related to the module: at the 
start of each module, a selection question is posed to admit only the relevant persons 
to that part of the questionnaire. Two selection questions were posed at the 
beginning of the questionnaire to allow only persons under the age of 40, of whom 
the parents are living on a farm, to answer the questionnaire. 
The first module collects general information on the respondent (place of residence, 
gender, education, siblings, parents). In addition, some information related to the 
education and work situation of the parents is asked (type of education, agricultural 
education, profession, function on the farm). 
                                                 
5 The fact that the parents are farmers could not be controlled due to the set-up of the survey. 
6 The sample represents 2.5% of the total population of farmers’ children in Flanders. This 
calculation is based on the total number of Flemish farms (33,272), the average number of 
children per Flemish household (1.53), the average age of the PDM at the moment of farm 
transfer (59.4), an estimation of the age at which the PDM has first succession perspectives 
(average age of the first child for Flemish male (32 year) plus a child age of 16 years, makes 
48 years) and the average age of the successor at the moment of farm transfer (28.3). The 
calculation is as follows: 465/((33,272 * 1.53) * (59.4 – 48.0)/(59.4-28.3))= 2.5%  
(Federal Public Service Economy SMEs Self-employed and Energy 2007, European 
Commission 2008) 
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The second module deals with the farm characteristics. Farm size and farm type are 
asked to situate the farm within the Flemish agricultural landscape. Within the farm 
size, a division is made between farmer’s owned land and tenant land. Related to the 
farm type, the number of mother animals is asked in case of animal production on 
the farm. The question related to the farm labour gives an indication of the pressure 
of work and the division of work between the workers (father, mother, children and 
others). The last questions of this module are related to the farm history. 
The third module investigates the underlying reasons of the positive or negative 
intention of farm succession. The questions focus on the opportunities and threats 
that the respondents experienced with respect to a possible farm transfer. 
The fourth module is related to the designation of the successor on the farm, who is 
not necessary the respondent. In case the successor is not (yet) designated, the main 
reasons are asked for. In case the successor is designated, questions asked whom is 
the successor, what his/her place is within the family, if all family members agree 
with this choice and when the farm will be transferred. 
The fifth module has only to be filled out if the respondent is the successor. The 
questions within this module are related to the labour supply, the changes in farm 
management and the role of the partner after farm transfer. Two questions focus on 
the current engagement in the farm management, while the last questions try to 
investigated the objectives of the future farm management. 
The last module consisted of some general questions that have to be filled out by all 
respondents. On a 7-point Likert scale, respondents indicate the importance of 
personal objectives. 
 
4.3.4. A succession intention model  
4.3.4.1. The farm succession intention stages 
In general, the succession process takes a number of years during which a gradual 
transfer of managerial control to the successor occurs. Succession starts with the 
decision to have a successor and is influenced on the one hand by the parent-owners 
of the farm who decide on to whom of the children passing the farm, and on the 
other hand by the child who has to agree to be appointed as a successor (Kimhi and 
Nachlieli 2001). In order to reach the moment of farm transfer, different stages have 
to be completed by the potential successor. Inspired by the theory of planned 
behaviour (Ajzen 1985, 1988, 1991) and in-depth interviews with (potential) 
successors, the succession intention stages are developed and consists of three stages 
in which both interest parties (present PDM and potential successor) have a different 
role and importance (Figure 4.4):  
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• Intention stage (IS): The first pre-designation stage of the process consists of 
the formation of a positive attitude towards intention. It is the stage in which 
the potential successor starts to consider taking over the farm or not. 
Therefore the potential successor has in this stage the major role in 
considering the intended farm succession, while the present PDM has only 
limited influence on the formation of a positive intention on farm transfer. If 
no positive intention is formed, the potential successors exits the model. 
• Persuasion stage (PS): The second pre-designation stage is more farm 
management oriented, and both the present PDM as the potential successor 
have a role in the formation of a positive result. Gradually the influence of 
the present PDM increases, as he will try to influence the positive or negative 
intention of a potential successor. At the end of this stage the successor is 
designated. If the potential successor is not designated as successor, he exits 
the model. 
• Succession stage (SS): The post-designation stage is the succession stage. 
Both the present PDM and the successor have an equal share of influence in 
this stage. The farm responsibilities are gradually transferred to the successor, 
and succession is completed at the end of this stage.  
 
Figure 4.4 Share of influence of present PDM and potential successor in the succession intention 
process 
Source: own compilation based on Ajzen 1985, 1988, 1991, Kimhi and Nachlieli 2001 
 
Figure 4.5 indicates that in the different stages, a person can decide to not continue 
the family farm, and so to ‘exit’ the model. The expectation of continuing the farm is 
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assessed at each of the three stages of the model by means of a classification based 
on the following questions of the SIM questionnaire (Appendix 1): 
1. Are you a farmer’s daughter or son? 
• Yes: Included as survey respondent (continue to 2) 
• No: Not included in the survey 
 
2. Are you willing to take over the family farm? 
• Yes: Positive intended farm succession (continue to 3) 
• No: Negative intended farm succession 
• No idea: Uncertain about intended farm succession 
 
3. Will you take over the family farm, or have you already taken over the family 
farm? 
• Yes: Designated as farm successor (continue to 4) 
• No: No designation as farm successor 
• No idea: Uncertain about being designated as farm successor 
 
4. Have you already taken over the family farm? 
• Yes: Farm transfer 
• No: Not yet final decision on farm transfer 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Farm succession intention stages 
Source: own compilation based on Ajzen 1985, 1988, 1991, Kimhi and Nachlieli 2001 
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The outcome of each stage consists of either a positive intention/attempt to farm 
succession or the decision to withdraw from farm succession (exit). At the moment 
that a successor exits the model, he is included in the population of farmer’s youth 
and has the possibility to reconsider farm succession. 
In the continuation of this chapter, the point of view of the potential successor is 
taken into account, and not the point of view of the leaving PDM as proposed by 
Kimhi (1997). By doing so, we do not want to minimise the role of the leaving PDM 
in the succession process, but we argue that a good motivation by potential 
successors is a cornerstone for a fruitful farm transfer. 
 
4.3.4.2. Influencing factors 
As stated in the section 4.3.1, the SIM is influenced by personal considerations, the 
farm environment, the social environment and external influences. In order to 
measure these different aspects, 14 variables on beliefs related to farm transfer 
(Appendix 1, question 29 and 30), and 10 variables related to personal objectives 
(Appendix 1, question 48) are taken into account. The variables related to the 
perception are binomial variables. The variables related to the personal objectives are 
measured on a 7-point Likert scale. The 7-point Likert scale opens the possibility to 
handle the variables as being on a continuous scale.  
The descriptive analysis of these 24 variables is given in Appendix 4. Through a 
Principal Component Analysis (Varimax), a data reduction is established and 7 
factors are extracted with an eigenvalue above 1.10. The component matrix of this 
Principal Component Analysis is given in Appendix 5. The seven factors explain 41 
per cent of the variance. The descriptive analysis of these factors is given in Table 
4.5. 
Based on the importance of each variable in the factors, the 7 factors are labelled and 
grouped according to a personal considerations, the farm environment, the social 
environment or external influences. 
4.4. Results 
4.4.1. Descriptive analysis of the farm succession intention stages 
Figure 4.6 indicates the division of respondents according to their present position in 
the farm succession intention stages. The analyses are based on a total of 465 
respondents. 19 per cent of the respondents had from the start no intention to take 
over the farm business of the parents. 50 per cent had a positive intended farm 
succession and 31 per cent had at the moment of filling out the questionnaire not yet 
made up their minds and were still uncertain about the intended farm succession.  
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From the 232 cases with a positive intention towards farm succession and that are 
within the persuasion stage or already passed it, 48 per cent (N=111) indicated to be 
designated by the parents as farm successor. Barring unforeseen events, they will 
continue the farm business and farm transfer is or will be established in the next 
years. Nevertheless, a considerable group of farmers’ children with positive intention 
(45%, N=105) had not yet made up their mind. Multiple factors can influence them 
to decide to go for farm succession or to exit the process. A minority of those who 
reported an original positive intention (7%, N=16) decided in a later stage of the 
process to not take over the family farm. They can be said to leave at the PS stage. 
Finally, in the last stage – the succession stage – the designated successor is gradually 
involved in the farm management. Farm management is gradually transferred from 
the present PDM to the future PDM. From the survey respondents, 23 per cent of 
those with a positive PS (N=26) have already passed this stage and have taken over 
the farm, while 77 per cent of these respondents (N=85) had not yet finalised the 
transfer process and were still in the succession stage. It has to be noticed that due to 
the snowball sampling the relative size of the different groups cannot be generalised. 
The main characteristics of the groups of respondents are given in Table 4.1. 
As can be expected, the respondents, who are already designated as farm successors, 
are slightly but significantly older than the other groups of respondents. 65 per cent 
of the respondents were male. Female respondents were relatively more present in 
the group with negative intention for farm succession. The majority (85%) of the 
potential successors already designated as farm successor, were male. Most of the 
respondents are still living with the parents (87%). Only 24 per cent of the 
respondents is following or has finished higher education of four years or more 
(after secondary school). 68 per cent of the respondents followed agricultural 
education. The female respondents followed relatively more general higher 
education, while the male respondents frequented relatively more agricultural 
education. 
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Figure 4.6 Group structure of survey respondents 
Source: SIM questionnaire 
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Table 4.1 Main sample characteristics 
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465 89 144 105 16 111  
Average age 
respondents (year) 
22 22 21 20 22 23 5.664  
** a 
Male respondents 
(%) 
65 37 63 74 50 85 55.423 
** b 
Highest school level 
(%) 
      30.709 
** b 
Secondary school 40 34 38 36 50 49  
Higher education – 3 
years 
37 30 38 42 25 37  
Higher education – 4 
years 
15 15 17 18 18 10  
University 9 21 8 4 6 5  
Agricultural 
education (%) 
68 37 62 80 69 87 67.205 
** b 
Source: SIM questionnaire 
**: Significant difference between groups at the 0.01 level 
a: F-value 
b: Pearson χ² 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 A succession intention model 
61 
4.4.2. Set of beliefs 
This section gives the descriptive analyses of the set of beliefs of potential farm 
successors related to farm succession and job opportunities. The perceptions of the 
respondents are linked to their current succession intention stage. 
 
4.4.2.1. Vision related to the future of Flanders agriculture 
The vision of the farmers’ children on the future of Flemish agriculture is linked with 
the different succession intention stages (Figure 4.7, Pearson χ²: 94.352, p-value: 
0.000). Farmers’ children with a negative intended farm succession have a quite 
negative view on the future of Flemish agriculture: less than 40 per cent has a 
positive vision. On the other hand, farmers’ children who are designated as farm 
successor see a bright future for Flemish agriculture and horticulture. Only 9 per 
cent has a negative perception about the future. The other groups of farmers’ 
children have also relatively positive beliefs about the future of Flanders agriculture. 
They grew up within the agricultural sector and their experiences with the 
agricultural sector gives them trust in the future. 
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Figure 4.7 Farmers’ children vision related to the future of Flemish agriculture 
Source: SIM questionnaire 
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4.4.2.2. Motivation for farm succession in the persuasion stage 
From the set of respondents with positive intentions (N=232) the motivation to take 
over the farm is linked to a kind of personal idealism (Figure 4.8). For the majority of 
the farmers’ children in the persuasion stage, it is a childhood dream to continue the 
family farm. For the designated successors and those still uncertain about 
designation, farming is also the ideal job, which is not the case for those who are not 
designated as farm successor. The influence of the parents is not decisive in the 
motivation to take over the family farm. This is in contrast with the research of 
Glauben et al. (2005) who stated that people often feel the pressure to take over the 
farm, because it is still seen as a tradition.  
The motivation is also related with educational choices. To a minor extent, but also 
important, are the farm characteristics that play a role in the motivation of potential 
successors. 
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Figure 4.8 Motivation for farm succession in the persuasion stage 
Source: SIM questionnaire 
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4.4.2.3. Envisaged problems of potential successors related to farm transfer  
Figure 4.9 indicates the major envisaged problems related to farm transfer. Farmers’ 
children without intended farm succession or uncertain about intended farm 
succession mainly focus on administration and (environmental) regulations as 
potential problems for farm transfer. Designated successors appoint financial 
regulations as a major problem, while the group of farmers’ children who are 
uncertain about designation as farm successor or who are not designated as farm 
successor focus on the (financial) arrangements between the children. These results 
show that in the different stages of the farm succession intention model, potential 
successors attach a different importance at different aspects. 
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Figure 4.9 Envisaged problems related to farm transfer 
Source: SIM questionnaire 
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4.4.2.4. Off-farm job opportunities 
In general, farmers’ children have positive beliefs related to work opportunities 
outside the farm (Figure 4.10, Likelihood ratio: 480.441, p-value: 0.000). The group 
with a negative intended farm succession has an optimistic view. They hardly see 
difficulties in finding a job, but as they are relatively young, the search for a good job 
is still rather far away. Also the group of designated successors sees a bright future 
related to off-farm job opportunities, but if everything goes well, they will not have 
to search for an off-farm job as they are designated as farm successor. 
Farmers’ children who are not designated as farm successor, have a positive 
intention about farm succession, but they will not continue the farm business. This 
entails that they will have to look for a job outside agriculture, and almost 30 per 
cent thinks that it will be difficult to find the ideal job. This group of farmers’ 
children is most involved in the search for an off-farm job, and the link with reality 
gives them a more negative perspective, although the majority of this group is still 
positive towards off-farm job opportunities. 
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Figure 4.10 Attitude towards the availability of off-farm job opportunities 
Source: SIM questionnaire 
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4.4.2.5. Future job in or outside agriculture?  
The connection between farmers’ children and the agricultural environment is 
reflected in their beliefs related to future job opportunities. Especially farmers’ 
children without intended farm succession would look for a job outside agriculture 
(Figure 4.11, Pearson χ²: 146.237, p-value: 0.000). The majority of this group does 
not feel a strong link with the agricultural sector and will take their own future non-
agricultural perspectives into account when looking for a job. 
In all groups of farmers’ children, a considerable part of the respondents (average 34 
%) wants still to work within the agricultural sector. The link with agriculture is 
strong enough to be willing to continue within the same sector as their parents did. 
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Figure 4.11 Future job in relation with the agricultural sector 
Source: SIM questionnaire 
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4.4.3.  Designation of farm successor 
In the majority of cases, the successor is the child with interest in continuing the 
family farm (Table 4.2). This choice is made over the years and the future planning is 
reflected in the agricultural education.  
 
Table 4.2 Way of designation of the successor (% of respondents) 
Child with interest 55 
Choice is made over the years 47 
Child with agricultural education 19 
Based on consultation of children 18 
Oldest child/son/daughter 14 
Youngest child/son/daughter 12 
No idea 4 
Source: SIM questionnaire 
 
Table 4.3 Designation of successor based on family rank order and gender (Number of respondents) 
  Transfer to son Transfer to 
daughter
Transfer to 
several children
Oldest child  39 4  
Not oldest nor 
youngest child 
6 2  
Youngest child  34 6  
Family with several 
children 
One son 51   
 One daughter 3
Family with 1 child  7 3
 Total 137 18 15
Source: SIM questionnaire 
 
Table 4.3 indicates that the appointment of the successor is not based on the age 
order of the children, but we see that the farm is considerably more transferred to 
male than to female children. Transfer to multiple children is limited. Research states 
that the transfer to one of the sons is seen as a tradition (Gale 1993), resulting in the 
fact that transfer to a potential female successor is less likely (Simeone 2005). 
Daughters are not viewed as eligible successors, especially in families with both 
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daughters and sons, which is in accordance with our results. However we do not 
confirm that the age structure of the children matters in the appointment of a 
successor as stated by Kimhi and Nachlieli 2001, Silvasti 2003, Glauben et al. 2005.  
The reason why, according to the farmer’s children, the farm successor is not (yet) 
designated is different between the sub groups (Table 4.4). An important reason 
within all groups is the fact that parents not yet think about farm transfer. They are 
not yet far enough in their farm life cycle to focus on the transfer of the farm. For 
the group of negative intended farm succession, the lack of interest by the children is 
of major importance. Uncertainty about who will be the farm successor can be 
related with interest in continuing the farm by different children. According to our 
questionnaire, family conflict is not seen as a reason to not designate a successor. 
 
Table 4.4 Reason why successor is not (yet) designated (% of respondents within each group)a 
 Negative 
intended farm 
succession 
Uncertain 
about intended 
farm 
succession 
Uncertain 
about 
designation as 
farm successor  
Parents do not yet think about farm 
transfer 
26 (2) 49 (1) 56 (1) 
Lack of children’s interest  37 (1) 10 (2) 2 (5) 
Interest by different children  1 (5) 9 (3) 27 (2) 
Restricted farm viability  21 (3) 8 (4) 9 (3) 
No idea 5 (4) 8 (4) 7 (4) 
Family conflict  1 (5) 1 (5) 2 (5) 
Source: SIM questionnaire 
a: between brackets, the rank order within each group is given 
 
4.4.4. Succession Intention Model 
The SIM consists of 4 aspects that influence the flow through the farm succession 
intention stages, and the 7 factors attributed to each aspect are the following: 
• Personal considerations: 
o Family mindedness related to farming 
• Social environment: 
o Family related arrangements of farm transfer 
o Partner related problems 
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• Farm environment: 
o Farm growth limitations 
o Progressive farm management 
o Limited farm viability 
• External influences: 
o Policy limitations 
 
Because of the elapsed time during the transition from the intention stage through 
the persuasion stage and finally to the succession stage, the influencing aspects can 
have different degrees of influence in the different stages of the SIM.  
 
Table 4.5 Descriptive analysis of restrained factors  
Factor  Factors Mean SD Minimum Maximum Cases 
Personal 
considerations 
Family mindedness 
related to farming 
0.00 1.00 -2.88 3.35 465 
Social environment Family related 
arrangements of farm 
transfer 
0.00 1.00 -3.44 3.06 465 
 Partner related 
problems  
0.00 1.00 -2.35 4.90 465 
Farm environment Farm growth 
limitations  
0.00 1.00 -2.41 3.55 465 
 Progressive farm 
management  
0.00 1.00 -1.91 3.93 465 
 Limited farm viability 0.00 1.00 -5.40 2.99 465 
External influences Policy limitations 0.00 1.00 -2.80 2.59 465 
Source: SIM questionnaire 
 
First, the individual influencing aspects are discussed. Second, the SIM is analysed. 
 
4.4.4.1. Influencing aspects 
4.4.4.1.1. Personal considerations (P) 
In literature, a number of personal considerations related to farming and farm 
transfer are stated (Marshall 1961, Casson 1982, Gasson et al. 1988, Herrmann and 
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Uttitz 1990). Marshall (1961) states that risk taking is a defining characteristic of 
entrepreneurs. According to Casson (1982), farmers reduce leisure time in favour of 
providing additional support for investments in the initial stages of the business. 
According to Gasson, et al. (1988), farmers are willing to accept a low standard of 
living in return for unremitting hard work. Herrmann and Uttitz (1990) stated a 
number of general attitudes related to farming: independence, connection with 
nature, enjoyment and hobby, economic security and having family close by. A 
positive connotation with these intentions is assumed to increase the probability of 
farm succession.  
Although the above stated personal considerations are tested in the light of farm 
transfer, the factor analysis restrains only one factor related to attitudinal 
considerations. The factor reflects the ‘Family mindedness related to farming’. A 
high score indicates that not the highest income is aimed at, but within the farm 
context, the successor strives at the best solution for the farm and the family. This is 
reflected in the positive correlation with objectives such as collaboration with family 
members and seeing work as a hobby. The close linkage between family and farm 
explains the importance of the family within the person’s intentions related to the 
family farm. 
 
4.4.4.1.2. Social environment (S) 
One of the prime objectives of family farms is the desire to pass on the business to 
the next generation. A certain expectation exists that the farm will continue over 
generations (Gray 1998), which has its consequences for the farm development 
(Potter and Lobley 1996b). However, social expectations change with generations. 
The life of older generations was structured by economic constraints and social 
expectations related to the family farm. Today, these aspects are less obvious for 
younger generations who have more opportunities from which they can choose 
(Villa 1999).  
Because farming is still seen as a tradition (Glauben et al. 2005), young people often 
feel pressure to take over the farm. To a great extent, the near family performs this 
social pressure. In general, the expressed negative opinion related to farm transfer of 
the parents or partner is limited (Table 4.6), although a negative opinion of the 
partner can be an important limiting aspect in the intention stage of farm succession: 
this is reflected in the factor ‘Partner related problems’.  
Related to the social environment, the second factor in the Principal Component 
Analysis is the factor ‘Family related arrangements of farm transfer’. A high score 
indicates that the potential successor takes into account the family interests in the 
practical arrangements of the farm transfer, e.g. difficulties of division of the family 
farm between children, involvement of parents in the management, setting up a firm 
for the family.  
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Table 4.6 Disagreement with farm transfer (% of respondents) 
 Negative 
intended 
farm 
succession 
Uncertain 
about 
intended 
farm 
succession 
Uncertain 
about 
designation 
as farm 
successor 
No 
designation 
as farm 
successor  
Designated 
as farm 
successor 
χ²-
value 
By parents  11 6 4 0 1 13.401 
** 
By partner 4 17 9 6 2 21.373 
** 
Source: SIM questionnaire 
** significant difference between succession intention groups at 0.01 level 
 
4.4.4.1.3. Farm environment (F) 
Some authors see the farm environment as the determining factor for farm 
succession: the location and the type of farming (Corsi 2004), the potential farm 
income (Gasson et al. 1988, Gale 1993, Hennessy 2002, Glauben et al. 2005, Simeone 
2005), and so on, are all factors that have a high influence on farm succession. 
Research shows that farm transfer occurs more on relatively larger farms within a 
sub sector (Gasson et al. 1988, Glauben et al. 2002, Breustedt and Glauben 2007) and 
is more likely on full-time farms (Simeone 2005). On the other hand, research also 
reveals that profit maximisation and economic reasons are mostly not the main 
objectives in family farms (Boehlje and Eidman 1984, Gasson et al. 1988, Hennessy 
2002). 
Today much more than before, farm economic criteria will affect people’s intention 
and decision to transfer a farm: a farm is no longer merely a ‘way of subsistence’, but 
has changed into a business that often struggles to survive. Objective criteria such as 
potential income, land prices, value of the farm equipment are of major importance 
for the viability of the farm, and thus for a potential farm transfer. However, the 
factor analysis indicates that all these aspects can mainly be covered within 3 main 
influencing factors related to the SIM: growth limitations, progressive farm 
management and lack of farm viability. 
• The ‘growth limitations’ variable covers both the limitations in expanding the 
farm size, and the incapability of financing the growth of the farm.  
• The ‘progressive farm management’ variable indicates that the respondent 
wants to further develop the farm by aspiring a high income, building a firm 
for the future, while he is envisaging the difficulty of finding enough labour 
to develop the farm, etc.  
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• The ‘lack of farm viability’ variable is reflected in outdated buildings and 
machinery in relation with the difficult search for enough financial means by 
financial institutions. A lack of farm viability hinders a positive vision 
towards farm transfer. 
In literature, high importance is given to the farm characteristics such as type of 
farming, farm size, etc, but our results show that the three stated farm concepts, 
independent of e.g. farm type, give a view on farm transfer, and have an important 
but partial influence on the perception of potential successors related to farm 
succession.  
 
4.4.4.1.4. External influences (E) 
Intentions concerning farm succession are formed within a society. External 
influences can effect the decisions made by an individual person, who has no power 
to influence. The following is a selection of the obstacles mentioned in literature with 
reference to the study wherein the obstacle is mentioned: 
• Uncertainties about policies (Glauben et al. 2002, Simeone 2005); 
• Exposure to a non-farming home and work environment (Gale 1993, 
Glauben et al. 2002, Corsi 2004)  
• Health of the farmer and the successor (Väre et al. 2005); 
• Changes in the family and farm situation (Ajzen 1985, Väre et al. 2005); 
These external influences are related with ‘intertemporal inconsistency’ (Horowitz 
1992). They shift over time and can only be analysed in time series (not covered by 
this cross-section research). However, the presented subjective vision towards these 
elements can be indicative for the different stages within the SIM.  
The factor analysis withholds one factor related to the external influences. The factor 
covers a number of policy constraints that young people encounter in the farm 
succession intention process. Major constraints are related with environmental policy 
and administrational obligations. Potential successors are hindered by the 
environmental and farm regulations associated with the contemporary intensive 
farming system in Flanders. They perceive the legislation and administrative 
obligations related to the farm transfer as a burden. A high score on this factor 
indicates that policy regulations are a major constraint in the process of farm 
transfer. 
 
4.4.4.2. Analysis of the succession intention model  
The relation between the four influencing aspects and the succession intention stages 
indicates that the seven factors each have their influence on the different stages of 
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the SIM (Figure 4.12, Table 4.7). The family mindedness, aiming at a good 
interaction between family and farm has an important influence in the intention 
stage. In this context, the agreement of the partner on farm transfer is decisive in the 
intention to farm succession. Also the policy constraints covering envisaged 
problems to meet environmental regulations, a complex farm transfer policy and a 
high administrative burden, is another decisive factor within the intention stage. In 
general, personal considerations, the external influences and to some extent the 
social environment determine if a potential successor is situated in the intention 
stage or in the following stages. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.12 The farm succession intention model  
Source: own compilation 
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Table 4.7 Analysis of variance of factors related to the farm succession intention stages (N=465) 
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 N 89 144 105 16 111  
P Family 
mindedness 
related to farming 
-0.288 a -0.195 a 0.223 b 0.344 b 0.223 b 6.681 
** 
S Family related 
arrangements 
related to farm 
transfer 
-0.028 b 0.090 b 0.290 b 0.366 b -0.422 a 8.523 
** 
 Partner related 
problems 
-0.044 
ab 
0.232 b -0.061 ab -0.332 a -0.160 
ab 
3.289 * 
F Farm growth 
limitations 
0.352 d 0.140 cd -0.295 ab -0.540 a -0.107 
bc 
 
 Progressive farm 
management 
-0.371 a 0.026 b 0.126 b 0.113 b 0.128 b 4.118 
** 
 Limitation of farm 
viability 
0.212 b -0.009 b 0.029 b -0.439 a -0.122 
ab 
2.235 * 
E Policy limitations 0.236 b 0.280 b -0.394 a -0.215 a -0.149 a 9.618 
** 
**: significant difference between clusters at the 0.01 level 
*: significant difference between clusters at the 0.05 level 
a, b, c, d: group membership in Duncan post-Hoc test, indicating the significant group 
membership of the One Way Anova analysis 
 
If one is situated further in the SIM, farm growth limitations and the family related 
arrangements related to farm transfer become decisive in whether the potential 
successor will really take over the farm. The succession plan becomes more concrete 
and practical considerations become more prominent than the ambition. Finally, 
both in the intention stage and persuasion stage, an intended progressive farm 
management is a stimulating factor related to the succession intention stages, while 
the limitation of the farm viability is a constraint.  
The seven factors enhance each other, but the individual factors are not correlated, 
as they are the result of a factor analysis. The results confirm our hypothesis that 
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farmer’s children take personal considerations, farm environment, social 
environment and external influences into account in the decision to continue the 
family farm. 
Based on a linear ordinary least square regression in which the rank order of the 
succession intention stages is seen as a dependent variable (scale 0-37), the degree of 
impact of each factor within the SIM is analysed (Table 4.8).  
 
Table 4.8 Importance of the individual factors within the SIM (N=465) 
 Variable Coefficient (β) β/st.er. P[|Z|]>z 
 (Constant) 1.581 34.612 0.000 
P Family mindedness 
related to farming 0.236 5.164 0.000 
S Family related 
arrangements related 
to farm transfer -0.106 -2.311 0.021 
 Partner related 
problems  -0.105 -2.295 0.022 
F Farm growth 
limitations -0.223 -4.877 0.000 
 Progressive farm 
management  0.169 3.692 0.000 
 Limitation of farm 
viability  -0.123 -2.687 0.007 
E Policy limitations -0.221 -4.828 0.000 
Adjusted R²  0.18   
Model test F-value (7,449) 15.031  0.000 
 
This analysis indicates that the family mindedness related to farming, the farm 
growth limitations and the policy constraints are the most important factor within 
the SIM: the attitude of the potential successor, in combination with external factors 
such as policy regulations and the possibilities to expand the farm, are important 
determinant factors for the succession intention stages. In the second place, the 
considerations of other involved persons and the farm environment influence the 
decision whether to continue the family farm. 
                                                 
7 0: negative intended farm succession; 1: uncertain about intended farm succession; 2: 
uncertain about being designated as farm successor; 3: designated as farm successor 
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4.4.5. Clustering of potential successors  
The seven factors generated by the factor analysis indicate important aspects of the 
succession intention process. However, similar as not all factors are equally 
important in all stages, not all factors are equally important for all potential 
successors. Clustering of potential successors can highlight specific policy measures 
in order to reduce the constraints related to farm succession. 
On the basis of the seven factors, a K-means cluster analysis is performed to group 
the respondents. Four clusters are restrained (Table 4.9). Eight outliers are not taken 
into account. It has to be noticed that due to the way the sample has been 
constructed, the relative number of respondents in each cluster is only indicative for 
the composition of the respondent groups and may not be extrapolated towards the 
total farm community, as we are not sure that each group has participated to the 
survey in the same degree. 
The following clusters are defined: 
• Businesslike expander (16%): The potential successor wants to enjoy work 
and perform in a good way. He has interest outside agriculture and is not 
focussed on the family aspect of the family farm. His partner does not fully 
support the farm transfer. Due to the obsoleteness of the farm, the farm 
viability and the availability of loans from the bank are questioned. According 
to this group, policy regulations are a limiting factor related to farm transfer. 
•  Family minded conservator (33%): This cluster consists of potential 
successor who envisage a rather conservative farm management and attach 
high importance on the family aspect of the family farm. They enjoy their 
work as a hobby and like to collaborate with family members. A high income 
and self-development are of minor importance. The major constraint is 
situated on the external influences: they perceive problems to meet 
environmental regulations and the policy related to farm transfer is too 
difficult. 
• Family minded expander (26%): This group of potential successor is not 
hindered by policy regulations and administrative burdens, but they want to 
set up a firm for the family and are already concerned with the practical 
arrangements of the family farm. The most important constraints are related 
to farm growth limitations and obsoleteness of buildings and machinery: 
farm investments will be necessary to remain a viable farm business. 
• Businesslike individualist (24%): At first sight, this group of potential 
successors does not see major constraints related to farm transfer, but if we 
look in detail, than it becomes clear that they do not have a positive intention 
to collaborate with family members, they do not want to set up a firm for the 
family, and do not want to enjoy work as a hobby. They strive for a high 
income and self-development. Their major personal objectives are not 
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focussed towards the continuation of the family farm, but are more directed 
towards an individual career. 
 
Table 4.9 Analysis of variance of factors related to clusters of potential successors 
  Business-
like 
expander  
Family 
minded 
conservator 
Family 
minded 
expander 
Business- 
like 
individualist 
F-value 
N  75 (16%) 125 (33%) 121 (26%) 109 (24%)  
P Family 
mindedness 
related to 
farming 
-0.096 b 0.252 bc 0.661 c -1.053 a 76.771 ** 
S Family related 
arrangements 
related to farm 
transfer 
-0.154 a -0.172 a 0.619 b -0.304 a 18.670 ** 
 Partner related 
problems 
1.011 c -0.059 b -0.252 ab -0.527 a 66.950 ** 
F Growth 
limitations 
-0.378 a -0.372 a 0.730 b -0.015 a 30.239 ** 
 Progressive 
farm 
management 
0.446 b -0.633 a 0.240 b 0.253 b 29.437 ** 
 Limitation of 
farm viability 
1.313 c -0.250 ab 0.046 b -0.313 a 171.041 
** 
E Policy 
limitations 
0.217 b 0.508 b -0.370 a -0.381 a 24.603 ** 
**: significant difference between clusters at the 0.01 level 
a, b, c: group membership in Duncan post-Hoc test, indicating the significant group 
membership of the One Way Anova analysis 
 
The relation between clusters and the succession intention stages indicates that the 
characteristics related to perception and objectives of farm transfer are significant 
different for the different succession intention stages (Table 4.10, Pearson χ²: 24.390, 
p-value: 0.018). The cluster of ‘businesslike expander’ and ‘family minded 
conservator’ represent significantly more potential successors who are still uncertain 
about their intended farm succession. Potential successors who are uncertain about 
being designated as farm successor are significant more represented in the cluster 
‘family minded expander’. The cluster ‘businesslike individualist’ consists significantly 
more of farmers’ children who exit the succession intention model in the first stage 
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(negative intended farm succession) or in a later stage if they are not designated as 
farm successor. 
Specific policy recommendations that focus on the cluster characteristics can 
enhance the flow through the succession intention stages. 
 
Table 4.10 Relation between clusters and the succession intention stages 
 Business-
like 
expander  
Family 
minded 
conservator 
Family 
minded 
expander 
Business- 
like 
individualist 
Total 
Negative intended farm 
succession 
14 29 19 27 89 
Uncertain about intended farm 
succession 
28 57 26 30 141 
Uncertain about being 
designated as farm successor 
15 29 42 19 105 
No designation as farm 
successor 
0 4 5 6 15 
Designated as farm successor 18 33 29 27 107 
Total 75 152 121 109 457 
 
4.4.6. Policy recommendations 
Based on the results of the SIM and the four clusters, the following policy 
recommendations can be made, targeting specific groups of potential successors. 
In the cluster ‘businesslike expander’, significant more potential successors are 
uncertain about their intention to farm succession. Their low family minded attitude, 
in combination with necessary future farm investments ask clear information related 
to other legal farm structures. At policy level, alternative legal farm structures have to 
be reconsidered in order to develop a farm structure that suits the needs of the 
contemporary family farm, without laying a burden on the family. Moreover, 
education and extension services have to give more and clear information related to 
the characteristics and consequences of different legal farm structures.  
Especially the potential successors of the cluster ‘family minded conservator’ 
envisage major problems with the policy regulations related to farm transfer. 
Transparency of policy regulations related to farm transfer can improve the 
perception of farmers’ children related to farm succession. Simplification of farm 
administration and (environmental) regulations can raise the number of farmers’ 
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children with a positive intention to farm transfer. An accessible farm succession 
policy can diminish the perceived policy related difficulties related to farm transfer. 
Significant more potential successors of the cluster ‘family minded expander’ are 
uncertain about designation as farm successor. Due to the lack of available 
agricultural area, they envisage problems to expand the farm in the future. 
Agricultural policies have to stimulate the withdrawal from land use of PDMs 
without succession perspectives above the retirement age. The released agricultural 
land becomes available for competitive PDMs in order to increase the production. 
Hereby public authorities could envisage regulations for a better functioning of the 
land market or to support young farmers in obtaining extra land. 
Finally, the cluster ‘businesslike individualist’ consist relatively more of farmers’ 
children who exit the SIM. Although it is an important group, no specific farm 
transfer policy measures have to be taken, as they are not oriented towards the 
continuation of the family farm. 
4.5. Conclusions 
Farm transfer is of major importance for the continuation of family farms, and has 
been highlighted in the first axis of the European Rural Development policy 2007-
2013 and national agricultural policies. Targeting the specific problems of farmers’ 
children related to farm transfer can remove current barriers within farm succession.  
The results of section 4.4.2 confirm that beliefs related to farming and farm transfer 
have an influence on the intention and behaviour of farmers’ children with respect to 
farm succession. Positive beliefs form the basis of the succession intentions. 
Farm succession is a long time process that can be visualised in a farm succession 
intention model (SIM) developed. The model is illustrated by the Flemish case for 
which through factor analysis, the objectives and perceptions of potential successors 
could be grouped in seven factors related to farm transfer. The family mindedness 
related to farm transfer, the partner related problems, and policy limitations are 
crucial in the intention stage. In combination with the farm environment, reflected in 
a progressive farm management, limitations of farm growth and farm viability, and 
the social environment taking into account the arrangement of the farm transfer 
within the family, a potential successor is situated in the intention, persuasion or 
succession stage. The results confirm that farmer’s children take personal 
considerations, farm environment, social environment and external influences into 
account in the decision to continue the family farm. However, not all farmers’ 
children are open to farm transfer and some farms lack viability and competitiveness 
to be transferred, but following policy recommendations may help potential farm 
successors to take over the family farm: 
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• Clear information related to legal farm structures helps young PDMs to 
consider which farm structure fits best the needs of the farm, taken into 
account the farm-family relation and without laying a burden on the family 
(Chapter 7). 
• Transparency of policy regulations related to farm transfer can improve the 
perception of farmers’ children related to farm succession. Simplification of 
farm administration and (environmental) regulations can raise the number of 
farmers’ children with a positive intention to farm transfer. An accessible 
farm succession policy can diminish the perceived policy related difficulties 
of farm transfer. 
• Due to the lack of available agricultural area, potential successors envisage 
problems to expand the farm in the future. Agricultural policies have to 
stimulate the withdrawal from land use of PDMs without succession 
perspectives above the retirement age. A better functioning of the land 
market and specific support for young PDMs who need land to expand their 
farm to be viable, may help to make the land available for competitive PDMs 
in order to increase the production.  
As the majority of possible farm successors follow agricultural education, specific 
attention should be given to the farm succession problem and related legislations 
during this training in order to decrease perceived problems. Although economic 
perspectives will continue to dominate (and thus result in a further decrease of the 
number of farms), it is obvious that creating a more stimulating environment 
through more specific extension and other services could decrease the exit among 
potentially positive inclined successors. That responsible authorities are becoming 
aware of this is for Flanders proven by the fact that the Flemish government has 
announced some specific policy actions such as increased attention in education and 
participation of PDMs in extension programs focussed on farm succession. 
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5.1. Introduction 
According to Gale (2003) and Williams and Farrington (2006), the current slow-
down in the entry rate of young farmers can be explained largely by structural 
changes, increasing capital requirements, low expected rates of return and higher off-
farm career opportunities. These changes raise two main questions: (1) which farms 
will remain viable as family farms in an environment marked by a decreasing number 
of farms and (2) can agricultural policy stimulate the transfer of viable and 
competitive farms? The second question is important, as stimulating the entrance of 
young farmers may have impact on the entire farming sector. Young entrants are 
more innovative, more motivated towards the longer term and better able to adapt. 
Their entrance makes the sector more productive, competitive and viable (Williams 
and Farrington 2006). 
Important questions are (1) whether this stimulation effect starts at the moment of 
farm transfer, or whether the designation of a successor itself has already an 
influence on the competitiveness and (2) what is the role of succession and 
retirement policies within this process. On the one hand, policies helping PDMs 
before the succession actually takes place may allow a higher number of farms to 
remain viable and be transferred. On the other hand, retirement policies may focus 
on making the exit of non-viable farms easier through measures such as increased 
pension rights, possibilities for finding new living quarters and so on. These policies 
may help to transfer the assets of non-viable farms to viable ones, which may also 
ultimately result in a higher number of viable farms. To this end farms need to be 
categorised so that the most adequate policy instrument can be used in each case: 
investment policies for those farms with possibilities for succession, and early 
retirement or related schemes for those that are not viable in the long run. 
The first part of this chapter (Section 5.4) proposes and validates Total Farm Assets 
(TFA) as an explanatory variable related to the transfer of family farms. The 
objective is to explore the potentials of this indicator that identifies viable farms at an 
                                                 
8 Part of this chapter has been published in Sociologia Ruralis: Calus, M., Van Huylenbroeck, 
G., Van Lierde, D. (2008). Relationship between farm succession and farm assets on Belgian farms. 
Sociologia ruralis, 48(1) 38-56. 
 
Chapter 5 – Influence of  succession on investment 
decisions8 
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early stage. If the targeting of policies can be improved by using this indicator, the 
goals of the EU Rural Development Policy can be achieved more successfully. 
The second part of the chapter (Section 5.5) builds further on the TFA as indicator 
for farm transfer. A first econometric model estimates the influence of the successor 
on farm investments before farm transfer. This model is based on the concept of the 
succession effect (Potter and Lobley 1992, Kimhi et al. 1995). A second model tests 
whether the designation of the successor at the end of the farm life cycle has an 
effect on the post-succession investment decisions.  
 
 
Figure 5.1 Economic aspects related to investments, within the farm succession cycle model 
Source: own compilation 
 
5.2. Theoretical framework: asset fixity theory and transaction 
costs 
Managing the family farm is not only based on the attempt to maximise the present 
value of the farmer’s disposable income or to optimise the farm’s net worth (Boehlje 
and White 1969; Gasson et al. 1988). Other goals, such as maintaining control of the 
business and passing on a secure and sound business to the next generation 
(Errington 2002) are important for the farming family as well. This has both business 
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and family implications. It means that the business has a longer than usual planning 
horizon that is measured in generations rather than years, and that securing long-
term survival may be even more prominent among the firm’s objectives than 
maximising short-run gains. The structure and operation of the farm may even be 
adapted to the coexistence of two families during the transfer period, as well as to 
the possibilities of remaining a viable farm in sole proprietorship.  
At the end of the farm life cycle, succession perspectives play an increased role in 
farm management. Two strategies can be distinguished: 
• If the farm is transferred within the family, the viability of the farm will be 
optimised. 
• If the farm is stopped, the liquidation value will be optimised. 
The outcome that is selected can be explained by combining asset fixity theory and 
transaction cost theory. 
 
5.2.1.  Asset fixity theory 
Asset fixity theory (Johnson 1955) asserts that assets in a farm business remain fixed 
as long as their expected value in their present use is lower than the cost of 
increasing their amount and remains higher than their value in an alternative use. The 
difference between the extra investments and the value at which the farm could be 
sold is defined as the asset fixity trap (Figure 5.2) (Hsu and Chang 1990). 
Within the asset fixity trap, it is accepted that total assets on farms with a designated 
successor will remain fixed during the consolidation stage (Figure 5.2). In the short 
run (before the successor is designated) only limited changes or investments will be 
made in order to increase the viability of the farm at transfer. This is because the cost 
of altering the quantity of a given asset is higher than the benefits that can be derived 
once those future benefits are discounted for uncertainty about the succession. The 
availability of a successor will encourage farm improvements and these long-term 
perspectives can help to justify investments.  
Farms with no future perspectives cannot justify farm-specific investments because 
the acquisition costs exceed the gains in market value. The expected value of the 
farm will therefore tend toward the value of liquidation due to the lack of farm-
specific investments and the obsolescence of buildings and machinery. Older PDMs 
without successors will proceed to run down their businesses and start consuming 
their material assets and tenant’s capital (Potter and Lobley 1992). At the end of the 
farm life cycle, the farm can be sold at the value of liquidation. 
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Figure 5.2 Asset fixity related to the end of the farm life cycle 
Source: own compilation based on Johnson 1955, Hsu and Chang 1990, Potter and Lobley 1992 
 
The investment behaviour of PDMs without successors will thus be radically 
different from PDMs with an identified successor (Potter and Lobley 1992). The 
timing of farm transfer will therefore determine the value of the assets transferred 
(Figure 5.2). This timing decision must maximise the present value of the farm and 
has a major effect on the future profitability of the farm (Kimhi 1994). 
 
5.2.2. Transaction cost theory 
Besides the fixity of assets, the transaction cost theory may also explain farm transfer 
decisions. This theory is an extension of a neo-classical framework because it 
recognises that profit maximisation is limited by bounded rationality and 
opportunistic behaviour. The definition of a transaction in new institutional 
economics is ‘an exchange which occurs between two stages of the 
production/distribution chain as the product changes in form and/or in ownership 
rights’ (Hobbs 1995). According to transaction cost theory, a transaction can be 
determined by the asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency (Williamson 1979). 
The transfer of a farm can be regarded as a transaction between the current property 
holders and the new ones. The new property holders can be the farmers’ 
descendants who are interested to continue farming or someone outside the family 
who is interested in buying the farm. 
Due to their specificity, farm assets are, in general, less useful for non-farm activities. 
At individual farm level, asset specificity can differ, depending on the degree to 
Asset fixity trap 
New investments 
Value of liquidation 
 
Fixed 
assets 
Farm transfer Farm exit 
End of farm life cycle 
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which the assets can be redeployed in alternative uses, or by alternative users without 
sacrificing their productive value. When highly specific assets are involved, the 
degree of dependence between transaction partners grows beyond normal levels, as 
well as the possibility (and benefits) of opportunistic behaviour, because highly 
specific transactions also imply asymmetric information (Williamson 1996). In such 
situations, the first consequence is the high information and negotiation costs for the 
transaction partners. When a farm is transferred within the family, information on 
the specificity of the assets is more easily available for both transaction partners 
(parents and children), so this element of transaction cost is lower. The fact that no 
farm-specific investments are realised if no successor is designated decreases the 
specificity of the farm assets, thus reducing the transaction costs of passing the farm 
on to people wanting to start new farm activities or even non-farm activities on that 
location (as far as is allowed by legislation and regulations). 
A second aspect that can affect the transaction cost of a farm transfer is uncertainty, 
which can be exogenous or endogenous. Changes in legislation and environmental 
conditions are exogenous factors that influence the transfer possibilities of a farm. 
When general economic conditions or specific farm conditions are clear and good, a 
transfer will be more likely than in case of an uncertain or unfavourable policy or 
economic environment. Endogenous uncertainty concerns individual behaviour. The 
degree of uncertainty is expected to decrease when the parties involved are family 
members as, in most cases, convergent expectations and goals concerning such 
matters as the survival of the farm become prominent. The reciprocity of this 
expectation creates a better environment for realising transactions. 
The last factor that influences the transaction costs is the frequency of the 
transaction. The transfer of a family farm is a transaction that normally occurs ones 
in a farm life cycle, or in a generation, implying that the transaction cost will increase 
as the transaction is rare for the family farm. 
5.3. Methodology  
5.3.1. Valuation of family farms at the moment of farm transfer 
In literature, estimates of the valuation of family farms are often based on farm size 
and standard farm income. Within this research, it is important to look at the 
valuation of family farms at the moment of farm transfer. TFA is proposed as 
measure of farm valuation at the moment of farm transfer. 
The farm size (Upton and Haworth 1987, Weiss 1999, Rizov and Mathijs 2001) takes 
into account the land available for production, and is a first tool to measure 
differences between farms within the same (land related) farm sector. Due to 
differences in land use between different sectors (e.g. arable production and green 
houses), farm size is not an appropriate valuation method related to the whole 
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farming sector. Moreover, the size of a farm is a weak potential determinant of farm 
succession because limited expansion possibilities, in particular in a peri-urban 
context such as in Belgium and the development of lower land-related production 
activities makes this parameter less relevant as an indicator of the likelihood of farm 
transfer. The intensity of agricultural production can indeed influence farm survival, 
apart from any link to farm size. 
The relationship between succession and standard farm income (Pfeffer 1989) is also 
not straightforward. The sale of parts of a farm may result in temporarily high liquid 
assets but endanger the future of the farm, and conversely, increased investments can 
reduce present liquid assets, but ensure the long-term future of the farm. At the 
moment of farm transfer, SGM does not take the farm value as such into account. 
Both farm size and standard farm income only partially reflect a farm’s business 
value. At the moment of farm transfer, the valuation of the family farm has to reflect 
the productive capacity, e.g. the value of the assets that have to be transferred to the 
successor in order to be able to continue to family farm. Based on accounting, the 
total farm assets represents the value of all assets of the farm and thus indicates the 
productive capacity of the farm, without taking into account the way these assets are 
financed. But as assets and liabilities are in balance, it also represents the farm’s 
financial value and thus any possible financing difficulties for the successor. Assets 
give also the possibility to look at the farm in a long term perspective: as assets can 
be controlled by the owner of the enterprise, they can be expected to provide future 
benefits by contributing directly or indirectly to future net cash flows and they are 
the outcome of a prior event or transaction (UNCTAD 2006). 
TFAs are, however, seldom used in the literature as an indicator of farm value, even 
though they reflect the total present value of the farm and form the basis of 
investment evaluation. Reasons for this may be that (1) TFA is an indicator which 
can only be extracted from accounting, thus not easily available, (2) these assets do 
not take into account the way the farm is financed (through debt financing or 
owners’ equity), and (3) at the moment of farm transfer, the TFA of the family farm 
is not used in practice to sell or transfer the farm. In case that the farm is sold, the 
farm value can differ from the TFA due to e.g. the free market, land prices that are 
not in accordance with the book value of the land, manure emission rights that 
influence the value of land,… In case that the farm is transferred to the next 
generation, the division of the farm over the sibs might influence the price of the 
family farm. This implies that the TFA does not represent the value at which the 
family farm will be sold or transferred to the next generation, but the TFA represents 
the current value of all farm assets that make it possible to continue the family farm. 
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5.3.2. Calculation of total farm assets 
Based on section 5.3.1, we use TFA as a measure of farm value at the moment of 
farm transfer. The TFAs consist of two major parts.  
The first are the fixed assets that are non-current assets and cannot easily be 
converted into cash. These include the current value of the land owned, soil 
improvement, buildings and constructions, permanent crops and production rights. 
The leased land is not taken into account in the value of the total farm assets, 
because at the moment of farm transfer, the value of these lands are not transferred 
(CLE 2000). 
The second part consists of current assets, that is, the share of the firm’s current 
assets that fluctuate in response to seasonal or anticipated short-term needs and 
which are consumed in the short term or require ongoing reinvestment to maintain 
their value. These include the current value of animals, machinery and liquid assets 
(CLE 2000).  
The value of farm assets represents the book value. Within this research, all data 
used are extracted from the same accounting database. However, if this indicator is 
used in a broader context by making use of different accounting databases, it has to 
be assured that TFA is build in the same way in order to compare TFA on the same 
grounds.  
The long-term influence of management capacity and cost-effectiveness is better 
reflected by the TFA trend than by changes in the standard farm income or the farm 
size, although we do not intend to use TFA as the value of the farm at the moment 
of farm transfer as this is influenced by external factors such as the free market and 
influence of sibs.  
5.4. TFA as indicator 
5.4.1. Methodology 
5.4.1.1. Hypotheses 
Within this section the following hypotheses are tested: 
3. There is a positive relationship between a farmer’s early awareness of whether a successor is 
available and the management of the farm 
4. The discrepancy between the intended succession and the actual succession is smaller on 
farms with a higher TFA 
Within this section hypothesis 3 is tested in a descriptive way. Section 5.5 will test 
this hypothesis in an econometric way. 
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Hypothesis 4 tests the discrepancy between the intended succession and the actual 
succession is smaller on farms with a higher TFA (Van der Meersche and De Marez 
1997). Discrepancy between intention and behaviour might exist for a number of 
reasons. Individual preferences might vary over time due to changes in both the 
economic environment and the family situation (Ajzen 1985). Other reasons may be 
that new information becomes available and leads to a revision of the first decision, 
that financial perspectives may change, or that the potential successor receives an 
attractive job offer outside the sector (Väre et al. 2005).  
 
5.4.1.2. Data 
Within this chapter, we make use of secondary panel data extracted from the Belgian 
Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) database. Panel data refer to any data set 
with repeated observations over time for the same individuals. ‘Individuals’ can be 
workers, households, firms, or governments (Arellano 2003). As the number of 
observations is not equal for all individuals, the panel is unbalanced. In our dataset, 
the maximum number of observations per farm is 15 and the minimum is 1.  
A first sub sample is used for the descriptive analysis (Section 5.3) and to analyse the 
pre-succession effect model (Section 5.5). The pre-succession effect model focuses 
on the influence of the designation of a successor on pre-succession investment 
decisions. As succession perspectives become clear from a certain age of the 
children, a sub sample of those farmers aged 45 years or more was selected. Our data 
set contains a 15-year observation period (1989–2003) resulting in an unbalanced 
panel of 4,366 observations on 713 farms. During the 15-year time period, farm 
transfer was observed on 197 farms. 351 PDMs had decided not to have a successor. 
On the remaining farms (165), a successor was not yet designated.  
Table 5.1 gives descriptive statistics for the farms sampled, based on the 2003 
accounting year. The total sample is divided in 3 groups based on the designation 
status of the successor. The high differences in land use among the farms sampled 
are explained by the inclusion of landless pig and poultry farms. The standard gross 
margin (SGM) can be used to overcome the difference in land use, but has 
limitations at the moment of farm succession, as it does not take the farm value as 
such into account. SGM and TFA have a correlation of 0.731**. 
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Table 5.1 Descriptive statistics of the sampled Flemish farms (2003) 
  Mean SDc 
N 44  
TFAa 632,719.02 314,311.75 
SGMb 3,264.55 2,224.48 
Successor designated 
Farmer’s age 56.52 5.39 
 Farm size (ha) 53.25 37.01 
 Labour (full-time 
equivalent) 
1.93 0.64 
N 86  
TFAa 336,925.79 227,596.47 
SGMb 1,993.16 1,293.89 
No successor 
designated 
 
Farmer’s age 52.64 6.32 
 Farm size (ha) 29.94 19.50 
 Labour (full-time 
equivalent) 
1.37 0.38 
N 105  
TFAa 471,876.37 294,627.26 
SGMb 2,549.98 1,430.09 
Successor still 
uncertain 
 
Farmer’s age 51.88 5.78 
 Farm size (ha) 38.30 22.50 
 Labour (full-time 
equivalent) 
1.56 0.44 
Source: FADN database 
a TFA: Total Farm Assets (€) 
b SGM: Standard Gross Margin (€) 
c SD: Standard Deviation 
 
5.4.2. Empirical results 
Hypothesis 3 tests whether we can see a difference in the development of the TFA 
from the moment that a successor is designated. As can be derived from Figure 5.3, 
the designation of a successor does indeed result in an increase of the TFA. This is 
consistent with our hypothesis that certainty about a successor influences farm 
management by stimulating new investments. On farms where the successor has not 
been designated and where uncertainty about the long-term continuation of the farm 
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still exists, we see no significant changes in the TFA as long as this situation persists. 
If no successor is designated, the TFA does indeed decrease toward the liquidation 
value of the farm. 
Time-series data are used to visualise the change in the TFA in different subgroups 
(Figure 5.3). On average, we can observe an increase of the TFA over time for the 
entire set of farms, but the rate of increase in the TFA differs between farms with 
different succession perspectives. The distinction between farms with an intended 
successor and farms without a successor (composed of both farms without 
successors and farms where succession is still uncertain) shows that, on average, 
higher asset farms have better succession perspectives, while farms with less assets 
face more difficulties in being transferred. Furthermore, the gap between these 
groups grows over time.  
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Figure 5.3 Development of average TFA per year, according to the presence of a successor 
Source: own calculations based on FADN database 
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Appendix 3.1 indicates that for all years, the TFA between groups with different 
succession intentions significant differ. The difference becomes even more clear 
when only PDMs close to retirement age are considered. This group of PDMs is 
made up of those who reached the age of 65, which is retirement age, during the 
period 1989–2003. On farms with PDMs close to retirement age and without a 
successor, the TFA decreases gradually towards the value of liquidation. In Figure 
5.3 no further differentiation is made according to the stage in the farm life cycle. 
These age-specific differences are indicated in Figure 5.4. 
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Figure 5.4 Average TFA per age category, according to the presence of a successor 
Source: own calculations based on FADN database 
 
Figure 5.4 shows that in the age group of PDMs between 45 and 60 years old, a 
significant difference exists between those who are certain about succession and 
those who are not. Specifically, PDMs with a designated successor maintain a higher 
TFA. 
These farm development patterns are confirmed when looking at the relative change 
in TFA. Figure 5.5 illustrates this by plotting the relative change of TFA between 
year t and year t-2 (∆TFAt-2 =(TFAt - TFAt-2)/TFAt-2) and similar patterns can be 
observed for ∆TFAt-1, ∆TFAt-3, ∆TFAt-4 and ∆TFAt-5. 
For PDMs between the ages of 49 and 60, we observe a significantly higher growth 
on farms with a successor than on farms where the successor has not yet been 
designated. Farms without a designated successor have on average a zero to negative 
growth. Before the age of 49 and after the age of 60, no significant difference 
between these groups occurs. The negative growth on farms without a successor 
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begins at the age of 57 and confirms the hypothesis that these farms start to disinvest 
as is also stated by Potter and Lobley (1992) and Phimister et al. (2004). The 
designation of a successor encourages further farm investments, but if no successor 
is present, such investments are not justified and the farm value starts to decrease 
because the replacement value becomes lower. These finding are consistent with the 
theory of asset fixity. 
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Figure 5.5 Relative change in TFA per age, according to presence of a successor (∆TFAt-2) 
Source: own calculations based on FADN database 
 
To be used as a general indicator for farm succession, the TFA growth should be 
independent of the farm type. Analysis does not show significantly different TFA 
development patterns according to farm types, meaning that TFA is a more suitable 
indicator than farm size or SGM to be used as general indicator for succession 
perspectives (Appendix 3.2). 
Our analysis confirms that, in general, farms with higher TFA and a relatively higher 
growth in TFA have a higher probability of having a successor. Before using TFA as 
an indicator for succession, however, we should also investigate whether a 
relationship between intention and behaviour exists. Intention of succession can be 
defined as the designation of a successor, and behaviour as the formal transfer of the 
farm. In the FADN database, PDMs are asked to indicate every year whether they 
have a successor. In case of a negative or unknown answer, we may assume no fixed 
succession intention. Because behaviour can be observed only at the moment of 
farm transfer, only the data of PDMs close to retirement age are used (N = 266) to 
test the hypothesis. 
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One year before farm transfer or exit, 41.7 per cent (N = 111) of the PDMs in this 
sample declared they had a designated successor (Table 5.2). Nevertheless, on 30 of 
these farms no farm transfer was observed, which may be due to the fact that the 
PDMs were too optimistic about their succession plans. On the other hand, on the 
same number and percentage of farms (111, or 41.7 per cent), a farm transfer was 
observed, and in 27.0 per cent (N = 30) of those cases a successor had previously 
been uncertain, which can be attributed to unplanned behaviour. However despite 
these exceptions, the general pattern as shown by Table 5.2 is a high significant 
relation between intention and behaviour (Pearson χ²: 78.995; p-value: 0.000). 
 
Table 5.2 Relationship between the assignment of a successor and farm transfer in the year before 
observed farm transfer or farm exit (number of farms) 
  Intention No intention  
  Successor 
designated 
Successor still 
uncertain 
No successor 
designated 
Total 
Behaviour Farm transfer 
1989–2003 
81 18 12 111 
No 
behaviour 
No farm 
transfer 1989–
2003 
30 50 75 155 
Total  111 68 87 266 
Source: own calculations based on FADN database 
 
In a time period of 10 years prior to farm transfer or farm exit, the intention of 
succession can change due to changes in the external environment or for personal or 
farm reasons (Figure 5.6), showing a high dynamic behind the process. Only for 44.1 
per cent of the farms, the succession intention remained unchanged over the period. 
Of these, 4.4 per cent had a successor, 65.0 per cent had no successor, and 30.6 per 
cent was uncertain about succession. On average, each year 8 per cent of the farms 
indicates a change in their succession perspectives. In the 10 years prior to farm 
transfer or exit, uncertainty in succession plans becomes more significant in 55.4 per 
cent of the changes. This pattern can be explained by the fact that the wish or 
perception of the farmer is not always in accordance with the future plans of the 
children (Chapter 4). As Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5 indicates a positive relationship 
between the TFA and the intention of farm transfer. These perspectives are then 
reflected in TFA development. However, as indicated by Table 5.2, on some farms 
there may be a discrepancy between the succession intention and actual result 
(transfer or exit). 
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Figure 5.6 Change in succession intentions during the last 10 years before farm transfer or farm exit 
Source: own calculations based on FADN database 
 
The discrepancy between intention and behaviour is the highest for medium-sized 
farms (Table 5.3). Farms with low TFA (TFA below €100,000) have both low 
intention and behaviour for farm transfer. On large-scale farms (TFA more than 
€600,000), intention and behaviour are largely focused towards farm transfer. But on 
medium-sized farms (TFA between €200,000 and €600,000), intention and behaviour 
do not always coincide, as uncertainty about future viability, the development of the 
farm, government policies and judgments concerning on-farm and off-farm 
employment opportunities plays an important roles in the decision about farm 
transfer, reflecting the uncertain survival possibilities of this type of farm.  
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Table 5.3 Relationship between TFA, intention and behaviour for farms close to retirement 
(number of farms) 
 TFA 
below 
€100,000  
TFA 
between 
€100,000  
and 
€200,000  
TFA 
between 
€200,000 
and 
€400,000  
TFA 
between 
€400,000 
and 
€600,000  
TFA 
more 
than 
€600,000  
All 
respondents 
No intention, 
no behaviour 51 44 32 4 8 139 
Intention, no 
behaviour 4 8 11 9 6 38 
No intention, 
behaviour 5 7 11 3 3 29 
Intention, 
behaviour 4 11 33 30 25 103 
Total 64 70 87 46 42 309 
Discrepancy 
between 
intention and 
behaviour 
14% 21% 25% 26% 21%  
Source: own calculations based on FADN database 
 
5.5. The succession effect9 
5.5.1. Introduction 
The succession status of the farm family household is important in describing the 
way the farm business develops over time (Potter and Lobley 1992, 1996b). The 
designation of the successor stimulates farm investments as already shown in a 
descriptive way in section 5.4. In literature this is referred to as ‘the succession 
effect’. Potter and Lobley (1992) suggest that a succession effect may operate 
throughout a farmer’s career, and not only in the retirement stage or when the 
                                                 
9 The succession effect referred to in literature discusses the succession effect before farm 
transfer. In this chapter both the existence of a succession effect before and after farm 
transfer is studied. This entails that we refer in this chapter to the succession effect before 
farm transfer as the ‘pre-succession effect’, and to the influence of the succession effect on 
the post-succession investment decisions as the ‘post-succession effect’. 
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farmer gets older. Even among younger farmers, the expectation of having a 
successor or not may have a strong impact on the investment decisions. They state 
that a successor can be seen as a driving force for the PDM and provides an 
incentive to expand the farm, to invest and to increase the output over longer 
periods than would be the case if succession is uncertain or has been ruled out 
(Potter and Lobley 1996a). This ‘succession effect’ is also suggested by Kimhi et al. 
(1995). They argue that the occurrence of a successor within the family farm might 
motivate the PDM to invest and raise the current farm size. This link becomes 
stronger as the event of succession comes closer. A successor provides a constant 
incentive for expansion and forward planning; while a PDM without a successor has 
no such interest. But Kimhi et al. (1995) did not find empirical evidence for the 
succession effect. Stiglbauer and Weiss (2000) find even a negative relationship 
between previous farm growth and the probability of farm succession, indicating a 
possible aversion of PDMs to make long-term decisions immediately before farm 
transfer. However these results are based on the use of a physical measure (number 
of hectares, …) for farm growth. Based on the findings of section 5.4, we argue that 
TFA is a better indicator to measure whether a pre- or post-succession effect exists. 
 
5.5.2. Methodology 
5.5.2.1. Hypotheses 
Based on the results of section 5.4 and the literature review in section 5.5.1, the 
following hypotheses can be stated: 
 5. When a potential successor has been identified, current management will be oriented 
towards optimising the viability of the farm. When, instead, an exit from farming is 
envisaged, the value of liquidation becomes important and PDMs start to disinvest 
 9. The timely designation of a farm successor has a positive effect on the TFA development 
after the start of the new farm life cycle 
Based on the theory of Kimhi et al. (1995), hypothesis 5 states that PDMs with a 
reasonable assured expectation of succession will develop their businesses in a more 
positive context compared to PDMs who are more pessimistic about succession 
perspectives. The related first research question tests whether there exists a positive 
influence of a designated successor on the TFA development. Within this section, 
this hypothesis will be tested with an econometric model. 
However in practice, farm transfer is observed both on farms with a timely 
designated successor, as on farms where succession was not yet clear or even on 
farms who stated to not have a successor. Hypothesis 9 therefore states that the 
timely designation of a farm successor will also have an effect on the TFA 
development after the start of the new farm life cycle. The related research question 
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tests whether the succession effect experienced before farm transfer has still an 
effect on the post-succession TFA development.  
 
5.5.2.2. Data 
Different sub samples are used to analyse the pre- and post-succession effect on 
investment decisions (Table 5.1).  
• A first sub sample is used to analyse the pre-succession effect model (Section 
5.5). This is the same sub sample as used in section 5.4. The pre-succession 
effect model focuses on the influence of the designation of a successor on 
pre-succession investment decisions. As succession perspectives become 
clear from a certain age of the children, a sub sample of those farmers aged 
45 years or more was selected. Our data set contains a 15-year observation 
period (1989–2003) resulting in an unbalanced panel of 4,366 observations 
on 713 farms. During the 15-year time period, farm transfer was observed on 
197 farms. 351 PDMs had decided not to have a successor. On the remaining 
farms (165), a successor was not yet designated.  
• The post-succession effect model focuses on the relation between the 
successor designation before farm transfer and the post-succession 
investment decisions. Therefore a sample of those farms observed in the 
FADN before and after farm transfer is selected. Only the observations after 
farm transfer are taken into account, resulting in a total of 816 observations 
on 115 farms.  
Table 5.4 gives descriptive statistics for the farms sampled, based on the 2003 
accounting year. The total sample is divided in 3 groups based on the designation 
status of the successor. The descriptive statistics are given for the sub samples 
related to the pre- and post-succession effect. The high differences in land use 
among the farms sampled are explained by the inclusion of landless pig and poultry 
farms. The standard gross margin (SGM) can be used to overcome the difference in 
land use, but has limitations at the moment of farm succession, as it does not take 
the farm value as such into account. SGM and TFA have a correlation of 0.731** in 
the pre-succession sample and 0.679** in the post-succession sample. 
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Table 5.4 Descriptive statistics of the sampled Flemish farms (2003) 
  Pre-succession effect Post-succession effect 
  Mean SDc Mean SD 
N 44  64  
TFAa 632,719.02 314,311.75 477,903.92 266,488.77 
SGMb 3,264.55 2,224.48 2,819.84 2,484.47 
Successor 
designated  
Farmer’s age 56.52 5.39 35.73 5.60 
 Farm size (ha) 53.25 37.01 14.45 27.79 
 Labour (full-time 
equivalent) 
1.93 0.64 1.70 0.62 
N 86  5  
TFAa 336,925.79 227,596.47 283,556.00 114,099.37 
SGMb 1,993.16 1,293.89 1,669.80 597.37 
No successor 
designated 
 
Farmer’s age 52.64 6.32 37.00 9.27 
 Farm size (ha) 29.94 19.50 1.08 1.95 
 Labour (full-time 
equivalent) 
1.37 0.38 1.39 0.05 
N 105  15  
TFAa 471,876.37 294,627.26 496,166.67 257,969.26 
SGMb 2,549.98 1,430.09 2,438.60 1,293.74 
Successor still 
uncertain 
 
Farmer’s age 51.88 5.78 34.33 6.21 
 Farm size (ha) 38.30 22.50 12.61 17.72 
 Labour (full-time 
equivalent) 
1.56 0.44 1.59 0.36 
Source: FADN database 
a TFA: Total Farm Assets (€) 
b SGM: Standard Gross Margin (€) 
c SD: Standard Deviation 
 
5.5.2.3. The pre- and post-succession effect models 
To test the hypotheses of a positive pre- and post-succession effect, ordinary least 
square panel data regression models are performed on the Flemish FADN data. We 
hereby assume – based on Kimhi et al. 1995, Potter and Lobley 1996a – that TFAs 
are influenced by the financial position of the farm (solvency – SOLV), age and the 
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succession effect. Other aspects of the farm management will also have an impact on 
the TFA development, but these effects are captured as unobserved heterogeneity 
within the fixed effect panel data models. Therefore we can only include a limit 
number of independent variables in our model. Section 5.4 showed already that the 
TFA indicator is independent from the farm type what makes it a more 
comprehensive and general indicator to be used over different farm types. That 
analysis also showed that education of the PDM had no influence on the TFA 
development.  
The financial position is reflected in the farm solvency (SOLV), calculated as the 
own capital divided by the total liabilities of the farm (%). It indicates the burden of 
debt by the farm, i.e. possible financial difficulties in the future. A high solvency 
involves that most of the farm property is owned by the PDM and loans from the 
bank are limited. The solvency increases over the farm life cycle as the PDM builds 
up his own capital (Figure 5.7).  
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Figure 5.7 Average solvency development on sampled Flemish family farms 
Source: own calculations based on FADN database 
 
In our models [1] and [2], the lagged variable is used to overcome endogeneity 
problems: SOLVt-1 i is not influenced by TFAt i.  
 
5.5.2.3.1. Pre-succession effect model 
A pre-succession effect means that depending on the designation or non-designation 
of a successor, different patterns of farm development are followed. The designation 
or non-designation is based on the indication of the PDM that he has designated a 
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successor, that succession is not yet certain, or that no successor is designated. This 
indication is made within the FADN database. In order to test the pre-succession 
effect, two dummies are added to the model. The dummy Dsucc represents the effect 
of the designation of a successor. The dummy Dnysucc indicates that succession is 
uncertain (i.e. not yet successor designated). So the base category is a farm that states 
not having a successor. Lagged variables are used to overcome the problem of 
endogeneity. TFAt i  has no influence on the dummies Dsucc t-1 i and Dnysucc t-1 i. The time 
effect is included by the variable AGE, that represents the age of the PDM. The 
year-specific effects are not significant and therefore not restrained in the model. 
Model [1] indicates the pre-succession OLS fixed effect panel data regression model. 
The model includes group dummy variables that capture the unobserved 
heterogeneity of each group, in this case, each farm.  
 
TFAt i = α1 + β1 SOLVt-1 i + β2 Dsucc t-1 i + β3 Dnysucc t-1 i + β4 AGE + εit [1] 
 
5.5.2.3.2. Post-succession effect model 
Within the post-succession effect model, dummy variables cannot be used as they are 
regarded as a fixed parameter in the fixed effect panel data regression model. Each 
dummy variable of model [1] is replaced by a succession related variable that 
indicates the number of years after farm succession in model [2]. If a successor was 
timely designated before farm transfer (more than two years before farm transfer), 
i.e. if the Dsucc has the value 1 over a longer time period, than the variable Ysucc t i 
indicates the number of years after farm succession. If there was no timely 
designation of a successor, the variable Ysucc t i has the value 0. The variables Ynysucc t i 
and Ynosucc t i are composed in the same way, based on the value of Dnysucc resp. Dnosucc.  
Model [2] indicates the post-succession OLS fixed effect panel data regression 
model. The model includes group dummy variables that capture the unobserved 
heterogeneity of each group, in this case, each farm. The year-specific effects are not 
significant and therefore not restrained in the model. 
 
TFAt i = α2 + β5 SOLVt-1 i + β6 Ysucc t i + β7 Ynysucc t i + β8 Ynosucc t i  + εit  [2] 
 
5.5.3. Empirical results 
The empirical results test the hypotheses of a pre- and post-succession effect. The 
pre-succession effect reflects the influence of the designation of a successor on the 
farm investments. The post-succession effect reveals the influence of the designation 
of a successor before farm transfer on the post-succession investment decisions. 
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Due to the lack of observations for all farms over the 15-year time period, all 
econometric analyses were performed on unbalanced panels. The Hausman-test 
(Arellano 2003) indicates fixed effect models and not random effect models. This is 
also confirmed by the t-statistics of all group dummy variables that are significant. 
The use of the group dummy variables within the fixed effect models corrects for the 
unobserved heterogeneity (Arellano 2003). The observations over time of one 
individual farm are captured within a specific group. The group dummy variables 
cover the farm specific characteristics that are not included in the independent 
variables of the model (e.g. soil type, farm environment, ...) and enable us to estimate 
general models related to the pre- and post-succession effect, not depending on farm 
type, farm size etc. 
Table 5.5 provides the descriptive statistics, measures of central tendency, measures 
of dispersion, and number of observations of independent variables of the two sub 
samples used in the analyses.  
 
Table 5.5 Descriptive statistics of the sub samples of pre- and post-succession effect 
 Variable Mean SD  Minimum Maximum Cases 
TFA 349,496 242,369 2826 1,856,505 4357 
SOLV 81.27 16.76 2.33 100.00 3646 
Dsucc 0.21 0.40 0.00 1.00 4357 
Dnysucc 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 4357 
Pre-
succession 
effect 
AGE 53.35 5.70 45.00 90.00 4357 
TFA 443,606 230,560 38,868 1,477,054 816 
SOLV 42.82 21.07 0.44 100.00 708 
Ysucc 4.31 3.81 0.00 14.00 816 
Ynysucc 0.85 2.43 0.00 14.00 816 
Post-
succession 
effect 
Ynosucc 0.34 1.54 0.00 13.00 816 
Source: own calculations based on FADN database 
 
The solvency (SOLV) of the farms after farm transfer (average 43%) is significant 
lower than the solvency of the farms close to farm transfer (average 81%). The 
solvency is built up during the farm life cycle (Figure 5.7). Due to this high average 
solvency rate at the end of the farm life cycle, new investments will decrease the 
solvency rate. Only a moderate correlation between the variables related to 
succession perspectives exists (Table 5.6, Table 5.7). Within these OLS fixed effect 
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panel data regression models, no problems of multicolinearity, heteroscedasticity or 
endogeneity are observed10. 
 
Table 5.6 Correlation matrix of the independent variables of the pre-succession effect model 
 SOLV Dsucc Dnysucc AGE TFA 
SOLV 1.000     
Dsucc -0.121 1.000    
Dnysucc -0.003 -0.529** 1.000   
AGE 0.266** 0.176* -0.178* 1.000  
TFA -0.210** 0.272** 0.015 -0.036 1.000 
Source: own calculations based on FADN database 
**: significant at 0.01 level 
*: significant at 0.05 level 
 
Table 5.7 Correlation matrix of the independent variables of the post-succession effect model 
 SOLV Ysucc Ynysucc Ynosucc TFA 
SOLV 1.000     
Ysucc 0.098 1.000    
Ynysucc 0.182* -0.464** 1.000   
Ynosucc 0.050 -0.291** -0.085 1.000  
TFA 0.145* 0.070 0.180* -0.092 1.000 
Source: own calculations based on FADN database 
**: significant at 0.01 level 
*: significant at 0.05 level 
 
5.5.3.1. Pre-succession effect 
Table 5.8 indicates that all four independent variables are statistically significant at 
the 0.05 alpha level. The independent variables of the model account for 14 per cent 
of the variance in the dependent variable and group effects account for 91 per cent 
                                                 
10 No problems related to multicolinearity are observed as the correlations in Table 5.6 and 
Table 5.7 are relatively limited. The graphical interpretation of squared residuals in relation 
with pre- and post succession effect indicate that there is no heteroscedasticity.  The 
Hausman test is used to test the endogeneity 
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of variance. This results in an overall score of 93 per cent of the variance in the 
dependent variable.  
TFA is negatively correlated with solvency. If the solvency increases with one per 
cent, ceteris paribus, the TFA decreases with €2,862. Or put differently, at the end of 
the farm life cycle, PDMs developing their farm do this partially with external 
sources, such as bank loans, or invest their own capital to develop the farm. Farm 
investments are vital to remain competitive in the contemporary farm environment.  
The influence of the age of the PDM on the TFA indicates an increase of the TFA 
of €8,937 if the age of the farmer increases one year, ceteris paribus. During the farm 
life cycle, the TFA increases as the PDM gets older: a continuous development of 
the family farm is necessary to remain a competitive and viable farm. 
 
Table 5.8 Parameters of the OLS fixed effect panel data regression of the pre-succession effect model 
Variable Coefficient (β) St. Error β/st.er. P[|Z|]>z 
SOLV -2,862.17 164.48 -17.401 0.000 
AGE 8,936.85 387.88 23.040 0.000 
Dsucc 37,762.54 6,173.10 6.117 0.000 
Dnysucc 13,568.84 5,548.68 2.445 0.015 
Adjusted R² 0.93    
Model test F(625, 3020) = 80.54  0.000 
 
The succession effect is reflected by the positive sign of the coefficients of the 
dummy variables related to the designation of a successor. A certainty about farm 
succession is increasing the TFA with on average €37,763, compared to the TFA of a 
farm without designated successor, ceteris paribus. The effect of not yet having 
certainty about a successor is reflected in an average increase of TFA by €13,569 
compared with the TFA of a farm without designated successor. This result confirms 
a pre-succession effect of both the designation of a successor and the uncertainty 
about designation of a successor, although the latter to a smaller extent. A timely 
designated successor stimulates the PDM to make extra farm investments (Figure 
5.8). Uncertainty about farm succession stimulates limited farm investments.  
Making use of the Total Farm Assets (TFA) as an indicator of farm development, we 
are able to confirm econometrically the pre-succession effect based on empirical 
evidence for Flanders. A first conclusion is that PDMs take into account the 
possibilities of farm transfer within the investment decisions. The designation of a 
farm successor has a more pronounced influence on the investment decisions than in 
case the succession is still uncertain, but both the designation of a successor and the 
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uncertainty about farm succession, increases the TFA statistically significant 
compared to a non designation of a farm successor. 
 
 
Figure 5.8 Conceptual model of the pre-succession effect  
Source: own compilation 
 
5.5.3.2. Post-succession effect 
Table 5.9 gives the parameters of the post-succession effect model. Three 
independent variables are statistically significant at the 0.05 alpha level (SOLV, Ysucc, 
Ynysucc). The variable Ynosucc is not significant at the 5 per cent level. The independent 
variables of the model account for 7 per cent of the variance in the dependent 
variable and group effects (farm specific characteristics) account for 85 per cent of 
the variance. This results in an overall score of 87 per cent of the variance in the 
dependent variable.  
The pre- and post-succession models differ related to the farm solvency (SOLV). At 
the end of the farm life cycle, the solvency is at a relatively high level as it is build up 
during the farm life cycle (Figure 5.7). At the start of a new farm life cycle, PDMs 
start with a high debt ratio and if farm management enables an increase of the farm 
solvency, this is reflected in an increase of the TFA. An increase in the solvency by 
one per cent is reflected in an increase of TFA by €976, ceteris paribus. This may 
indicate that young PDMs who have more own equity are able to enhance farm 
growth. 
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Table 5.9 Parameters of the OLS fixed effect panel data regression of the post-succession effect 
model 
Variable Coefficient (β) St. Error β/st.er. P[|Z|]>z 
SOLV 976.25 329.66 2.961 0.003 
Ysucc 13,732.29 1,481.47 9.269 0.000 
Ynysucc 14,763.71 2,839.57 5.199 0.000 
Ynosucc 7,150.71 4,973.71 1.438 0.151 
Adjusted R² 0.87    
Model test F(107, 600) = 43.96  0.000 
 
Within the context of a post-succession effect, the variables related to the timely 
designation of a successor have also a significant effect on the TFA. In these cases 
where the successor was timely designated before farm transfer or that the 
succession was not yet certain, the TFA increases each year statistically significant 
with on average €13,732 resp. €14,763, with all other parameters constant. Even if 
the PDM has not yet designated a farm successor, the potential farm successor can 
prepare (mentally) for possible farm succession and at the start of the new farm life 
cycle, he experiences the same stimulus as his designated colleague. On farms where 
the successor was only designated at the moment of farm transfer, we observe no 
statistically significant increase of the TFA. Hence, a conclusion is that the timely 
designation of a successor or a possibility about successor designation at the end of 
the previous farm life cycle gives also an extra stimulus to the development of the 
farm at the start of the new farm life cycle. In other words, our results also confirm 
the existence of a post-succession effect.  
These results also mean that at the start of the farm life cycle, the age of the 
successor has no direct influence on the TFA, which is in contrast with the age-effect 
at the end of the farm life cycle. Moreover, the annual rate of increase at the start of 
a farm life cycle (Ysucc, Ynysucc) is higher than the rate of increase at the end of the 
previous farm life cycle (AGE). This indicates that young successors are more 
dynamic and invest more than the PDMs they succeed. These results confirm that 
younger farmers are indeed more innovative and competitive as suggested by 
Williams and Farrington (2006) and thus that well planned succession cycles are 
important for keeping agriculture competitive. 
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Figure 5.9 Conceptual model of the post-succession effect 
Source: own compilation 
 
Combining the pre- and post-succession effect, it becomes clear that farms with a 
timely designated successor have both a pre- and post-succession effect that gives 
them a high competitive advantage in terms of TFA compared to other groups 
(Figure 5.9). The TFA development is significantly higher and if these effects appear 
in subsequent farm life cycles, they build up a considerable advantage in terms of 
TFA compared to farms where succession perspectives are less clear.  
On farms where the successor is not yet designated before farm transfer, a smaller 
pre-succession effect is observed, and they also have an extra stimulus to further 
develop the farm after farm transfer. This stimulus has on average the same extent as 
the group with a designated successor. However this also means that they have 
difficulties to catch up the pre-succession delay. The limited pre-succession effect 
gives them in other words a disadvantage that still plays a role in the new farm life 
cycle. 
The last group consists of farms that indicated not having a designated successor, 
but who succeeded anyway in transferring the farm. This lack of future farm vision is 
reflected in the lack of a pre-succession effect, but also after farm transfer no post-
succession effect is observed. In most cases, it means that these farms lack a real 
economic perspective as also the successor only decides at the latest moment to take 
over the farm, mainly to preserve the family patrimony. The lack of a well-
considered future vision creates a gap with the other groups of farms that is difficult 
to catch up.  
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5.6. Conclusions 
Farm transfer is of major importance for the continuation of family farms. The early 
identification of farms with a high probability of farm transfer may therefore be an 
important tool for agricultural policies designed to stimulate farm continuation.  
The first part of this chapter has validated the potential of TFA as indicator for 
discriminating between farms with a high and low succession potential. Taking into 
account asset fixity theory and transaction costs theory, TFA appears to be a 
theoretically sound indicator to reveal the relationship between the long-term 
orientation of the farm and its current management, although it might be questioned 
for extra large farms. Our empirical findings show that TFA is indeed significantly 
higher on farms with a potential successor; in other words, a positive relationship 
between a farmer’s early awareness of whether a successor is available and the 
management of the farm exists. Our results show that succession intentions start to 
influence the farm investment decision about 10 years before the farm is actually 
transferred. In this period farms with a designated successor have a higher increase 
in TFA than farms still uncertain about succession. On farms without succession 
perspectives we even observed zero growth, and in those owned by PDMs aged 
from 57 years, we observe even a negative development in TFA. The results related 
to the discrepancy between intention and succession confirm that the discrepancy 
between the intended succession and the actual succession is smaller on farms with a 
higher TFA. On farms with a low TFA, the intention is low, and this is reflected in a 
low succession rate.  
The second part of the chapter is based on the succession effect suggested by Kimhi 
et al. (1995). Making use of the Total Farm Assets (TFA) as an indicator of farm 
development, we were able to confirm econometrically the pre- and post-succession 
effect, at least for the farms represented in the FADN set of Flanders. Our results 
clearly confirm the existence of a pre-succession effect. From an age of 49 years, 
PDMs take succession perspectives into account in the farm development. The age 
of the PDM and the way the farm is financed influence the growth rate of TFAs, but 
also the designation of a successor is a positive stimulus for farm investments. The 
TFA will increase if own capital or external financial sources can support the farm 
expansion. A certainty or possibility of farm succession stimulates farm development 
by the PDM, confirming hypothesis 5.  
The post-succession effect reflects the consequence of the timely designation of a 
successor before farm transfer on the post-succession investments. Both farms 
where the successor was timely designated or uncertain do have higher growth rates 
of TFA after farm transfer than farms that were still transferred even if till the last 
year before transfer no successor was designated. These results show that the timely 
preparation of the successor is also a decisive factor. Even if uncertain, successors 
who envisage succession are better prepared than those who only decide at the last 
moment. The last group will find it hard to catch up with the other groups of PDMs 
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regarding TFA. But also the successors who were not yet designated before farm 
transfer can on average not bring their TFA to the same level as the groups with 
timely designated successors. We confirm that the timely designation of a farm 
successor has a positive effect on the TFA development after the start of the new 
farm life cycle. This means that the future farm vision of a PDM has consequences 
for the current and next farm life cycle(s). 
From both science and policy perspectives the empirical models confirm that, in 
their farm investment decisions, PDMs anticipate to the presence or absence of a 
successor. Their appraisal of the farm succession has consequences for the own farm 
life cycle, but also for the next farm life cycle(s). Therefore, the following 
recommendations related to further research and policies are made: 
• Further exploration of the potentials of TFA as an indicator is an important 
research area. Research may, among other things, concentrate on the 
refinement of the indicator for more specific policy issues such as investment 
specific support actions. Taking specific sub groups into account, the 
inclusion of farm specific variables can reduce the unobserved heterogeneity 
within specific farm types.  
• As the importance of TFA in the context of farm transfer is proven, TFA 
should be included as an indicator related to farm succession both in the 
internal management of the farm, as in the farm succession extension. Within 
accounting, more importance should be given at the elaboration of the TFA. 
When there are general rules for calculation of the TFA, which can be used 
over the different accounting systems, the TFA can also be used in policy 
recommendations.  
• At present, policies focus at the start of the farm business and try to 
stimulate and help the successors during and after farm transfer, but our 
results indicate that the end of the farm life cycle is also of major importance 
for the future viability of the farm. At the end of the farm life cycle, 
governmental policies and extension services can highlight the importance of 
a timely decision related to farm succession and the consequences on the 
farm development, in order to stimulate the pre-succession effect. 
• TFA development can be used in the consolidation stage of the farm life 
cycle to indicate what kind of measures are most effective for the future of 
the farm and the farm owner. If their TFA indicates a high probability of 
farm transfer, farms can be directed to measures improving the transfer (e.g. 
vocational training and information actions). However, if TFA indicates a 
low probability of farm transfer, more effort can be made to guide the farm 
in the exit process. Targeting PDMs in an earlier stage can thus improve the 
effectiveness of such policy measures, which over the long run can also 
enhance the structure of the farm sector and its competitiveness. 
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6.1. Introduction 
Within the social and economic aspects of the succession cycle (Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5), the importance of the financing of the farm transfer is already been 
highlighted. It is an aspect that plays an important role during the whole farm 
succession cycle. This chapter puts the financing of farm transfer in the centre of 
attention (Figure 6.1) and looks at the influences on farm transfer (e.g. the influence 
on transfer strategies, the succession ladder and labour availability), and changes in 
farm practice after farm transfer.  
The main objective of this chapter is to give an overview of the different ways of 
financing farm transfer from a theoretical point of view, to analyse the influencing 
factors of the external financing leap, and to analyse the consequences related to the 
farm management. 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Economic aspects related to financing, within the farm succession cycle model 
Source: own compilation 
6.2. Financing of farm transfer 
6.2.1. Farm capital 
As stated in the definition of a family farm (Section 2.2), a considerable part of the 
capital has to be borne by the farm and, therefore, by the farm family as long as the 
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farm production is organized by farm families (Schmitt 1991). Although ‘small’ and 
‘family’ are not the same, small farmer’s best prospects for survival were felt to rest 
on their ability to capitalise and expand the scale of their operations (Gasson et al. 
1988). As already stated in section 2.4.1.1, PDMs have a greater flexibility than other 
structures to divide the net returns of the family farm among (1) expansion of 
production, (2) family consumption or (3) investment in production factors, allowing 
them to compete successfully with industrial forms of farming focussed on returning 
a profit. This is reflected in the TFA increase over time (Chapter 5). The 
capitalisation within the family farm is possible when a part of the net returns can be 
kept aside for the future. The capitalisation can take place during all stages of the 
farm life cycle and is reflected in the decline or survival of the family farm.  
Considering decline first, there are many farms that cannot reproduce on an enlarged 
scale and that cannot keep up with the development of modern agriculture. They lag 
behind and survive only for a short time through: 
• Accepting a small income and/or 
• Supplementing the household income with income from wage labour or 
insurance and/or 
• Consuming their own ‘capital’ 
These farms do not have a long-term perspective and most often a combination of 
these methods is used. Sooner or later the family will leave the business, or 
production will be reduced to an insignificant level. 
On the other hand, the survivors are able to reproduce their farms on an enlarged 
scale. If they cannot manage it on their own, they take loans from private or state 
banks. They have to enlarge production to meet the new expenditures. A good 
management enables them to accumulate and enlarge their own capital (Almås 1984). 
These tendencies are confirmed by the results of Chapter 5. Within the framework 
of a limited budget, the farmer has been able to improve returns to farming by 
investments in the efficient application of technology rather than by acquiring more 
land (Swinnen et al. 1993). These economies of scale in European agriculture are 
reflected in the increase of the average economic size unit, the increase in average 
utilised agricultural area per farm, in combination with a limited increase of the 
average labour input per farm (Section 2.3.1). The increased capitalisation of the 
family farm, related to the increased scale of the farms, entails that especially at the 
moment of farm transfer high amounts of capital are needed to continue the family 
farm. 
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6.2.2. Sources of financing 
At the moment of the arrangement of the family farm take-over price, the different 
involved parties have to negotiate taking into account the basic assumption that the 
financing of the farm transfer by the successor has to be feasible (Van der Meersche 
and De Marez 1997). Due to the Belgian legislation stating that ‘the inheritance is 
divided in equal shares, but the preservation of the unity of the holding is 
primordial’, the capital requirements of the successor are considerable and financial 
arrangements have to be made with external institutions or family members. Within 
these arrangements, the unpaid labour provided by the successor, has to be taken 
into account: the principle of the postponed wages in agriculture states that a 
successor aged 18 or more, who has normally worked at least 5 years on the farm, 
should be remunerated for his labour (Belgisch Staatsblad 1967).  
 
6.2.2.1. Family’s equity 
The family’s equity determines the resilience to adverse farming conditions. It is 
decisive for the acquisition of external sources of financing and has the advantage 
that it is unconditional available for the family farm without paid interest rate 
(Elhorst 1987). Before farm transfer, successor’s equity is built through external 
wages or cooperation in the family farm, but it is not sufficient to finance farm 
transfer. To increase owner’s equity after farm transfer, family members, mostly the 
parents, provide financial support by means of gifts, family loans with low interest 
rates (Landbouw-Economisch Instituut and Rabobank Nederland 1987) or through a 
gradual farm transfer. All these aspects are covered by the family’s equity. 
 
6.2.2.2. Bank loans 
Farm successors make also use of bank loans to cover the farm transfer and new 
investments (Landbouw-Economisch Instituut and Rabobank Nederland 1987). 
These external sources of financing have a temporary character. The created debt 
makes sense if the returns on investment exceed the interest rate being charged for 
the use of others’ money, but the higher risk has also to be taken into account 
(Hughes et al. 1986). Therefore, financial institutions base the allocation of 
agricultural loans, such as for example loans related to farm transfer, on an 
evaluation of risk (Cops 2008). The risk level is reflected in the probability of default 
and the liquidation value of assets, and has an effect on the interest rate.  
The evaluation criteria are related to the applicant, the farm results and the financial 
position of the farm. The relationship between these factors determines the 
allocation of the loans (Landbouw-Economisch Instituut and Rabobank Nederland 
1987, Cops 2008): 
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• Applicant: 
o Assessment of the qualifications of the PDM, based on the origin, 
job competences, entrepreneurship and commitment.  
o The relation between the financial institution and the PDM over 
time. 
• The farm results:  
o The operational safety (e.g. land ownership, production rights, …), 
exploitation (e.g. kind of product, quality, modernity, …), and future 
plans of the farm are taken into account. The farm has to meet all 
necessary environmental regulations.  
o An evaluation of the sector based on e.g. the cyclical sensitivity, 
(inter)national competition and prospects.  
o The objectives and motivations of the project, in casu the farm 
transfer. 
• Financial position: 
o The relation between the amount of owner’s equity and bank loans is 
an important indicator. Owner’s equity is a source of stability, in 
order to overcome periods of financial difficulties. A higher solvency 
decreases the risk of the bank. However in case of farm transfer, the 
owner’s equity of the successor is limited.  
o In case of a low solvency, financial institutions require a high 
profitability of the farm, in order to increase the solvency and decrease 
the risk. The farm profitability is based on the estimation of the pay 
back capacity of the farm, taken into account the average yearly cash 
flow, the credits and the amount of money necessary to live. 
o A third indicator of the financial position is the liquidity. Liquidity 
indicates the extent to which financial means are available to satisfy 
short run needs. 
o Finally, the guarantees in case of bankruptcy determine the financial 
position of the farm. 
 
6.2.2.3. Government support 
The Flemish government provides special support for farm transfer. This support is 
part of the support measures of the Flemish Agricultural Investment Fund (VLIF, 
Vlaams Landbouwinvesteringsfonds) in the framework of the European regulation 
1257/99. Within this regulation, each country decides on the specific support 
measures towards young farmers: e.g. the Flemish government provides both 
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establishment and investment support, where the Dutch government offers only 
limited investment support.  
If Flemish PDMs meet the regulations of the VLIF, they can apply for establishment 
support, investment support and guarantee support (VLIF 2007). 
The general regulations for all these subsidies are related to: 
• The occupation status: the PDM has to work more than 50% on the farm, 
and the farm revenues have to be minimum 35% of the total revenues 
• The PDM has to be a competent farmer, measured in terms of having 
followed agricultural education, or general education supplemented with 
specific courses 
• The farm has to be economic viable. The labour income per full time labour 
equivalent has to be more than the reference income that is yearly 
determined (e.g. in 2005, this was €23,000 per full time labour equivalent) 
• The farm has to have all necessary permits related to environment, water, 
buildings etc. 
• The PDM has to do farm economic accounting 
On top of the general regulations, the extra conditions to receive the establishment 
support are: 
• The PDM has to be younger than 40 years at the moment of the application 
• Only the establishment costs at the moment of farm transfer related to the 
following items are accepted: 
o Taking-over of moveable property of the farm related to animals, 
equipment, material, plantations, stocks, field crops and field 
remaining 
o The purchase of animals, materials, stocks aimed at completing the 
moveable property of the farm 
o Taking-over of shares at the moment that the successor is established 
as manager of an agricultural professional partnership 
Establishment support is reserved for the transfer of the farm and the moveable 
property of the farm. The objective of the Flemish government is to encourage 
young people to establish a farm as independent profession. Young entrepreneurs 
are in general more open to realise the necessary structural improvements in the 
sector. The support measures are open to all types of agricultural firms regardless of 
the kind of activity or production method. Some general rules are applied to grant 
the establishment support. On the first bracket of €50,000, an establishment subsidy 
of maximum 50 per cent or €25,000 is granted, spread over the two years following 
on the year of farm transfer. This subsidy is co financed by the European Union. On 
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the remaining establishment costs, with a maximum of €100,000, an interest subsidy 
of maximum 4 per cent during 10 years is awarded. During this period, the PDM has 
maximum 1 year of exemption of capital reimbursement. This interest subsidy is also 
co-financed by the European Union. Establishment costs higher than €150,000 that 
are financed by a loan (with a maximum of €250,000), can get an interest subsidy of 
maximum 4 per cent during 10 years, during which an exemption of capital 
reimbursement is possible during maximum 1 year. The Flemish government 
finances this interest subsidy. 
After farm transfer, PDMs can still apply for investment support. This funding aims 
at encouraging PDMs to adapt their farm structures to the rapidly evolving and 
changing circumstances in which the farms are active. New farm investments are 
necessary to ensure the farm viability due to developments in the field of 
environment, animal welfare, technology, energy, commercialisation and distribution, 
the liberalisation of the market, reorientation of EU policy etc. 
The investment support wants to encourage adaptations of the farm structure related 
to: 
• Decrease of the production costs 
• Improvement and switch of production 
• Increase of quality 
• Improvement of environment, hygienic circumstances and animal welfare 
• Stimulation of farm diversification 
The intensity of support ranges from 10 to 30 per cent. It depends on the extent to 
which government wants to stimulate the investment and takes into account the 
economic life span of the investment. Investment support can be granted both as 
interest subsidy or capital subsidy depending on the way of financing. Supplementary 
to the own guarantees, during a 15-year period, a community guarantee can be 
attributed for an amount of maximum 80 per cent of the subsidized credit (VLIF 
2007). 
Figure 6.2 indicates the total estimated costs within Flemish agriculture submitted for 
establishment and investment support by VLIF over a 14 year time period. The 
regression in 2000 can be explained by the dioxin crisis that affected the Flemish 
agricultural sector in 1999. The total amount of investments is on average a factor 10 
higher than the total amount of establishment costs and shows an increasing trend. 
At Flemish level, relatively more farm investments are made, compared to the early 
nineties, but the relative amount per application remains more or less constant 
(Figure 6.3). There are more applications for farm investments, while the number of 
farms decreases, indicating an increasing trend to invest in order to stay competitive 
(one farm can submit several applications). After the dioxin crisis, the estimated cost 
submitted for establishment support stabilized in the period 2002-2005 (on average 
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200 applications per year). The high increase during the last years (both in number of 
applications and estimated total cost) can be explained by the changes in application 
procedure, a higher amount of establishment support applications to anticipate an 
expected decrease in establishment subsidies, the increased importance of business 
entities with separate legal personality, the increased amount of farms where both 
partners (man and woman) are farm manager and each submit separately an 
application for establishment support, and last but not least an increased faith in the 
future of agriculture (VLIF 2007). 
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Figure 6.2 Total estimated cost submitted for establishment and investment support in Flanders  
Source: VLIF 2007 
 
For the establishment costs, we can see that the average estimated cost per 
submission is increasing over time (Figure 6.3). Stakeholders indicate that the 
estimated costs indicated in the VLIF-statistics are closely related to the VLIF 
regulations: often the estimated costs of farm transfer are estimated maximum 
€250,000, because this is the upper limit for support. The farm value above this limit 
will be transferred in one of the following stages of the farm transfer (gradual farm 
transfer) (Section 6.4.3.1). 
Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3 give an overview of the total estimated cost submitted for 
establishment support and investment support. Delaender (2008) states that 95 per 
cent of these applications are approved, but not all applications are approved for the 
total submitted amount. Table 6.1 indicates that 92 per cent of the establishment 
support submissions is related to the agricultural sector and 8 per cent to the 
horticultural sector. The average cost per approved application is €168,293 and on 
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average 30 per cent of these costs are financed by means of establishment subsidies 
(€50,564) (Table 6.2). 
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Figure 6.3 Average amount of VLIF establishment and investment support per submission  
Source: VLIF 2007 
 
Table 6.1 Overview of submission for establishment support in agriculture and horticulture (2006)  
 Agriculture Horticulture Total 
Total estimated cost submitted for 
establishment support (€) 
81,271,594 6,929,964 88,201,557 
Total number of applications for 
establishment support 
378 51 429 
Total estimated cost submitted for 
investment support (€) 
306,751,276 160,635,341 467,386,617 
Total number of applications for 
investment support 
3,277 1,515 4,792 
Source: VLIF 2007 
 
As not only successors can apply for VLIF investment support, the total number of 
applications and related total cost for investment subsidies in 2006 are much higher 
compared to the establishment subsidies (Table 6.1). With 34 per cent of the total 
estimated cost submitted, the horticultural sector is much more represented within 
the submission of investment support than in the submission of establishment 
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support. The average cost per approved application is €71,706 of which on average 
25 per cent (€18,168) is financed by investment subsidies (Table 6.3). 
 
Table 6.2 Overview of approved applications related to VLIF establishment support (2006)  
Total approved cost for establishment support (€) Agriculture 32,010,810 
 Horticulture 2,321,003 
 Total 34,331,813 
Total number of approved applications   204 
Average cost per approved application for establishment support (€) 168,293 
Total amount of attribute establishment support (€)  10,315,092 
of which Flemish support (€)  6,021,000 
of which European support (EOGFL) (€)  4,294,092 
Percentage attributed establishment support related to total approved cost 30% 
Source: VLIF 2007 
 
Table 6.3 Overview of approved applications related to VLIF investment support (2006)  
Total approved cost for investment support (€) Agriculture 141,399,446 
 Horticulture 71,207,704 
 Total 212,607,150 
Total number of approved applications   2,965 
Average cost per approved application for investment support (€) 71,706 
Total amount of attribute investment support (€)  53,869,002 
of which Flemish support (€)  40,401,752 
of which European support (EOGFL) (€)  13,467,251 
Percentage attributed investment support related to total approved cost 25% 
Source: VLIF 2007 
 
6.2.2.4. Importance of the different sources of farm transfer financing 
Figure 6.4 indicates that at the end of the farm life cycle the family’s equity is relative 
high, compared to the bank loans. At the moment of farm transfer, the loans of the 
bank increase to an average amount of €250,000 –the maximum amount for VLIF 
support, but PDMs are free to apply for higher loans – while the family’s equity 
Chapter 6 
118 
drops. The first years after farm transfer, the successor establishes an increase of the 
TFA, by increasing the family’s equity. This increase is possible because of higher 
farm results, lower family expenses and more profitable conditions for loans of 
young farm families, compared to the older farm families (Landbouw-Economisch 
Instituut and Rabobank Nederland 1987). The loans will decrease after a period of 6, 
10 to 15 years, depending on the redemption period of the loans, but at that time, 
new investments can further increase the competitiveness of the farm, or the 
successor has to compensate the family for the financial help at the moment of farm 
transfer. 
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Figure 6.4 Financial situation of average farm close before and after farm transfer  
Source: own calculations based on Flemish FADN database 
 
When differentiating on farm size, based on TFA, we can fine-tune the results of 
Figure 6.4. As expected, at the moment of farm transfer, the bank loans increase to a 
higher extent for farms with high TFA compared to the groups with lower TFA 
(Figure 6.5). But from a relative point of view (Figure 6.6), the bank loans of the 
farms with TFA more than €500,000, cover a significant lower percentage of the 
TFA after farm transfer, compared to the relative smaller farms. The explanation is 
based on the fact that the VLIF-support takes maximum €250,000 into account for 
capital and rent subsidies. Farms with TFA of more than €500,000 envisage high 
farm transfer costs, but on average the family will carry a relative higher percentage 
of financing: gradual farm transfer can lower the external burden of debt. For farms 
with a TFA below €200,000, it is more favourable to have a relative high loan from 
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the bank, as the VLIF support does not cover only a capital subsidy, but also the 
interest subsidy up to an amount of €250,000 (Section 6.2.2.3). 
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Figure 6.5 Absolute amount of external financing of the family farm differentiated by TFA 
Source: own calculations based on Flemish FADN database 
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Figure 6.6 Relative amount of external financing of the family farm differentiated by TFA 
Source: own calculations based on Flemish FADN database 
 
Table 6.4 gives an overview of the VLIF applications, related to submission 
trajectory. A subcategory diversification is indicated as the Flemish government pays 
high attention to farm diversification.  
Chapter 6 
120 
Table 6.4 Submission of VLIF applications (2006) 
 Submissions 
through 
individual 
person  
Submissions 
through 
financial 
institutions 
Total amount 
of submitted 
costs 
Total estimated cost related to 
establishment support 
1,314,975 86,886,582 88,201,557 
Number of submissions related to 
establishment support 
16 413  
Average estimated cost related to 
establishment support 
82,186 210,379  
Total estimated cost related to 
investment support 
59,873,396 407,513,221 467,386,617 
Number of submissions related to 
investment support 
1,785 3,007  
Average estimated cost related to 
investment support 
33,543 135,522  
Total estimated cost related to 
diversification investments 
2,710,565 12,838,005 15,548,570 
Number of submission related to 
diversification investments 
90 141  
Average estimated cost related to 
diversification investments 
30,117 91,050  
Total estimated cost 63,898,936 507,237,808 571,136,744 
• Total amount through 
financial institutions 
25,00011 454,867,660 454,892,660 
• Total amount through own 
financing 
63,873,936 48,427,362 112,301,298 
Percentage own financing 100% 10%  
Source: VLIF 2007 
 
Table 6.4 indicates that the majority of submissions related to establishment support 
are done through financial institutions. The average level of establishment cost is 
also much higher if financial institutions are involved. In case of financing 
                                                 
11 No specific financial institution was indicated on the application form 
 Financing of farm transfer and influence on farm practice 
121 
investments through financial institutions, on average 10 per cent of owner’s equity 
is provided by the PDM.  
6.3. Methodology 
6.3.1. Hypotheses 
The importance of financing farm transfer is tested based on the following sub 
hypotheses: 
6. High total farm assets are positive correlated with a high absolute external financing 
leap 
7. High total farm assets are positive correlated with a high relative external financing leap 
8. The way of financing the family farm determines farm management of the next farm life 
cycle 
 
6.3.2. Data 
The results of this chapter are based on the FADN database (Section 5.5.2.1), the 
questionnaire related to the succession intention model (Appendix 1) and in-depth 
interviews. 
 
6.3.3. Modelling changes in external financing at the moment of farm transfer 
Figure 6.5 and Figure 6.6 indicate considerable changes related to the origin of farm 
financing at the moment of farm transfer. The external financing sources increase 
both in absolute and relative numbers as the successor makes use of bank loans to 
finance the farm transfer. An external financing leap is established. 
By means of an econometric model, the influencing factors of this external financing 
leap are analysed. Based on the interview with Cops (2008), our hypothesis is that a 
high TFA entails a high external financing leap both in absolute as relative numbers, 
while the external financing leap is negative related with the debt status of the 
parents: financial institutions take into account the financial situation of the PDM 
when deciding on a loan for the successor. Moreover, our hypothesis states that the 
age has a negative influence on the external financing leap because older successor 
could already accumulate capital before farm transfer, and a high farm obsoleteness 
(FO), indicating relative depreciated machinery, lowers the external financing leap.  
The external financing leap can be visualised both in absolute and relative numbers.  
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• The absolute external financing leap (AEFL) indicates the difference between 
the absolute external financing amount the first year after farm transfer and 
the absolute external financing amount in the last year before farm transfer. 
• The relative external financing leap (REFL) indicates the difference between 
the debt status (external capital/total capital) the first year after farm transfer 
and the debt status the last year before farm transfer. 
In Table 6.5, the descriptive statistics of AEFL and REFL are given. 
 
Table 6.5 Descriptive statistics of AEFL and REFL 
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum Cases 
AEFL 104,511 110,072 0.00 586,673 115 
REFL 35.18 30.16 0.00 96.15 115 
 
To test the hypotheses, an ordinary least square data regression is performed related 
to the AEFL (Model [3]) and to REFL (Model [4]) making use of the Flemish 
FADN data. Based on the interview with Cops (2008), we assume that AEFL and 
REFL are influenced by the financial position of the leaving PDM (SOLVPDM), the 
productive capacity after farm transfer (FOsucc), the age of the successor (AGEsucc) and 
the TFA of the farm after farm transfer (TFAsucc).  
The FO (farm obsoleteness) reflects the modernity of the farm. FO is calculated as 
the accumulated farm depreciations divided by the total assets that have to be 
depreciated (%). FO indicates whether investments are made to remain competitive 
in a rapidly changing farm environment. An increase of the FO indicates that 
investments become dated. If new investments are made, this is reflected in a 
decrease in the relative amount that is already depreciated (i.e. decrease of FO). The 
financial position is reflected in the farm solvency (SOLVPDM), calculated as the own 
capital divided by the current market value of the total assets before depreciation 
(%). It indicates the burden of debt by the farm, i.e. possible financial difficulties in 
the future. A high solvency involves that most of the farm property is owned by the 
PDM and loans from the bank are limited.  
 
AEFL = α3 + β9 FOsucc + β10 SOLVPDM + β11 AGEsucc + β12 TFAsucc  + ε [3] 
 
REFL = α4 + β13 FOsucc + β14 SOLVPDM + β15 AGEsucc + β16 TFAsucc  + ε [4] 
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Table 6.6 provides the descriptive statistics, measures of central tendency, measures 
of dispersion, and number of observations of the four independent variables of the 
AEFL and REFL model. The correlation matrix is given in Table 6.7.  
 
Table 6.6 Descriptive statistics of AEFL and REFL model 
Variable Mean SD Minimum Maximum Cases 
FOsucc 44.14 26.10 1.74 90.20 115 
SOLVPDM 78.06 20.76 2.88 100.00 115 
AGEsucc 28.71 4.66 21.00 42.00 115 
TFAsucc 357,232.09 216,476.81 38,868.00 1,077,760.00 115 
Source: own calculations based on Flemish FADN database 
 
Table 6.7 Correlation matrix of the independent variables of AEFL and REFL model 
 FOsucc SOLVPDM AGEsucc TFAsucc 
FOsucc 1.000     
SOLVPDM -0.096 1.000   
AGEsucc 0.181 * -0.214 ** 1.000  
TFAsucc -0.148 * -0.302 ** -0.092 1.000 
Source: own calculations based on Flemish FADN database 
**: significant at 0.01 level 
*: significant at 0.05 level 
 
Within these ordinary least square regression models, no problems of 
multicolinearity, autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity or endogeneity are observed12. 
6.4. Empirical results 
6.4.1.  Absolute external financing leap 
The model is tested by means of an ordinary least square data regression. Table 6.8 
indicates that the independent variables of the AEFL model are statistically 
                                                 
12 No problems related to multicolinearity are observed as the correlations in Table 5.6 and 
Table 5.7 are low. The Durbin-Watson statistics indicate no problems of autocorrelation 
(AEFL: 1.77 and REFL: 1.99). The graphical interpretation of squared residuals in relation 
with AEFL/REFL indicate that there is no heteroscedasticity.  The Hausman test is used to 
test the endogeneity. 
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significant at the 5 per cent alpha level. The constant is not significant at the 5 per 
cent level. The independent variables of the model account for 36 per cent of the 
variance in the dependent variable (adjusted R²).  
 
Table 6.8 Parameters of the OLS data regression of the AEFL model 
Variable Coefficient (β) St. Error β/st.er. P[|Z|]>z 
Constant 52,907.41 76,360.77 0.693 0.490 
FOsucc -1,234.53 325.77 -3.790 0.000 
SOLVPDM 2,003.89 432.96 4.628 0.000 
AGEsucc -3,772.83 1,852.11 -2.037 0.044 
TFAsucc 0.162376 0.0410286 3.958 0.000 
Adjusted R² 0.36    
Model test F(4, 110) = 17.16  0.000 
 
The results of this model indicate that AEFL and the variable FO are negatively 
correlated. If FO increases by one per cent, all else constant, the AEFL decreases 
with on average €1,235. In other words, more modern farms who have recently 
invested and thus have to depreciate more farm investments, need a higher amount 
of external financing sources to cover the farm transfer. The solvency of the 
previous farmer before farm transfer influences the AEFL in a positive way. An 
increase of the solvency by one per cent, ceteris paribus, enables the successor to 
have an average increase in the external financed capital by €2,004. It means that 
banks put more faith in the successor if the parents were more reliable in repaying 
debts. Within the evaluation of risk at the moment of farm transfer, financial 
institutions include indeed characteristics of the previous farmer (Cops 2008): higher 
loans are approved if the solvency of the previous farmer was more favourable. The 
negative effect of the age on the AEFL, holding all else constant, indicates that older 
farm successors need less external financing. Each extra age year of the successor 
make that the AEFL decreases with €3,773, all else constant. During the years before 
farm succession, successors are able to accumulate own financial means. The longer 
this period, the less the requirement for external capital. Finally the size of the farm, 
reflected in TFA has an influence on the AEFL of the farm transfer. An increase of 
the TFA by €1,000 increases the AEFL by €162. The transfer of larger farms, in 
terms of TFA, entails higher external capital needs in absolute numbers, but the 
increase is disproportional. 
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6.4.2.  Relative external financing leap 
The results of the REFL model are given in Table 6.9. Within this model, all 
independent variables are significant at the 5 per cent level.  
 
Table 6.9 Parameters of the OLS data regression of the REFL model 
Variable Coefficient (β) St. Error β/st.er. P[|Z|]>z 
Constant 47.18 20.66 2.284 0.024 
FOsucc -0.310 0.088 -3.515 0.001 
SOLVPDM 0.593 0.117 5.060 0.000 
AGEsucc -1.270 0.501 -2.534 0.013 
TFAsucc -0.000023 0.000011 -2.053 0.042 
Adjusted R² 0.38    
Model test F(4, 110) = 18.30  0.000 
  
Similar to the AEFL model, an increase of FOsucc by one per cent, decreases the 
REFL with 0.31 per cent, ceteris paribus. In other words, more modern farms have a 
relative higher amount of external financing. An increase of the solvency of the 
leaving farmer by one per cent, holding all else constant, is reflected in an average 
increase of the REFL by 0.59 per cent. An increase of the age of the successor by 
one year, decreases the REFL by 1.27 per cent, ceteris paribus. Both the AEFL and 
REFL model indicate the same tendencies for farm obsoleteness, solvency and the 
age of the successor. The two models differ related to the influence of the farm size. 
The REFL decreases with 2.3 per cent if the TFA increases with €100,000. Larger 
farms need in absolute terms more external financing to cover farm transfer, but in 
relative terms the external financing is less important than on smaller farms. The 
descriptive tendencies of Figure 6.6 are confirmed by the REFL model. As the VLIF 
support is limited to a maximum amount of €250,000, farm successors tend to limit 
the bank loans and rely on the family to overcome the transfer period through, e.g. 
gradual farm transfer, family loans and gifts. 
 
6.4.3.  Influence of financing on farm transfer 
6.4.3.1. Types of farm transfer 
In general, two types of farm transfer can be distinguished: the direct farm transfer 
and the gradual farm transfer. Within the direct farm transfer, the whole farm is 
transferred at a given moment from leaving PDM to successor. All financial 
Chapter 6 
126 
arrangements are made at that time, entailing that the successor has a high burden of 
debt. The advantage of the direct farm transfer is that family conflicts related to the 
farm value can be limited. The farm management between the leaving PDM and the 
new PDM is clearly separated. The disadvantage is that the high burden of debt 
brings along the impracticability of new investment in the years following the farm 
transfer. 
The gradual farm transfer causes a lower financial burden for the new PDM: in the 
first stage, the moveable property of the farm and production rights are transferred 
to the successor, often for an amount of €250,000, because this is the maximum cost 
for VLIF support. In the following years, the remaining moveable property of the 
farm and production rights can be transferred to the new PDM. The farm buildings 
and agricultural land in property of the leaving PDM are rented to the successor. In 
the majority of cases the successor becomes the new leaseholder of the rented 
agricultural land, instead of the leaving PDM (Section 6.4.3.4). The farm buildings 
and agricultural land in property are transferred gradually from the leaving PDM to 
the successor during the farmer’s career. At the end of the new farm life cycle, the 
majority of the farm is owned by the new PDM (Van der Meersche and De Marez 
1997). The advantage of the gradual farm transfer is a higher feasibility of farm 
investments in the years following the first stage of farm transfer. These investments 
are made in order to stay competitive. During the gradual farm transfer the leaving 
PDM and the successor (‘samenuitbating’) often cooperate (Van der Meersche and 
De Marez 1997).  
The type of farm transfer will have also an effect on the farm strategies used (Section 
6.4.3.2) and on the length of the succession ladder (Section 6.4.3.3).  
 
Farmer Jan (26): 
“At the moment of farm transfer, I took over the moveable property of the farm for an 
amount of €250,000, as this is the maximum amount covered by VLIF (Flemish 
Agricultural Investment Fund). This was 60% of the farm. The transfer of the next part of 
the farm will be at the moment that my father retires, or if there are financial or tax 
advantages. I do not take the support for granted, I would prefer a system with fair product 
prices, and without such support, because in that case, the government does not have to put 
limitations on production etc. So everything free, a good price and no support any more!” 
 
Farmer Bart (33): 
“It was a direct farm transfer, a sale arranged by the notary. It is financially difficult, but I 
like it more this way because if later one of the parents dies, brothers and sisters (in law) are 
also involved and problems arise. There were no gifts, so at the moment something happens, 
everything is mine.” 
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6.4.3.2. Farm transfer strategies 
A major constraint in replacing one generation by another is the transition phase, 
which may include the cooperation between 2 generations. During this period, the 
inclusion of a new farm worker tends to cause a fall in the average productivity of 
labour because other production factors, land in particular, are not very flexible 
(Blanc and Perrier-Cornet 1993).  
Within the sample of the survey among Flemish farmers’ children, the successor is 
already designated on average 5 years before, or in other words given the average age 
of 23 of respondents, at the average age of 18 years and the transfer will be within 6 
to 7 years, at the average age of 29. At that time, the father will reach the average age 
of 61, and can retire. This makes that within the sampled families the transition 
phase started around the average age of 50 years of the PDM, which is in accordance 
with the results of Chapter 5.  
In general, the length of the transition phase is the outcome of 3 main variables: the 
age difference between the leaving PDM and the successor, the age at which the 
leaving PDM retires and the age at which the successor enters working life (Blanc 
and Perrier-Cornet 1993). In order to avoid lower productivity, the successor can 
raise the potential farm income, creating an economic surplus that can be divided 
between the two generations (parents and successors). This makes both parties better 
off than their second-best alternative. The second-best alternative can be for the 
parents to eventually sell the farm outside the family, and for the child to find an 
alternative source of income, or for both, delaying the succession decision by 
another period before making an irreversible agreement (Kimhi and Nachlieli 2001). 
In general, farm families use different strategies in order to increase or decrease the 
length of the transition phase (Boehlje and Eisgruber 1972). In larger families, the 
farm can be transferred later, since there are more potential successors and parents 
can take more time before making a decision, especially if uncertainty about 
successors’ performance exists (Nerlove et. al. 1987 referred by Kimhi 1994). A way 
to shorten the transition period, which is common in Ireland, is that farmers marry 
late and choose their successors among the younger children. In this manner, the age 
gap between the successor and his father is widened, and the transition period 
shortened (Blanc and Perrier-Cornet 1993). Another way to shorten the transition 
period is the occupational mobility, where the possible successor takes an off-farm 
job for some time, until the father gives up managing the farm. This supposes an 
open attitude towards changing jobs, the availability of jobs outside the farm and a 
good mobility (Blanc and Perrier-Cornet 1993, Hennessy and Rehman 2007).  
Hypothesis 8 did not focus on these strategies in particular, neither on the age 
difference between leaving PDM and the successor and the length of the transition 
stage. In our Flemish dataset, the average age of the farmers to have their first child 
is 27 years, while for the total male population in Belgium this average age is 31 year 
(Federal Public Service Economy SMEs Self-employed and Energy 2008b). This 
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indicates that the Irish strategy of delaying marriage and birth of the first child is not 
used in Belgium. Opposite, Flemish farmers have their first child on a relatively 
younger age than in general. 
Our results indicate that the number of children has also no influence on the 
duration of the transition phase. Only the age at which the successor is designated, is 
related with the school level: the average age of successor designation increases as 
the level of schooling increases.  
The in-depth interviews and FADN accounting data indicate both a strategy of 
creating more labour intensive activities on the farm (Figure 6.7) and a strategy of 
occupational mobility in Flanders (Figure 6.8). After finishing their studies, farmers’ 
children work a couple of years outside the farm before taking over the family farm. 
At the moment of farm transfer they reduce the off-farm employment. The possible 
danger of this transition phase strategy is that occupational mobility evokes farm exit, 
but on the other side, it gives the potential successor the possibility to make a well-
considered choice. 
 
Farmer Jan (26): 
“I always wanted to take over the family farm. But my father was not yet old enough to 
retire when I finished my studies as agricultural engineering (industrieel ingenieur landbouw). 
So I started working as salesman in a crop protection firm, but I didn’t like it that much. 
After 14 months, I changed the job, but in this new job, the work I did was not related to 
my studies. I decided to never work for an employer again and started as self-employed 
person. I took over the family farm for 60%, but there was not enough work on the farm for 
two full time labour units. So I’m also working as agricultural contractor, and in winter, I 
work as freelancer for a seed company. This is a provisional arrangement: after we finished 
the slurry depot and the new cow house, we will enlarge the milk quota. At that moment, 
there will be work enough on the farm and I can quit my job as freelancer.”   
 
Successor Raf (22): 
“If the farm remains profitable, I would like to take over the family farm, but first I want to 
work for 10 to 15 years. My father is only 50 years. But during that period, I would help 
my father during the weekends. My parents would give me a monthly wage for the weekend 
labour. If I wait for 10 to 15 years, the future of the farm will be more clear, as the 
dockland of Antwerp is expanding and our farm is threatened. But my father has doubt 
about the fact that I will return to the farm if I start to work out of the farm. He is afraid to 
lose me, but I do not think that this will be the case.”  
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Figure 6.7 Average labour use before and after farm transfer  
Source: FADN database 
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Figure 6.8 Off-farm employment of PDM13 
Source: FADN database 
                                                 
13 Before farm transfer (until year 0), the PDM refers to the leaving PDM. After farm 
transfer (from year 1) the PDM is the farm successor. 
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6.4.3.3. Succession ladder 
During the transition phase, the managerial control of the family farm is handed 
over, bit by bit, to the successor. He is climbing gradually the ‘succession ladder’, 
which is the order in which the successor is getting involved in farm management 
tasks. According to Hastings (2003), first the technical decisions (e.g. type of 
fertilizer to be used) and the tactical decisions concerning the day-to-day planning 
and organisation of the work, are handed over to the successor because 
considerations of retirement and succession cannot be disentangled from day-to-day 
farm-management (Kimhi and Lopez 1999). Next come the decisions related to the 
long-term strategic planning of the farm business (e.g. deciding and planning capital 
projects). The following rung of the ladder are the decisions related to the 
employment and management of staff on the farm (e.g. deciding when to take on 
additional staff). On the fourth rung, the successor begins to become involved 
directly in financial matters (e.g. negotiating sales of farm products). And finally the 
last rung is the decision when to pay bills: this is one of the last areas of 
responsibility to be handed on to the next generation (Errington 2002).  
Based on the questionnaire related to the succession intention model (Appendix 1), 
our results indicate, to a certain extent, the same follow up of handing over the 
managerial control as proposed by Errington (2002), although we distinguish a more 
limited number of rungs within the Flemish family farms (Figure 6.9). The following 
rungs can be distinguished: 
• Farmers’ successors indicate that they are first involved in the day-to-day 
farm management: they are involved in daily planning and organisation of the 
work  
• The next rung is related to the technical decisions, such as type of fertiliser to 
be used etc. 
• The third rung involves the long run planning, including financial 
negotiations etc.  
• The last rung is related to the payment of bills and people’s management  
The comparison between the results of Hastings (2003) and the results of our 
research, reveals that the first rungs are more distinguished within our results: first 
decisions related to the daily planning and the organisation of the work are handed 
over, not yet including the technical decisions. These only come on the second rung, 
while Hastings (2003) all includes them in the first rung. On the next rung, similar as 
in the research of Hastings (2003), the long term planning is handed over, but we 
include already the financial decisions. Payment of bills is situated on the last rung, in 
combination with the management of labour. The management of labour is, 
according to Hastings (2003), handed over in an earlier stage, but the fact that it is 
situated on the last rung can be ascribed to a limited amount of hired labour in 
Flemish agriculture. 
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Figure 6.9 Order of involvement in the managerial control by the farm successor14 
Source: SIM questionnaire 
 
6.4.3.4. Land 
Both in direct and gradual farm transfer, the successor mostly rents the agricultural 
land from the parents or takes over the land lease of the previous PDM because the 
majority of the agricultural land in Flanders is rented. This is the result of history and 
legislation: in the 19th century, liege lords leased out land to farmers (Swinnen 2002). 
Until 1950, farmers bought land at moments when agriculture was profitable and 
sold land at times of losses. But changes in the land lease legislation in favour of the 
leaseholder, made that this cyclic tendency ended and on average 70% of the 
agricultural land is leased (1952: maximum prices of land lease are established; 1967: 
                                                 
14 The percentages indicate the number of respondents that ranked a management aspect at a 
given rank order 
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an automatic renewal of the land lease contract after a period of 9 year land lease is 
put into force). Moreover, in case that land is property of the farming family, the 
Belgian legislation (Belgisch Staatsblad 2007) states that ‘the inheritance is divided in 
equal shares, but the preservation of the unity of the holding is primordial’, making it 
normal that the successor has to lease the land from his non-farming brothers and 
sisters.  
In general, the land lease legislation states that land lease is provided for a period of 9 
years, but also career land lease (loopbaanpacht) is possible (duration is equal to 65 
year minus the age of the PDM, although the minimum duration is 27 year) (KBC 
Bank NV 2004). The career land lease gives more security to the PDM, but the 
landlord can ask higher rent. Seasonal land lease (seizoenspacht) and crop land lease 
(cultuurpacht) last less than one year, and are not bounded to the land lease 
legislation (KBC Bank NV 2004). 
The leaseholder can transfer the lease to his descendants or adopted childs, to those 
of his husband/wife, or to the husbands or wifes of his descendants and adopted 
childs, without permit of the landlord (KBC Bank NV 2004, De Bondt 2005). In all 
other cases, the landlord has to give his permission. 
If the leaseholders declare, within a period of 3 months after farm transfer, to the 
landlord that the lease is transferred, then it is called a ‘privileged transfer of the 
lease’ (bevoorrechte pachtoverdracht), and brings along a land lease renewal 
(pachtvernieuwing). A new first land lease period of 9 years starts. The old 
leaseholder is released from all obligations that arise after the notification (KBC 
Bank NV 2004). 
The landlord can resist the privileged transfer of the lease, within a period of 3 
months following on the notification, and based on serious grounds explained in the 
law. The major reason is the intention of the landlord to exploit the land himself. If 
the transfer of the land lease to a third party happens without the approval of the 
landlord although this is required by law, the landlord can break the lease due to 
illegal transfer of the land lease (KBC Bank NV 2004). 
If a farmer wants to start as legal entity, the land lease has to be transferred from the 
natural person to the legal entity that becomes the new operator, except for the 
agricultural company (Landbouwvennootschap – LV). From that moment on, no 
transfer of land lease is required and the land lease lasts for successive periods of 9 
years. 
If the land was in ownership of the parents, the successor will often not buy all the 
land at the moment of farm transfer because of high land prices, but a land lease 
contract between the new PDM and the parents will be established (Figure 6.10). 
After a certain period of time, the successor can become owner of the land through 
buying the land from the parents or inheritance (Elhorst 1987, Landbouw-
Economisch Instituut and Rabobank Nederland 1987). 
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Figure 6.10 Relationship between land in ownership and rented land before and after farm transfer  
Source: FADN database 
 
 
 
 
Farmer Peter (28): 
“It was not a problem to transfer the land lease to the BVBA. We had a meeting with all 
landlords of which we rent land. Part of them is family, and they did not have any problem 
with the transfer of the lease. If you are a natural person, or an agricultural company (LV), 
you can have privileged transfer of the rent, but this is not the case for the BVBA. So you 
have two possibilities: you have a meeting with all landlords and explain the intentions of 
becoming a BVBA, or you do it without telling them, but at the moment that they know 
that the farm is converted to a BVBA, you risk that they stop the land lease, and you lose 
part of the land. If part of the rented land is close to the homestead, that involves high risk. 
In our case, the rented land is rather far from the homestead and it would not be a breaking 
point if I would loose 1 or 2 hectares. For others, this is of major importance.”  
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6.4.4. Farm practice 
6.4.4.1. Farm management 
According to McCrostie Little and Taylor (1998), the predominant type of farming is 
unlikely to change in the process of succession, but the actual methods of farming 
may change between generations. Potential farm successors can also intend to carry 
out changes in the farm management after farm transfer. In our research two third of 
the farm successors want to implement production investments. An increase of the 
agricultural land is an option for half of the respondents. But changing the kind of 
commodity produced is not the prime objective of the majority of farm successors, 
as is also indicated by the fact that only 17 per cent of the respondents states the 
objective to change the kind of animals or crops after farm transfer (Table 6.10).  
 
Table 6.10 Management changes after farm transfer (% of respondents intending change)  
Investments based on production 68 
Increase of agricultural land 48 
Changes in management 38 
Investments based on environment 25 
Diversification of agriculture 17 
Changes in kind of crops and animals 17 
Changes in production method 14 
No idea 11 
No changes 7 
Source: SIM questionnaire 
Farmer Jan (26): 
“Everywhere, there is a shortage of agricultural land. In this region it is a problem to acquire 
extra land, so we have to work in a tactical way. For the farm that we have taken over, half 
of the land is bought, half of it is rented. 
In my opinion, there is problem with the land use. In our street there is a farmer aged 75 
who continues to farm, but according to me, that is not possible. Another one is aged 64 and 
will continue farming until his grandson, aged 10 years, will take over the farm. Is this also 
the case in other occupations? Somebody who works in a factory, or a butcher or baker will 
not work until he is 75, even if he likes the profession…” 
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In general, farm successors do not intend to change the farm type, but changes are 
made to improve the production. This is linked to the goal of a high quality of plant 
and animal production as stated by 64% of the respondents (Table 6.11).  
 
Table 6.11 Farm successor’s goals in future farming system (% of respondents’ goal)  
High quality of plant and animal production 64  
Positive image of farming to outside world 54  
Higher financial independence of farm 43  
Expand the farm size 37  
Develop farm for future generation 23  
Environmental friendly production 21 
Search for innovative production methods 20 
Limitation of risk 18 
Changes in kind of animals and crops 8  
Source: SIM questionnaire 
 
 
Farmer Jan (26): 
“I never considered changing farm type. Maybe I will increase the arable production, because 
I like it, we are quit freaks of agricultural machinery. We have taken over another arable 
farm, as we needed more land because of the manure regulations. Dairy production is easy, 
and the combination with arable production is good. After a winter with dairy production, 
you can go outside and you need in any case the land for the manure regulations. In the 
future, we will maybe cultivate a little more vegetables to increase the financial profitability by 
having 2 crops a year. In the past, this was not possible because we needed grass land for the 
cows, but the extra land can be used for vegetables such as spinach.” 
  
Successor Alexander (18): 
“If I take over the farm, I’ll maybe quit the sow production, and only fatten the piglets, but 
the disadvantage is that I have to purchase all the young animals, and the risk of diseases 
increases. Fattening pigs is much easier to work, because sows are labour intensive and the 
profitability is low. I would keep the vegetable production, but if I have the opportunity, I 
would increase the farm size. The problem is that at the moment that some land is sold, all 
neighbours start to offer like crazy and the land prizes are too high. ”  
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6.4.4.2. Farm labour 
6.4.4.2.1. Labour availability 
In our survey (Appendix 1), the labour input on the farms consists in 89 per cent of 
family labour. Only a limited amount of PDMs uses external labour sources which is 
also confirmed by the FADN data (Figure 6.7). The potential successors are involved 
in the farm work, and as stated by Gray (1998), if the successor works on the farm, 
usually for minimal remuneration, he demonstrates his commitment to farming as a 
career and his abilities to be a successful farmer. The net cost of family labour will 
always be lower than other labourers, given the land-specific experience acquired by 
or provided to the (working) children (Chapter 1). 
Figure 6.11 indicates that after farm transfer, on one fourth of the farms, the labour 
requirements are adapted to the availability of a single person. On 20 per cent of the 
farms, both the manager and the partner are involved in the farm work, while on 38 
per cent of the farms the manager and other family members provide the labour. 
Often the father or mother is still helping on the farm after farm transfer (Figure 
6.12). In 16 per cent of the cases, cooperation between parents and successor exists, 
often during a gradual farm transfer. Figure 6.7 confirms these results: before farm 
transfer, the fulltime labour units steadily increase, indicating the cooperation during 
the (gradual) farm transfer; at the moment of farm transfer, the average fulltime 
labour units decrease. This tendency continues the first years after farm transfer: the 
amount of cooperation between the leaving PDM and the successors gradually 
decreases. 
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Figure 6.11 Labour division after farm transfer  
Source: SIM questionnaire 
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Figure 6.12 Occupation of parents after farm transfer  
Source: SIM questionnaire 
 
Modern technology tends to create reduced work-time in many work situations. 
Depending on farm type, farm size, available time and motivation, it can be likely 
that the farmer or another family member will combine some other paid 
employment with farming (Gasson et al. 1988, Loyns and Kraut 1992, Ahituv and 
Kimhi 2002, Harsche 2005, Salvioni et al. 2005, Ahituv and Kimhi 2006, Benjamin 
and Kimhi 2006) as a way of supplementing the family income with an off-farm 
income. In combination with higher off-farm wages, the attractiveness and 
competitiveness of part-time farming increases as an alternative to a less efficient 
enlargement of farms in terms of farm income (Schmitt 1991). But part-time farmers 
have also disadvantages compared to full-time farmers (Loyns and Kraut 1992):  
• Part-time farmers have a higher cost of credit and more limited credit 
availability 
• The equipment that they use is poor, and often too much related to the farm 
size 
• Part-time farmers lack technical skills and knowledge  
Our in-depth interviews indicate that successors are often working part-time during 
the transfer period, but intend to work full-time in the future. 
 
6.4.4.2.2. Role of partner 
The role of the partner cannot be underestimated in family farming (Blanc and 
MacKinnon 1990, Keating and Little 1994). Data of the Directorate-general Statistics 
Belgium indicate that 88 per cent of the PDM is male (Federal Public Service 
Economy SMEs Self-employed and Energy 2006). Therefore, the role of the partner 
reflects in the majority of cases the role of the woman in the family farm. 
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In the farm business, women are more involved in the business than in other 
occupations. The term ‘women farmers’ covers women working in agriculture, as 
owners, joint owners, or spouses of farmers working full-time or part-time on the 
farm (Economic and Social Committee 2000). Some studies show that decision 
making on many family farms is still male dominated (Gasson and Winter 1992, 
Solano et al. 2001), although this can differ according to region and culture. The 
share of farmers’ women working off-farm is increasing, which can be caused more 
by development in society, rather than by a specific development within the farming 
sector. Since the farm family is both a social and an economic unit, the farmer’s wife 
has to combine a number of roles, contributing to the business as well as fulfilling 
the tasks of wife and mother (Gasson et al. 1988). The on-farm involvement of 
women can be delineated in five categories (Bokemeier and Garkovich 1987):  
• Farm homemaker, who takes care of the household, but is not really involved 
in the farm 
• Agricultural helper 
• Business manager with responsibilities for financial decisions, but not farm 
operations 
• Full agricultural partner who shares equally with her husband work and 
decision making on all aspects of the farm 
• Independent agricultural producer, who manages the farm largely by herself 
The change in society can also change the on-farm involvement of women, or 
reallocate work from an on-farm to an off-farm job (Figure 6.13).  
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Figure 6.13 Off-farm employment of partner  
Source: own calculations based on Flemish FADN database 
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The partner of the leaving PDM has in the majority of cases no off-farm 
employment, while partners of successors work out of the house, often on part-time 
basis. 
Our results indicate that the majority of the successors want that the partner is 
involved in the farm work, both as manager (34%) or helper (20%) (Figure 6.14). 
Some of the partners will be responsible for the administration and finances (12%). 
But also 24% of the successors indicate that the partner will work outside the home. 
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Figure 6.14 Role of partner after farm transfer  
Source: SIM questionnaire 
 
 
Successor Alexander (18): 
“Actually, I do not want a wife who is working on the farm. She has to work out of the 
house. Because it has advantages and disadvantages: if you are working together all the time, 
then you are happy to not see each other once in a while. If your partner is working out of the 
house, she will get a payment of pensions.” 
 
Farmer’s wife Lieve: 
“At this moment, I work full time out of the house. I teach and it is a good combination 
with the children. In the future, I’ll see if I start to work on the farm, but I also like it to 
work out of the house, to have social contact. It has to be financially wise to work on the 
farm, because at this moment, we live from my wage, and the benefits of the farm are used to 
invest and to let the farm grow.”  
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6.4.4.3. Farmer’s income 
The transfer of the family farm influences also the farmers’ income. Figure 6.15 
indicates that the factor income15 increases gradually both before and after farm 
transfer. No drastic change in factor income occur at the moment of farm transfer. 
The transfer of the family farm has however more influence on the farmers’ 
income16. Although the average factor income continues to increase, the average 
farmers’ income decreases because at the moment of farm transfer (1) depreciations 
increase if investments are made, (2) the amount of paid land lease increases because 
also land lease to the parents has to be paid (Section 6.4.3.4), (3) the interest on the 
capital required for the farm transfer has to be paid. In general, there are more fixed 
costs at the beginning of the farm life cycle, compared to the end of the farm life 
cycle. This makes that the average farmers’ income decreases after farm transfer. 
Figure 6.15 also indicates that the average total labour cost does not change 
significantly at the moment of farm transfer. 
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Figure 6.15 Evolution of factor and farmers’ income before and after farm transfer  
Source: own calculations based on Flemish FADN database 
                                                 
15 Factor income = gross output – operational cost + production subsidy + interest subsidy 
– taxes  
16 Farmers’ income = factor income – depreciation – paid land lease – paid labour – paid 
interest + investment subsidy 
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6.5. Conclusions 
Financing farm transfer is one of the crucial aspects in the farm life cycle. As farm 
successors do not have the own financial means to cover the farm transfer and new 
investments, the family farm take-over price is negotiated between the different 
involved parties (successor, family and financial institution) and financial means have 
to become available to finance the transfer. The financial means consist on the one 
hand of family’s equity, and on the other hand of loans of external financial 
institutions. The family’s equity determines the resilience to adverse farming 
conditions. Financing by the family can happen in a direct way through gifts or 
family loans, but also indirect through gradual farm transfer. After farm transfer, the 
family’s equity can be increased through establishment support. An external source 
of financing are the bank loans that are used in the majority of farm transfers. The 
characteristics of the applicant, the farm and the financial position determine the risk 
involved and the evolving interest rate.  
By modelling changes in external financing, it is clear that both the farm 
obsoleteness, the age of the successor, and the solvency of the leaving farmer 
influence the external financing leap at the moment of farm transfer. Farm transfer 
and farm investments entail high external capital needs, but the accumulation of 
capital by the successor before farm transfer lowers the burden of debt. The absolute 
external financing leap increases as the total farm assets increase, but the relative 
external financing leap decreases on larger farms: farm successors tend to limit the 
bank loans and rely on the family to overcome the transfer period through, e.g. 
gradual farm transfer, family loans and gifts. This confirms hypothesis 6, but we 
reject hypothesis 7.  
The types of farm transfer have implications on the different ways of financing farm 
transfer. Within the direct farm transfer, the successor has a high burden of debt, 
and there is limited space for extra farm investments. The gradual farm transfer 
causes a lower burden of debt, and has a higher feasibility of farm investments after 
farm transfer to increase the competitiveness and viability of the farm, but the 
financial implications of farm transfer last for a longer time. Being on good terms 
with the family members is crucial within gradual farm transfer. 
Farm transfer includes also a transition period in which different generations are 
depending on the family farm. In some cases, extra farm activities provide income 
for two families. But PDMs also use different strategies to shorten the transition 
period, and extra income has to be generated. Often the successor works for some 
time outside the farm, and returns to the farm at the moment that the parents retire, 
but one of the main concerns of the parents is that the successor will refuse to come 
back home and take over the family farm. 
After farm transfer, the farm practice will to a certain extent be the continuation of 
the previous farm, although most successors aim at farm expansion in order to have 
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a viable farm. The land in ownership of the leaving PDM is rented by the successor, 
or the land lease is transferred to the successor. Over time, the successor will buy the 
land and is owner at the end of his own farm life cycle. 
The transfer of the family farm has also an effect on the farmer’s income. Although 
the factor income will not change significantly, the increasing fixed costs after farm 
transfer make that the farmer’s income decreases after farm transfer. With these 
results, we confirm that the way of financing the family farm determines farm 
management of the next farm life cycle. 
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7.1. Introduction 
The business legal structure of a farm marks the agricultural production unit. 
Business entities are capable of entering into contracts, or of being held responsible 
for their actions. The legal structure of the business will determine the separation 
between the responsibility of the individual person and the company. Further more, 
it may influence amongst others the access to subsidies, fiscal advantages and farm 
transfer. It is therefore important for a PDM to carefully consider existing legal 
possibilities.  
The legal structure of a farm has inter alias an influence on the taxation, the legal 
liability, the land ownership and the farm transfer. Taken all aspects of legal 
structures into consideration, a farmer may select the best solution for his farm. But 
this is only possible if he possesses all necessary information on legal structures. The 
objective of this chapter is twofold: (1) to analyse the pros and cons of different legal 
structures in different Western European countries. As legal structures are 
considerably more present in French agriculture, we assume that French legal 
structures specifically designed for agriculture are better adapted to the needs of 
farmers than the Belgian ‘agricultural company’; (2) to test the perception and 
motivation of PDMs related to different legal farm statuses. The resulting attitude is 
confronted with the characteristics of legal farm structures, in order to cluster 
farmers towards possible policy measures.  
7.2. Business legal structures of farms 
Running a family business is possible under different legal structures and may 
involve one or more family members (Burkart et al. 2003). According to Crijns and 
De Clerck, 79% of the Belgian firms are family businesses (Van den Berghe and 
Carchon 2002). But within these family businesses different legal structures can 
occur. At the moment that agricultural tasks can be easily monitored in terms of 
input or output, family farms in natural person shift more and more to other forms 
of agricultural organization (Schmitt 1991). 
The two main structures in Western European agriculture are natural persons and 
corporations (companies).  
Natural persons are non-corporate businesses run by sole traders or partners who are 
legally responsible for the business which itself has no legal entity (Hill 2005). Most 
of the family farms in Europe are farmed under sole proprietorship. This legal 
Chapter 7 – Importance, knowledge and perception of  the 
business legal structure of  the farm 
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structure has a number of limitations such as high capital outflow of the sector at the 
moment of succession, personal liability in case of failure or financial problems, high 
labour pressure. There are also fiscal consequences related to tax regulation. The 
number of these private farms declines over long term as the treadmill of technology 
lowers the real prices of agricultural output and makes smaller farms unviable 
(Eurostat 2002). To solve these problems, legal structures have been developed in 
different European countries. In the period 1990-2005, the amount of legal entities 
increased both in absolute and relative numbers (Table 7.1). 
Legal structures for agricultural cooperation differ all over Europe. In France, an 
extensive offer of legal structures for agricultural enterprises is available (e.g. 
GAEC17, EARL18, SCEA19). Compared to the other European countries the share of 
legal entities within the French farm sector is considerable (Table 7.1). In Belgium, in 
1979 the agricultural company (‘Landbouwvennootschap’, LV) was constructed as a 
legal structure specifically for agricultural firms. Although this specific legal structure 
for farms exists in Belgian law, the relative amount of business entities with separate 
legal personality can be compared with the German and Dutch case where no 
specific legal agricultural status exists (Schmitt and Hoffmann 2001). In Europe, 
non-agriculture business entities with separate legal personality are also used in farm 
business, but the majority of the farms are under sole proprietorship. 
 
Table 7.1 Legal entities in agriculture  
 Belgium Germany France The Nether-
lands 
1990 500 7,280 a n.a.b 2,570 Number of legal 
entities 
2005 3,560 23,580 138,640 5,780 
% of total farms 1990 0.6% 1.2% a n.a. 2.1% 
 2005 6.9% 6.0% 24.4% 7.1% 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland 2006, Eurostat 2007 
a the calculation for Germany is based on the year 1991  
b n.a.: not available 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 GAEC: Groupement Agricole d’Exploitation en Commun 
18 EARL: Exploitation Agricole à Responsabilité Limitée 
19 SCEA: Société Civile d’Exploitation Agricole 
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7.2.1. Overview of business legal structures 
An overview of the legal structures in agriculture is given in Figure 7.1.  
 
7.2.1.1. Natural person 
Within the natural person (NP), the farm can be managed in sole proprietorship, or 
farmers can collaborate in a ‘maatschap’ (partnership with relatives with equal 
liability of the partners). The ‘maatschap’ is a partnership without legal personality 
and is often used as collaboration between family members. In 2005, the ‘maatschap’ 
was the legal structure in 27.2 per cent of the farms in the Netherlands (CBS 2007). 
A Dutch ‘maatschap’ lasts on average 10 to 15 years (Van der Veen et al. 2002). In 
Belgium, only 4.2 per cent had this legal structure (Federal Public Service Economy 
SMEs Self-employed and Energy 2006). 
In the configuration of NP, the farming activity is carried out by one farmer alone, 
or with members of the family. As self-employed person in Belgium, the PDM 
exercises a professional activity without being attached to an employer by means of 
an employment contract or status. The NP has in general the required labour and 
knowledge available. Own capital is supplemented with hired capital, in order to be 
able to produce. In the NP, no distinction between the farmer’s personal assets and 
professional assets is made.  
 
7.2.1.2. Business entity with separate legal personality 
A business entity with separate legal personality (BLP) can be established specifically 
for agricultural purpose (e.g. LV, EARL, GAEC), or a general form of BLP can be 
used within the agricultural sector (e.g. BVBA20, NV21, CVBA22).  
BLPs are characterised by legal bodies meaning that the firm receives an own legal 
identity. Family members can possess shares of the firm. BLP separates private assets 
from professional assets. The free transferability of shares can be limited and 
cooperation can be structured. BLPs give the farmer the possibility to attract 
partners for capital investment: non-farming family or third parties can enter certain 
types of BLPs. The BLP has an unlimited lifetime which entails that the continuity of 
the firm is independent of the people behind the firm. A BLP has also some 
                                                 
20 BVBA: ‘Besloten Vennootschap met Beperkte Aansprakelijkheid’ - Private Company with 
Limited Liability or Ltd. 
21 NV: ‘Naamloze Vennootschap’ – Public Limited Company 
22 CVBA: ‘Coöperatieve Vennootschap met Beperkte Aansprakelijkheid’ – Cooperative 
Company with Limited Liability 
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economic advantages: the property holders can be remunerated for their investments 
in the firm, and non-farmer capital contributors have interest in the results (De 
Muynck 2007). The main disadvantages of BLPs are the difficulties for control, and 
high transaction and agency costs (Van den Berghe and Carchon 2003, Boatright 
2004). In the family based Flemish agriculture, these general problems do not play a 
prominent role. A more important disadvantage is the more complex constitution. 
Various legal rules must be complied with within the functioning of a company: 
internal regulations and articles of associations must be drawn up, meetings must be 
held between members of the association and the farm falls often under more 
administrative demanding rules for obtaining subsidies, tax declarations and so on 
(Van der Veen et al. 2002, KBC Bank NV 2006, Terre d'Europe 2007). 
 
 
Figure 7.1 Overview of legal structures in agriculture 
Source: own compilation 
 
Business legal 
structures in 
agriculture 
 ‘Natural person’  
(NP) 
Sole proprietorship 
‘Maatschap’  
(e.g. Nl, B) 
Business entity with 
separate legal personality 
(BLP) 
Legal structure 
exclusive for farms, 
e.g.: 
LV (B) 
GAEC (F) 
EARL (F) 
SCEA (F) 
Legal structure not 
exclusive for farms, 
e.g.:  
BVBA (B) 
NV (B) 
CVBA (B) 
EBVBA (B) 
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The Agricultural Company (‘Landbouwvennootschap’, LV, Belgium) is a very 
specific type of BLP for the purpose of operating an agricultural or horticultural 
business in Belgium. The LV has managing partners and – sometimes – sleeping 
partners. A managing partner is a partner who exercises an activity in a company to 
yield a return on the capital, which can be partly of his own. His activity can be 
managerial or administrative in nature. A sleeping partner is a partner who limits 
himself to receiving the benefits from his invested capital without exercising a 
professional activity. Managing partners have to earn more than 50 per cent of their 
income on their agriculture activities on which they spend minimum 50 per cent of 
their time (KBC Bank NV 2006).  
A GAEC (‘Groupement Agricole d’Exploitation en Commun’, France) is a non 
trading partnership allowing farmers to work together under conditions that are 
comparable to those existing in sole proprietorship (NP). The partners keep their 
status of sole owner and each farmer can benefit of tax, economic and social 
benefits. All partners of a GAEC have to be farmer. The GAEC has economic, 
social and fiscal transparency. The members receive remuneration both as worker, 
and as capital provider. This legal structure helps to organise a peaceful transfer of 
the farm between parents and children (Terre d'Europe 2007; Van der Veen et al. 
2002). 
An EARL (‘Exploitation Agricole à Responsabilité Limitée’, France) is a non trading 
partnership for agricultural purpose. It enables a sole farmer owning 100 per cent of 
the capital to separate his professional assets from his private assets (Terre d'Europe 
2007). The EARL and the GAEC are on the one hand legal bodies, but may on the 
other hand benefit from the fiscal advantages given to individual natural persons. It 
means that farmers profit from limited liability and dissociated capital, but are 
subject to the individual tax system and not to the company tax system (Van der 
Veen et al. 2004). 
A BVBA (Belgium) is also a BLP in which the partners are only liable for the 
company assets. BVBA is the abbreviation of ‘Besloten Vennootschap met Beperkte 
Aansprakelijkheid’ (Private Company with Limited Liability or Ltd.). The capital is 
tied up in registered and not freely marketable shares. This way it is avoided that 
shares are transferred to outside parties without approval of the joint partners, 
resulting in loss of the family character of the company. A BVBA is set up by 
notarial act and has to comply with a number of accounting and administrative 
obligations (KBC Bank NV 2006). A special kind of BVBA is the EVBA 
(eenpersoonsBVBA) who can be established by one person, and all the shares are in 
the hands of one person. 
The basic characteristics of the discussed legal structures are given in Table 7.2. 
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Table 7.2 Characteristics of legal structures  
Legal structure Structure 
exclusive for 
agricultural 
purpose 
Number of 
Partners 
Corporate 
capital 
Taxation Legal liability 
Sole 
proprietorship 
no 1 -  income tax unlimited liability 
Maatschap 
(NL, B)) 
no minimum 2 -  income tax unlimited liability 
GAEC (F) yes minimum 2 
maximum 10  
€ 7,500 income tax liability restricted 
to 2 times the 
capital input of 
the partner 
LV (B) yes minimum 2 € 6,150 income tax / 
corporate tax 
unlimited liability 
for managing 
partners, limited 
liability for 
sleeping partners 
EARL (F) yes minimum 1 
maximum 10 
€ 7,500 income tax liability restricted 
to the capital 
input of the 
partner 
BVBA (B) no minimum 2 € 18,550 corporate tax liability restricted 
to the capital 
input of the 
partner 
EBVBA (B) No 1 € 18,550 Corporate tax Liability 
restricted to the 
capital input of 
the partner 
Source: Van der Veen et al. 2002, KBC Bank NV 2006, Terre d'Europe 2007 
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7.2.2. Taxation 
The legal structure of a farm has a major influence on the taxation regime. Although 
it is difficult to compare the taxation regimes of countries, some differences can be 
stated.  
 
7.2.2.1. Taxation of natural persons 
In most Western European countries, farms under natural person are taxed under 
the income tax with a progressive rate regime, but the interpretation differs. For the 
Belgian income tax, PDMs can choose between two systems. The so-called fixed 
system (‘forfait’ or lump sum per ha or animal) is based on estimated returns and 
costs that are yearly fixed for a crop or livestock category in a given region. Some 
additional costs are eligible for reduction, but e.g. no reduction of depreciations is 
available. The calculated income is taxed at the normal progressive income tax rates 
(Table 7.3). This system requires limited administration and accounting is not 
compulsory. The second system of income tax declaration in Belgium is based on 
Farmer Peter (28): 
“The conversion to a BVBA is established on January, 1st, 2007 at the moment we 
transferred the family farm.  It was a long way, we had discussions with different advisors, 
we informed in the different banks. I had the impression that one advisor wanted us to start 
with an agricultural company (LV) in which the VAT accounting can be done, but they 
supported the lump sum accounting and the lump sum tax declaration and I wanted to get 
rid of that. I think that the BVBA has more possibilities in spreading out the gains and 
losses. You can transfer losses to the next year, which is not possible in the lump sum system. 
For example, this year the taxes will be a little higher in the dairy production, but there will 
be losses in the pig production. The latter results in taxes that equal 0, because negative 
amounts are not possible. However in a BVBA, you can transfer the gains of the dairy 
production to the losses in the pig production, and if there is a total loss, you can transfer it to 
the next year. In the lump sum tax declaration this is not possible, e.g. you will gain 0 for 
the pig production, but you do have to pay taxes for the dairy production, which is not the 
case for a BVBA. Personally, these are important aspects in the consideration of a BVBA. 
Another aspect is that in the BVBA, the family expenditures and farm expenditures are 
completely separated. If the BVBA becomes bankrupt, it will not be a personal problem, 
except if we go bankrupt in the first 3 years, because then there is still personal liability. In 
an agricultural company, there is always personal liability. 
The last advantage of the BVBA is that towards the next generation, it will be easier to 
transfer the farm, as shares can be gradually transferred.”   
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proven returns and costs. The income thus calculated is taxed at the same income tax 
rates. Accounting is compulsory for the second system. In case of large investments, 
a tax system based on proven returns and costs may be advantageous (corporate tax 
or income tax declaration based on proven returns and costs). In the fixed system, 
the estimated results and costs are based on the production of an average farmer. 
This makes that PDMs who are doing not so well, are paying more taxes than they 
would have to pay in the taxation system of proven results and costs. PDMs who are 
doing well will benefit from the fixed system.  
 
Table 7.3 Comparison of the progressive income tax rate between France and Belgium (2006)  
Tax bracket Belgium  Tax bracket France  
€ 0.01 - € 5,940 0.0% € 0.01 - € 5,515  0.0 %  
€ 5,940 - € 7,290 25.0% € 5,515 - € 11,000  5.5 %  
€ 7,290 - €10,380 30.0% € 11,000 - € 24,432  14.0 %  
€ 10,380 - €17,300 40.0% € 24,432 - € 65,500 30.0 % 
€17,300 - €31,700 45.0% > € 65,500€  40.0 % 
> € 31,700 50.0%   
Source: Federal Public Service Financing 2007, Terre d'Europe 2007 
 
In France, different taxation regimes exist depending on the average income of the 
farm. An individual farmer with an average income over the last 2 years, below 
€76,300 can opt for a lump sum (‘forfait’) system in which accounting is not 
compulsory. Two third of the French PDMs uses this income taxation system of 
which the taxation brackets are given in Table 7.3. French PDMs with an income 
higher than €76,300, will follow the simplified or normal regime in which accounting 
is obligatory (Terre d'Europe 2007). In France, the fixed system is only possible for 
individual PDMs on relatively small farms, while in Belgium, the fixed system is 
independent of the farm size for NP. The GAEC and EARL are taxed under the 
income tax and the size of the farm defines if accounting is compulsory. The fiscal 
regulations will not be a burden to change the legal structure, as the fiscal obligations 
are similar for NP, GAEC, EARL. In France, young farmers receive a 50% 
reduction on taxable profit for a 5 year period, besides other fiscal advantages, when 
they are taxed on actual income regime and receive settlement subsidies of Rural 
Code (Van der Veen et al. 2002). 
In Germany, individuals pay taxes according to a progressive rate between 19.90 per 
cent and 48.00 per cent (Van der Veen et al. 2002).  
In the Netherlands, a system of ‘boxes’ is used for NP, depending on the kind of 
income, supplemented with different tax-deductible items (e.g. Agricultural 
allowance – ‘landbouwvrijstelling’). The tax rate of box 1 – taxable income from 
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work and home ownership – varies between 34.15 per cent and 52.00 per cent, box 2 
– taxable income from a substantial (business) interest – has a fixed rate of 25.00 per 
cent and box 3 – taxable income from savings and investments – a fixed rate of 
30.00 per cent (Belastingdienst 2007). The ‘maatschap’ in the Netherlands has more 
tax-deductible items than the Belgian ‘maatschap’ which is on fiscal grounds less 
profitable. 
 
 
7.2.2.2. Corporation tax 
In Belgium, the corporation tax has a fixed taxation rate (33.99%) which is on 
average lower than the progressive rate of the income tax if the taxable income is 
higher than €322,500. Below this amount, 4 tax levels are applied (from 24.98% till 
35.54%) (Federal Public Service Financing 2007). The corporation tax becomes a 
disadvantage at the moment that the farm receives a high amount of subsidies. The 
reduced tariff of 16.50 per cent taxes on European subsidies can not be used in 
BLPs. Accounting is compulsory in Belgian corporation tax. As agriculture is a sector 
with fluctuating revenues, BLPs can transfer profits and losses to the next year in 
order to reduce the tax burden. They can also pay a wage to the associates and pay 
less tax, but then associates will of course have to pay higher personal income taxes 
(under the progressive system explained before). Similar corporate taxation regimes 
exist in the other Western European countries. The corporation tax in France 
amounts to a standard rate of 33.83 per cent. In the Netherlands, firms pay 24.50 per 
cent tax on the first €22,689, the rest is taxed at 29.10 per cent. In Germany, the 
standard rate is 26.37 per cent, but PDMs are exempt from both trade tax on income 
and the special tax for businesses levied by the German municipalities (Van der Veen 
et al. 2002). Table 7.4 gives an overview of the calculated taxes and average tax 
Farmer Jan (26): 
“At this moment, we are paying taxes according to the lump sum system, but when we have 
built the new stables, we will probably change to the income tax declaration based on proven 
returns and costs. At that moment, we will probably also switch to an agricultural company 
(LV). I have already taken it into account, but at this moment, it has no use as we have 
limited costs because all stables are already depreciated.” 
 
Farmer Bart (33): 
“At this moment we are a family farm in sole ownership, but at the moment they advise us 
another legal farm structure, we will change. If we build a new cowhouse, we will have to 
change the legal farm structure, because the lump sum system will not be advantageous any 
more.” 
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percentage of a given taxable income for NP and BLP, apart from the differences in 
tax reductions in each country. 
 
Table 7.4 Calculation of taxes and average tax percentage for income and corporate tax 
Taxable 
income 
 Belgium France The 
Netherlands a 
Germany 
€25,000 NP €7,498 30% €2,353 9% €9,118 36% €4,621 18% 
 BLP €6,245 25% €8,458 34% €6,231 25%   
€50,000 NP €19,662 39% €9,853 20% €19,587 39% €13,973 28% 
 BLP €13,995 28% €16,915 34% €13,506 27%   
€100,000 NP €44,662 45% €28,302 28% €45,364 45% €34,069 34% 
 BLP €30,553 31% €33,830 34% €28,056 28%   
Source: own calculations based on Van der Veen et al. 2002, Federal Public Service Financing 2007, Terre 
d'Europe 2007 
a The Dutch taxation system knows a multitude of tax-deductible items that lower the 
calculated taxes 
 
As one assumes that on fiscal grounds, the LV (Belgium) has no legal body, the LV 
is automatically subject to the income tax if it counts fewer than three partners or if 
its capital is below €30,950. In other instances, the LV may choose to pay personal 
income tax (progressive rate) or, conversely, corporation tax (fixed rate).  
The accounting obligations differ over the different countries: in the Netherlands, 
every farmer is obliged to keep books. In France, from a certain turnover, PDMs 
have to do accounting, as in Germany where the obligation of accounting is related 
to size, profit and turnover (Van der Veen et al. 2002). In Belgium, obligations for 
accounting depends on the legal structure, but PDMs have to do farm economic 
accounting if they want to receive an installation grant. The VAT taxation is not 
discussed as there are limited differences between legal agricultural structures within 
each country. 
 
7.2.3. Legal Liability 
Legal liability is a situation in which a person is liable, and is therefore responsible to 
pay compensation for any damage incurred. Liability differs between the legal 
structures. Under the configuration of NP, the farmer has full liability. No separation 
between firm equity and the own property exists. Except for the LV, shareholders of 
BLPs have limited liability, as the firm equity and the private property are divided 
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(Table 7.2). The shareholders are legally responsible for no more than the amount 
that they have contributed to a firm (except for GAEC). In the EARL (France) and 
BVBA (Belgium), the liability of the partners is restricted to their capital input: the 
private capital is protected. In the LV, the managing partners have full liability, while 
sleeping partners have limited liability. However in practice, most farms – even in 
case of BLPs – have full liability as credit institutions will often ask personal liability 
for loans.  
 
7.2.4. Land ownership 
Land ownership has an influence on the legal structure and on the farm transfer. In 
France, Belgium and Germany, the majority of the agricultural land is leased (Table 
7.5). At the moment of farm transfer or change from NP to a BLP, a new lease will 
start, except in the case of an LV where the lease does not change, because the 
managing partner is regarded as sole owner. The regulations regarding land lease and 
farm transfer are covered in section 6.4.3.4. In the Netherlands, the majority of the 
land is property owned by the farmer, which implies a high installation cost at the 
moment of farm transfer.  
 
Table 7.5 Percentage of agricultural area tenant farmed (2000)  
 Belgium France Germany The Netherlands 
Agricultural area tenant farmed  67 63 63 28 
Source: European Communities 2003 
 
7.2.5. Farm transfer 
Young farm entrants are more innovative, more motivated towards the longer term, 
and better able to adapt new farm practices. Their entrance makes the agricultural 
sector more productive, competitive, and viable (Williams and Farrington 2006). In 
the majority of cases, young farmers enter the business by farm transfer from parents 
to child. The legal structure of the farm has an influence on the farm, and on the 
regulation of the farm transfer. The statutory Belgian regulation on inheritance states 
that there has to be a division of equal shares between the heirs. Due to the equal 
treatment of all the children within one family, the farm is not automatically kept as 
one single unit (in case of sole proprietorship). The farm may be split up in different 
smaller pieces or the successor has to compensate the other heirs, jeopardizing the 
viability of the farm. A similar inheritance law exists in France. The main aim of the 
agricultural inheritance law in Germany and the Netherlands is to maintain 
sustainable agricultural enterprises. In general, the unity of the farm is preserved and 
the property is transferred to one heir and the other heirs receive no compensation 
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from the successor although regional differences exist. However, in many cases the 
parents try to compensate the other heirs (Van der Veen et al. 2002). 
In a BLP, the workable unity of the farm is preserved and shares are equally divided 
among the children. BLP facilitates the association of different generations (parents-
children), which can allow for improvement in farming conditions (grouping of 
resources, sharing of working time), especially in France and Belgium. A ‘maatschap’ 
can also have this aim without being a BLP. 
In Belgium, a farm transfer under ‘maatschap’ or sole proprietorship involves that all 
aspects of the farm have to be transferred separately. In most cases, first the 
moveable property is transferred and later the immoveable property. Within BLP, 
only the shares have to be transferred at the moment of farm transfer, which implies 
that the administrational burden at farm transfer is limited. The firm will live on and 
is not crumbled (Vrijens et al. 2006). BLP ensures the lasting nature of the structure 
by means of a more gradual transmission of elements within the farm. In Belgium, 
the LV will ease the process of farm transfer compared to a ‘maatschap’ or sole 
proprietorship. In the Belgian ‘maatschap’, the administrational burden is high both 
at the moment of installation and farm transfer. This double administration does not 
occur in a LV. In a LV, the transfer tax of 10.0 per cent has not to be paid, only the 
shares have to be transferred. The Dutch ‘maatschap’ is also exempted from transfer 
tax. 
In the Netherlands, it is for successors of single holders difficult to transfer a farm 
unit as a whole due to high fiscal consequences. This fiscal burden is prevented if a 
‘maatschap’ exists longer than 3 years. In the Netherlands, the economic size of the 
farm is usually sufficient to offer the successor an official status in the farm as 
‘maatschap’. In a ‘maatschap’, a successor can already benefit from a number of fiscal 
facilities. In a Dutch BLP, high farm investments bring along lower profits, by which 
the benefit of the corporate tax is lower, compared to the ‘maatschap’.  
In France, a GAEC is suitable (1) to create an association among people still far 
from retirement, or among two people wishing to start up together, (2) to facilitate 
gradual transmission of capital within family based GAEC and (3) to give priority to 
remuneration of work compared to that of capital. An EARL enables installation 
between spouses and between parents and children, but this advantage is 
counterbalanced by increased taxes. 
The type of installation grants given in the different European countries varies 
according to the interpretation of the European regulation nr1257/99 on rural 
development (Van der Veen et al. 2004). In the different countries, a number of 
facilities for lower installation costs exist, but they are not directly linked with the 
legal structure of the farm. A number of facilities exist to build up equity before farm 
transfer. In France, the system of differed wages is applied irrespective whether the 
successor has an official status, while in the Netherlands, the successor in a 
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‘maatschap’ can already benefit from measures targeted at entrepreneurs before the 
actual take-over (e.g. start allowances). In Germany, no facilities are provided for 
building up equity before farm transfer. 
 
7.2.6. Advantages and disadvantages of business legal structures in Belgian 
agriculture 
The comparison of legal structures in Belgian agriculture and its surrounding 
countries makes clear that the Belgian legal structures have advantages and 
disadvantages (Table 7.6). On fiscal grounds, a NP can choose between a fixed 
taxation system or a taxation system based on proven results and costs. The fixed 
system is not profitable for all PDMs, but it lowers the administration and has no 
accounting obligation. Contrary to the Belgian situation, the French income tax is on 
average lower than the corporate tax. The French BLP who are exclusive for 
agricultural purpose, are taxed as NP, and benefit from relatively low tax rates. They 
have also the advantage of the limited liability, which is not the case for the Belgian 
LV. 
 
Table 7.6 Advantages and disadvantages of legal structures in Belgium 
Natural person (NP) Business entity with legal personality (BLP) 
- Limited life time + Unlimited life time 
+ One manager: uncomplicated decision-
making  
- Different people are involved in the 
management  
+ Less accounting and administrative 
obligations 
- Accounting and administrative obligations  
- High financial risk  + Limited financial risk  
- Income taxation has higher taxation rate 
than corporation tax 
+ Corporation tax has lower taxation rate than 
income taxation  
+ High autonomy + Number of people can collect the necessary 
capital 
- Complex transfer of the farm + transfer of shares at the moment of farm 
transfer 
 - Corporate capital has to be paid up in full 
 
The regulations for the Belgian ‘maatschap’ are less profitable than for the Dutch 
‘maatschap’, because of an administrative burden at the moment of foundation, and 
at the moment of farm transfer. The transfer taxes are also not lower in Belgium as it 
is the case in the Netherlands for a ‘maatschap’ that exists for more than 3 years. 
Within the LV taxes cannot be transferred. The LV has the advantage that in some 
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cases (fewer than three partners or if its capital is below €30,950) the farmer can 
choose between income tax and corporate tax. A disadvantage is that European 
subsidies within the corporate tax have to be taxed at 33.99 per cent instead of the 
16.50 per cent in income tax. The BVBA has limited liability, but the corporate 
capital is considerably higher than for LV. 
7.3. Methodology 
7.3.1. Hypotheses 
The relation between the knowledge and the attitude towards different legal 
structures in Belgium makes clear if farmers misperceive alternative legal structures. 
The following hypotheses are stated: 
10. A limited knowledge of legal configurations is a major obstacle in a positive attitude 
towards other legal constructions  
11. PDMs perceive the natural person configuration as being better than the business 
entities with separate legal personality 
12. Business entities with separate legal personality are reserved for a limited group of 
farms that have a well-considered idea of the future 
 
7.3.2. Data 
7.3.2.1. Data collection 
In order to test these hypotheses, data were collected during the Flanders’ agriculture 
fair at the beginning of January 2005. This is a general fair frequented by the majority 
of Flemish farmers. Visitors to this fair were asked to complete a questionnaire 
related to types of firms (Appendix 2). More then 280 farmers completed the form, 
of which 268 questionnaires were usable and thus withhold for further analysis. 12 
per cent of the questionnaires were only partially filled out. The sampling technique 
was based on non-probability sampling in which the participants of the fair were 
asked in the first place if they are farmer or not. In case of a positive answer, they 
were asked to fill out the questionnaire. Approximately 70 per cent of the 
approached farmers were willing to do so.  
The survey related to the legal farm structure was time and cost effective. On a 
couple of days all data were collected. However, a limitation of a questionnaire on an 
agricultural fair is that not all people are motivated to complete a survey. This is 
overcome by a clear introduction of the questionnaire to the people who declared to 
be farmer. Furthermore, a quiet atmosphere was created and the respondents got an 
incentive at the end. 
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Table 7.7 gives an overview of the main characteristics of the respondents related to 
the legal structure of their farm. In the questionnaire, 92.2 per cent of the farmers 
(N=212) work as NP of which 13.1 per cent was not aware of the own legal 
structure. This approaches the 92.9 per cent of the 34,410 Flemish farms which 
according to official statistics had in 2005 the NP as legal structure, but the fact that 
they ignore actual status makes them with a high probability NP. Only 7.8 per cent 
of the respondents has a BLP as legal structure. This is a relative low number, but it 
corresponds to the 6.8 per cent of farms in Flanders who in 2005 worked under BLP 
(Federal Public Service Economy SMEs Self-employed and Energy 2006). 
 
Table 7.7 Main characteristics of survey respondents 
 NP LV BVBA Other 
BLP 
Legal 
structure 
unknown 
F-value / 
Likelihood 
ratio 
N 212 11 5 5 35  
Average farm size 
(ha) 
32.26 51.73 32.36 115.00 29.94 3.332 *a 
Average full time 
labour units 
1.6 1.9 1.4 2.1 1.6 0.727 a 
Average year of birth 1961 1963 1963 1958 1963 1.397 a 
Education level (%)      8.914 b 
Primary school 7.5 9.1 0.0 20.0 2.9  
Secondary school 74.5 63.3 60.0 40.0 85.7  
Higher education 18.0 27.3 40.0 40.0 11.4  
Designation of farm successor (%)  3.239 b 
Farm successor 
designated 
21.7 27.3 40.0 40.0 25.7  
No farm successor 
designated 
19.3 9.1 20.0 20.0 22.9  
Farm successor not 
yet designated 
59.0 63.3 40.0 40.0 51.4  
Source: questionnaire related to legal farm structures 
*: significant difference between group at 0.05 level 
a : F-value 
b : Likelihood ratio 
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7.3.2.2. Questionnaire 
The questionnaire related to the business legal structure of the farm (Appendix 2) 
was held during a general agricultural fair. This requires a short questionnaire that 
can be filled out in a limited amount of time. The survey asks about the knowledge 
and perception related to different legal farm statuses in Belgium.  
The first part asks for some general farm characteristics (farm size, farm type, 
number of full time labour units, age, education, children, succession, tax system). 
With this information, a general picture of the farm can be drawn. Furthermore, the 
importance of some farm objectives are asked for. 
The second part deals with the knowledge level of different kinds of legal 
configurations in Belgium. The respondents are asked if they know these legal 
structures, whether these exist in Flanders and typically on what kind of farms. 
Respondents are asked to express their opinion on three important legal structures. 
The third part focuses on the perception of farmers related to the legal farm status. 
Answers are given on a 7-point Likert scale. Seven characteristics of legal farm 
statuses are given for both the natural person and business entities with separate legal 
personality (BLP). This makes a comparison between the two major groups of legal 
farm statuses possible. 
The fourth part is related to the own agricultural firm. The legal farm status is asked 
for, together with the time that the PDM is already working in this farm status. Some 
questions are related to the motivation of this kind of agricultural firm. The last 
questions of this part is related to possible future changes in this status. 
In the last part, questions are related to the information gathering of farmers, with 
first some general questions related to information collection on legal farm 
structures, and than the focus is put on information collection with respect to the 
possible changes in the own farm status.  
 
7.3.3. Methodological framework 
The objective of our empirical research is to analyse the perception and motivation 
of PDMs related to different legal farm structures in Belgium. The relation between 
attitude and the characteristics of legal structures are studied by means of the 
framework in Figure 7.2. Knowledge and perception of legal structures are the basis 
of motivation related to the own legal structure. The attitude towards legal structures 
in general is influenced by the motivation of the own legal farm, and by the 
perception and knowledge of the legal structures. Based on the convergence or 
divergence between the attitude towards legal structures and the characteristics of the 
legal structures, farmers are clustered according to possible policy measures. 
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Figure 7.2 Framework of attitude and characteristics of legal structures in agriculture 
Source: own compilation 
 
7.4. Empirical results 
7.4.1.  Knowledge of legal structures in agriculture  
The motivation and attitude of farmers towards legal structures is related to their 
knowledge of the different legal structures. The circulation of information about the 
different legal structures in Flanders is limited, which is reflected in the knowledge 
level of legal structures (Figure 7.3, Table 7.8). The knowledge level (Figure 7.4) is a 
compound indicator derived from processing the answers of a limited number of 
questions measuring the knowledge of different aspects of BLPs. About 30 per cent 
of the farmers has a low level of knowledge (knowledge level <=2) about alternative 
legal structures in agriculture. In particular, limited knowledge is present on farm 
transfer aspects and on rules to set-up an alternative legal structure. Farmers are 
familiar with the fact that the NP has unlimited liability but the unlimited liability of 
managing partners in the LV does not make part of common knowledge. The fiscal 
regulations for the LV are unknown. Most farmers do not know that within this legal 
structure, farmers can opt for different taxation systems, giving the farmer more 
freedom to adapt the fiscal regulations to the farm situation. Related to the fiscal 
regulations, the accounting requirements of the BLPs are also unclear. Farmers are 
aware of the subsidy regulations within the LV. Our first conclusion is that the 
apparent lack of knowledge about BLPs is certainly an inhibiting factor for farmers 
to consider whether BLPs are applicable to their farm. 
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Table 7.8 Correct knowledge about different aspects of legal structures (% of respondents who 
respond correctly) 
 NP LV BVBA 
Taxation 49.6% 13.8% 31.1% 
Accounting n.a.a 10.8% 56.0% 
Legal liability 45.9% 20.9% n.a. 
Farm transfer  17.5% n.a. n.a. 
Installation of BLP n.a. 17.5% 25.7% 
Subsidies n.a. 51.9% 17.5% 
Source: questionnaire related to legal farm structures 
a n.a.: not available 
 
The knowledge on different legal structures in agriculture is relatively low for farmers 
operating under NP configuration. In general, these farmers do not search for 
information about other legal structures. Even the knowledge on the legal structure 
of the own farm is limited. Farmers operating a farm under BVBA have a much 
higher level of knowledge. These farmers have selected the legal structures that 
suited best their needs. They are able to compare the different legal structures on an 
objective basis. Within the LV, the knowledge of the own legal structure is high, but 
contrary to the BVBA, their knowledge about other legal structures is low. 
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Figure 7.3 Knowledge of farmers regarding different legal structures in agriculture 
Source: questionnaire related to legal farm structures 
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Figure 7.4 Total knowledge level of BLP among surveyed farmers (scale: 0 (no knowledge) - 13 
(perfect knowledge)) 
Source: questionnaire related to legal farm structures 
 
In total, only a limited group of farmers has full insight in the different legal farming 
structures. On the basis of the available information, they are able to choose the legal 
structure that suits best their farming needs. Besides, a large group of farmers has 
only a limited knowledge of the different possibilities and consequences of legal 
structures. As a consequence of their ignorance, most of them continue farming in 
sole proprietorship. 
 
7.4.2.  Perception of legal structures in agriculture 
Not only the objective knowledge of different legal structures will influence the 
attitude of farmers towards legal structures. Also the farmer’s subjective perception 
of both NP and BLP has an influence on the farmer’s opinion concerning legal 
structures (Table 7.9).  
PDMs who run their farm as NP, do not perceive a difference in the importance of 
management skills between running a NP or a BLP. For all legal structures, good 
management skills are important. On average they also do not see an explicit 
difference in capital requirement among the different legal structures. In their 
perception, capital is important but no extra capital is needed when a farm is 
exploited under BLP configuration. Although, corporate capital is an essential 
condition to adopt BLP (Table 7.2). PDMs recognise that BLPs are more profitable 
from fiscal point of view, and reduce the financial risks. On the other hand, farmers 
have the impression that the NP configuration is a more flexible and a legally less 
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complex form than BLP. This makes farming as NP relatively easier to administer 
than BLPs. But in the opinion of most PDMs, a major bottleneck for BLP in 
Flemish agriculture is the extensive administration, which is in line with legal 
complexity and perceived lower flexibility. Fiscal advantages are not perceived of 
major importance, although a considerable tax difference between the legal 
structures exists (e.g. Table 7.4). 
 
Table 7.9 Farmers’ perception of the characteristics of legal structures a 
 NP BLP Paired sample T-test 
Intensive management  0.53 (1) 0.48 (2) 0.279 
High financial risk  0.44 (2) 0.22 (5) -2.097 * 
High administration 0.39 (3) 0.65 (1) -2.713 ** 
Capital intensive  0.31 (4) 0.38 (4) 1.045 
Flexible farm structure  0.17 (5) -0.13 (7)  3.200 ** 
Legally complex  0.04 (6) 0.47 (3)  3.321 ** 
Fiscal advantages  -0.25 (7) -0.04 (6) -1.995 * 
Source: questionnaire related to legal farm structures 
a Figures are standardized values of a seven point scale measurement. Between brackets the 
rank order of the characteristic is given 
 **: significant difference between groups at 0.01 level 
*: significant difference between groups at 0.05 level 
 
Explanation for the limited observed transition to BLPs in Flemish agriculture can 
be found in the perception of a more complex administration, the legal complexity 
and the perceived lower flexibility, while fiscal advantages are not highly perceived. 
 
7.4.3.  Motivation for the own legal structure 
The knowledge and the perception of farmers towards the different legal structures 
can be related to the choice of the legal structure for the own farm. Such analysis can 
reveal why farmers are adopting their current legal structure, and which 
opportunities and threats of this form are recognised. 
Farms working under the NP structure continue to do so mainly because of 
tradition. The current rules regarding government support to invest seem to be an 
incentive to continue the current management under NP, although the rules do not 
discriminate the LVs in this respect. Firms under BLP attach a high importance to 
the limitation of fiscal motives and financial risk to adopt the present legal structure. 
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Government support rules and the high administration are a burden for farmers 
operating already under BLP. In theory, the farm transfer under BLP should occur 
more fluently than under NP structure, but farmers under NP indicate that a fluent 
transfer of the farm is a positive incentive to stay in this structure. A fluent farm 
transfer is important for BLPs, but apparently not the main reason to adopt this 
form (Table 7.10). 
 
Table 7.10 Reason for having own legal structure a 
 NP BLP F-value 
Tradition 0.47 (1) -0.11 (4) 6.479* 
Easy to receive government support 0.27 (2) -0.16 (5) 4.435* 
Fluent transfer of the farm 0.01 (3) 0.11 (3) 0.436 
Fiscal advantages -0.14 (4) 0.33 (1) 7.459** 
Limited administration -0.19 (5) -0.46 (6) 1.980 
Limitation of financial risk -0.43 (6) 0.27 (2) 12.987** 
Source: questionnaire related to legal farm structures 
a Figures are standardized values of a five point scale measurement, between brackets the 
rank order of the characteristic is given,  
**: Significant difference between groups at 0.01 level 
*: Significant difference between groups at 0.05 level 
 
The involvement and importance attached to legal structures is also reflected in the 
information collection intensity about BLPs. Our results indicate that farmers in BLP 
have attended more regularly workshops about other legal structures than NP 
farmers (BLP: 77.3%; NP: 48.4%). They also discuss the subject more frequently 
with extension officers (BLP: 85.7%; NP: 60.2 %).  
Although the shift of legal structure is not always obvious, 30 per cent of the 
respondents has already thought of and considered the possibility of adopting 
another legal structure. NPs who have already considered to switch to another legal 
structure, indicate to be less bound to the present NP structure because of 
regulations with respect to government support or the persistence to the current 
legal structure than those who have not yet considered a switch. 
 
7.4.4.  Cluster analysis 
The results presented show that only a limited number of Flemish farmers has an 
open mind towards new legal structures for farming. On the other hand, not all 
farmers would benefit from a new structure. A major bottleneck is the lack of 
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knowledge and information. Information and promotion of legal structures should 
target the sensible group of farmers.  
To identify the sensible target groups, the surveyed farmers are clustered. Based on a 
hierarchical clustering, 3 clusters are restrained. A K-means cluster analysis divided 
the respondents into 3 clusters according to their objective knowledge, the subjective 
perception of the two main structures (NP and BLP), and the intensity of the 
information search.  
• The objective knowledge is measured through the total knowledge level of 
legal structures (including NP and BLP) that is based on the questions related 
to the knowledge regarding the different legal structures (Table 7.8). 
• The subjective perception measures the relative advantage of the NP 
configuration in comparison with BLPs (Table 7.9).  
• The information search collection related to BLPs is based on the intensity 
of the information search through different channels.  
Table 7.11 provides the descriptive statistics, the measures of central tendency and 
the measures of dispersion of the variables. Table 7.12 gives the correlation matrix of 
the three variables used for the cluster analysis. 
 
Table 7.11 Descriptive statistics of the variables of the cluster analysis 
Variable Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
Objective knowledge  
(scale: 0-30) 
13.58 7.58 0.00 27.00 
Subjective perception 
(scale: -36 - +36) 
0.34 4.02 -15.00 20.00 
Information search   
(scale: 0-8)  
3.11 1.89 0.00 8.00 
Source: questionnaire related to legal farm structures 
 
Table 7.12 Correlation matrix of the independent variables of the cluster analysis 
 Objective 
knowledge 
Subjective 
perception 
Information search 
Objective knowledge 1.000   
Subjective perception 0.073 1.000  
Information search 0.214 * -0.031 1.000 
Source: questionnaire related to legal farm structures 
*: significant at 0.05 level 
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By means of these three independent variables, a cluster analysis is performed. Table 
7.13 indicates the importance of perception within the different clusters. 
 
Table 7.13 Analysis of variance of the different clusters, related to the perception of legal 
characteristics a 
  Cluster 1: 
Directed 
towards NP 
Cluster 2: 
Conservative 
farmers 
because of 
ignorance 
Cluster 3: 
Open-
minded 
towards BLP 
F-value 
NP High administration 0.272 0.535 0.422 0.895 
 Intensive management  0.552 0.696 0.441 2.012 
 Flexible farm structure  0.357 0.124 0.099 1.329 
 Legally complex  -0.311 a 0.125 b 0.184 b 3.635* 
 Fiscal advantages  -0.026 b -0.213 ab -0.447 a 3.810* 
 Capital intensive  0.013 a 0.188 a 0.563 b 5.310** 
 High financial risk  0.080 a 0.303 a 0.703 b 5.437** 
BLP High administration 0.813 b 0.319 a 0.689 b 4.332* 
 Intensive management  0.667 b 0.198 a 0.519 b 4.093* 
 Flexible farm structure  -0.409 a -0.155 a -0.004 ab 4.395* 
 Legally complex  0.874 b 0.474 a 0.190 a 8.564** 
 Fiscal advantages  -0.362 a -0.156 a 0.187 b 6.233** 
 Capital intensive  0.739 c 0.413 b 0.093 a 9.553** 
 High financial risk  0.455 b 0.193 ab 0.076 a 3.398* 
Source: questionnaire related to legal farm structures 
a Figures are standardized values of a five point scale measurement 
**: Significant difference between groups at 0.01 level 
*: Significant difference between groups at 0.05 level 
 
Table 7.14 shows the basic characteristics of the three restrained clusters. All 
surveyed farmers are included in this analysis. 
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Table 7.14 Cluster characteristics 
 Cluster 1: 
Directed towards NP 
Cluster 2: 
Conservative farmers 
because of ignorance 
Cluster 3: 
Open-minded towards 
BLP 
Objective knowledge 
indicator 
+ + 0 + 
Subjective perception 
indicator  
+ 0 - 
Information search 
indicator 
+  0 +  
Number of farmers 40 91 95 
Source: questionnaire related to legal farm structures 
 
• The cluster of ‘directed towards NP’ is the smallest group of farmers. They 
are in general well informed on and have high objective knowledge of the 
different legal structures. According to their opinion (Table 7.13), the NP has 
more advantages than BLPs because of lower financial risks, lower capital 
requirement, lower administration, more flexibility and being legally less 
complex. This group consists only of farmers under NP. These farmers have 
made a conscious choice and will only change their legal structure in the 
future if other legal structures would present objective advantages.  
• The second cluster - conservative farmers because of ignorance - is a larger 
group of farmers characterised by a very limited objective knowledge of the 
different legal structures. As a consequence of their ignorance, they are not 
able to indicate the difference between NP and BLP. Their subjective 
judgement on administration and management efforts of BLPs is significantly 
lower, probably because of a lack of information. Farmers belonging to this 
cluster use significantly more the fixed tax declaration system (Pearson χ²: 
6.770, p-value: 0.034), and are less interested in information regarding 
alternative legal structure for their farm (Pearson χ²: 3.019, p-value: 0.051). 
All these elements can be influenced by the relatively lower level of education 
of this group of farmers (Pearson χ²: 10.324, p-value: 0.035). This group 
needs to be better informed. 
• The third cluster consists of open-minded farmers towards BLPs. This 
cluster has about the same size as the second cluster. The objective 
knowledge of these farmers is relatively high. They transform this knowledge 
into a more negative perception of NP in relation with BLPs. To build up a 
family farm is a less important objective for this group that attaches more 
importance to economic results. The NP is according to these farmers not 
profitable from fiscal perspective, is capital intensive and involves high 
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financial risks. These farmers use more frequently the income tax system 
based on proved returns and costs and have looked already to the 
consequences of changing to an alternative structure for their own farm 
(Pearson χ²: 3.019, p-value: 0.051). Their interest for BLPs is probably 
influenced by a higher level of education (Pearson χ²: 10.324, p-value: 0.035). 
This group of farmers should be the preferential target group for further 
information and targeted promotion in the sense that for these farmers it is 
important to compare the advantages of legal structures in their specific case. 
In particular at the moment of farm transfer, this group can benefit from 
looking at other options than the NP. 
7.5. Conclusions 
So far, as in other Western European countries, except France, BLPs play only a 
minor role in the Flemish agriculture and horticulture (6.8 % of Flemish farms). 
Although these legal structures may have advantages for farm transfer, legal liability 
and fiscal grounds, they are not popular. Main hypothesised reasons were lack of 
knowledge, insufficient (perceived) advantages and lack of knowledge about the 
consequences for their own situation.  
On theoretical grounds, the Belgian fiscal regulation entails high tax rates, both for 
NP and BLP. Contrary to the Belgian situation, the French income tax is on average 
lower than the corporate tax. The French BLP that are exclusive for agricultural 
purpose, are taxed as NP, and therefore benefit from relatively low tax rates. They 
also have the advantage of the limited liability, which is not the case for the 
managing partners in a Belgian LV. The regulations for the Belgian ‘maatschap’ are 
less profitable than for the Dutch ‘maatschap’. The LV has the advantage that in 
some cases (fewer than three partners or if its capital is below €30,950) the farmer 
can choose between income tax and corporate tax. A disadvantage is that European 
subsidies within the corporate tax have to be taxed at 33.99 per cent instead of the 
16.50 per cent in income tax. The BVBA has limited liability, but the corporate 
capital is considerably higher than for LV. In Belgium, the alternative legal structures 
in agriculture seem therefore to have fewer advantages to the farmers than in the 
neighbouring countries. In the first place, public authorities should reconsider the 
legal structures in agriculture and try to optimise them to the needs of the farmers, in 
order to make them more competitive in the European market. Related to farm 
transfer, the choice of an appropriate legal structure influences the ease of farm 
transfer. As example, a BLP entails that only the shares have to be transferred at the 
moment of farm transfer, limiting the administration, but a successor has to be open 
towards alternative legal structures. 
A survey among Flemish farmers reveals that the knowledge of legal structures is 
limited, confirming hypothesis 10. Also hypothesis 11 is confirmed as the perception 
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of natural person (NP) versus business entities with separate legal personality (BLP) 
is often in favour of the NP. Most farmers have no idea of the consequences of the 
implementation of a BLP for their own farm.  
The objective knowledge of different legal structures, the subjective perception of 
the farmer, and the intensity of information collection build up the general attitude 
towards legal structures. Combining these three aspects, three groups of farmers can 
be distinguished of which only one group has an open mind towards BLP (42 %). 
The other groups will remain in the NP structure, although for different reasons. A 
smaller group has a good objective knowledge of legal structures, but judges that the 
NP is the best legal structure for their family farm (18 %). A larger group however 
opts for the sole proprietorship as a consequence of their ignorance of the existence 
and possibilities of other legal structures (40 %).  
In general, more information on legal structures is needed. Extension services should 
explain more clearly and on an individualised basis the consequences of different 
structures. Information on legal structures should also be incorporated in agricultural 
education and agricultural post school courses. 
Farmers operating under the NP structure acknowledge the fiscal and property 
advantages of adopting BLPs, but the complexity of these forms, both in 
administration and legislation, limits the transition to alternative legal structures. 
Farmers already working under BLP acknowledge the advantages of this legal 
structure, but are not stuck to this form and are flexible to change if this would 
improve their situation. There seems to be scope for further adjustment and 
improvement of the legal structures in agriculture, taken into account the Dutch and 
French example. Nevertheless, BLPs are and will mainly be adopted by farmers who 
are able to evaluate all effects of alternative legal structures and for whom the higher 
administrative burden is compensated by a lower financial risk and other advantages, 
which confirms hypothesis 12.  
The results therefore hold important lessons for the public authorities. BLPs are 
perceived as entailing a high administrative burden. The fiscal and other advantages 
are not clear or pronounced. In particular, the fact that the LV – specially designed 
for farms – is not very well perceived is illustrative for this. Public authorities may 
therefore take stock of these results and try to adapt this specific form or create a 
new form more adapted to the needs of farms. For example, the high capital needs 
of the contemporary family farm can be fulfilled by the input of external capital of 
sleeping partners, and this could be stimulated by fiscal advantages. Moreover, more 
efforts on informing farmers have to be made in order to decrease the barrier of 
transition. 
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In Flemish agriculture, the family farm is seen as the cornerstone of the agricultural 
society. Statistics indicate that 87 per cent of the farms are family farms. Although 
the total number of farms has halved over the last 20 years, the relative share of 
family farms holds. Farm transfer is of major importance for the continuation of 
family farms, and has been highlighted in the first axis of the European 
Development policy 2007-2013 and in national policy mission statements such as in 
the policy letter of the Flemish minister of Agriculture. Therefore it is important to 
focus on the process of transfer of family farms, the influence of the social, 
economic and legal context on farm transfer, and the implications on financing farm 
transfer and farm practice.  
In most literature, the farm transfer is studied as a single process that last for a 
limited number of years. Such a point of view does not take into account the 
dynamics of the whole farm life cycle. The preparation of a new farm transfer starts 
already when the previous farm transfer is finished, as the family business includes 
different generations. Moreover, it is not a process that only is related to e.g. 
economic aspects; it is a process that takes into account social, economic, and legal 
aspects. The farm succession cycle model, proposed in this research, enables us to 
include all these aspects within a single framework (Figure 8.1). 
The farm succession cycle starts with the motivation and intention of farmers’ 
children to continue the family farm. The majority of them exit the succession cycle 
in one of these first stages, due to different reasons such as no interest in farming or 
limited farm viability. The next stage of the succession cycle is related to the 
economic context of the family farm. The investment decisions of the PDM before 
farm transfer are linked to the designation of a successor and determine the 
feasibility of farm transfer. The timely designation of a successor stimulates the PDM 
to further develop the farm to maintain a viable farm business. The influence of the 
timely designation of a successor on the investment decisions is referred to as the 
pre-succession effect. The next stage of the farm succession cycle is the farm 
transfer. The farm transfer includes the processes of farm succession, farm 
inheritance and farm retirement. In some cases a direct farm transfer is realised, but 
in the majority of cases a gradual farm transfer is preferred. The way the farm is 
transferred has financing implications and determines the investment possibilities 
after farm transfer. But also the timely designation as successor influences the 
investment decisions of the family farm after farm transfer. We refer to this concept 
as the post-succession effect. In the following years, the family situation determines 
whether a possibility of future intergenerational farm transfer exists. A new farm 
succession cycle starts. During the whole farm life cycle, the legal farm status will 
determine the farm management, and it has a major influence on farm transfer. 
Chapter 8 – General discussion and conclusions  
Chapter 8 
170 
Different business legal farm structures have different implications on the family 
farm business, also during farm transfer. The PDM has to choose the best legal farm 
structure for his farm in order to ensure farm continuity in the future. 
 
 
Figure 8.1 Conceptual framework: the farm succession cycle model 
Source: own compilation 
 
This research has contributed to the state of the art related to farm succession by 
enlarging the point of view to a long term approach, and by simultaneously 
highlighting the importance of the social, economic and legel aspects. In the 
following sections, we discuss these different aspects of the farm succession cycle, 
state our general conclusions and make recommendations for further research. 
8.1. The social aspects of farm transfer 
The social aspects of farm transfer is related to the different aspects of the human 
environment that influence the farm succession. Not only the economic viability of 
the farm as such, but also personal opinion, perceptions and objectives play a major 
role in the decision to continue the family farm. The succession intention model 
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developed in this research combines personal considerations, the social environment, 
the farm environment and external influences. Based on this general concept, the 
succession intention model shows that a family-minded attitude related to farm 
succession and a positive assessment of policy limitations are the main determinants 
for a positive intention towards farm succession. In a next stage, farm growth 
limitations and the family related arrangements related to farm transfer become 
decisive in whether the potential successor is designated as farm successor.  
As the main objective is to transfer viable and competitive family farms, we do not 
intend to stimulate the transfer of all family farms. This implies that related to the 
stimulation of farm transfer, not all farmers’ children should be focussed at, but a 
limited group of farmers’ children can be targeted to increase the number of possible 
successors. The target groups of farmers’ children can be obtained by clustering 
potential farm successors based on their perceptions and objectives related to farm 
succession. Specific policy recommendations focusing at the different groups may 
help potential farm successors to take over the family farm: 
• Transparency of policy regulations related to farm transfer can improve the 
perception of farmers’ children related to farm succession. Simplification of 
farm administration and (environmental) regulations can raise the number of 
farmers’ children with a positive intention to farm transfer. An accessible 
farm succession policy can diminish the perceived policy related difficulties 
related to farm transfer. 
• Clear information related to legal farm structures helps young farmers to 
consider what kind of legal farm structure fits best the needs of the farm, 
taken into account the farm-family relation and without laying a burden on 
the family. Agricultural education and extension services (at personal level) 
have to give sufficient attention to the characteristics and consequences of 
legal farm structures. 
• Due to the lack of available agricultural area, potential successors envisage 
problems to expand the farm in the future. Agricultural policies have to 
stimulate the withdrawal of land use of PDMs without succession 
perspectives above the retirement age. The released agricultural land should 
become available for competitive PDMs in order to increase the production. 
A better functioning of the land market and specific support for young 
farmers who need land to expand their farm to be viable, may help to 
increase succession in case where land availability is a problem. For example, 
the stimulation of withdrawal of land use can be done through financial 
incentives, and young farmers can have preference to the released agricultural 
area. 
Focusing on these aspects can improve the social aspects of farm transfer: some 
farmers’ children will have less social constraints related to farm transfer. But it has 
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to be stated that only a part of all farmers’ children is motivated to continue the 
family farm, but those who are interested might be stimulated by the above stated 
policy recommendations. An important task is also reserved for the agricultural 
education. They have to give more attention to farm transfer and the different 
regulations in the school curricula. 
8.2. The economic aspects of farm transfer 
As the main objective of the family farm is to execute an economic activity on the 
farm and to earn a living for the family, the economic aspects are decisive in farm 
transfer. The farm management decisions, and in specific investment decisions, are 
linked to the stages of the farm life cycle. However in the consolidation and exit 
stage of the farm life cycle, the timely designation of a successor has a major 
influence on the investment decisions of the farm. This reflects the relationship 
between the long-term orientation of the farm and its current management. 
The timely designation of a successor stimulates the farm investments in order to 
transfer a viable farm to the next generation. A lack of successor tends the PDM to 
focus on farm exit and no new farm investments are made in order to reach the 
value of liquidation.  
In literature, the indicators to study this economic context of farm transfer are 
mostly related to farm size and farm income, but we argue that these are not the best 
indicators at the end of the farm life cycle. This research introduces the Total Farm 
Assets (TFA) as indicator for farm management decisions at the end of the farm life 
cycle, and shows that in the Flemish situation, a timely designated successor 
stimulates investment decisions, while a lack of designated successor does not give 
the extra stimulus. The TFA will increase if farm investments are made, and if own 
capital or external financial sources can support this farm expansion. The fact that 
the successor is timely designated or uncertain stimulates farm development by the 
PDM. We refer to this effect as the pre-succession effect.  
Also after farm transfer, the timely designation of a successor is still perceptible in 
the investment decisions. Both farms where the successor was timely designated or 
uncertain do have higher growth rates of TFA after farm transfer than farms that 
were still transferred even if till the last year before farm transfer no successor was 
designated. It shows that the timely preparation of the successor is also a decisive 
factor in a successful farm continuation. Even if uncertain, successors who envisage 
succession are better prepared than those who only at the last moment decide. This 
effect is referred to as the post-succession effect.  
The combination of the pre- and post-succession effect indicates that the group of 
farm successors, who only decided at the last moment, will find it hard to catch up 
with the other groups of farmers regarding TFA. But also the successors who were 
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not yet designated before farm transfer can on average not bring their TFA to the 
same level as the group which timely designated successors. The future farm vision 
of the PDM has consequences for the current and the next farm life cycle. Therefore 
it is important to make some policy recommendations. At present, policies focus at 
the start of the farm business and try to stimulate and help the successors during and 
after farm transfer, but our results indicate that the end of the farm life cycle is also 
of major importance for the future viability of the farm. Governmental policies and 
extension services can highlight the importance of a timely decision related to farm 
succession and the consequences on the farm development, in order to increase the 
awareness of the importance of a timely designation of the farm successor and to 
stimulate the pre-succession effect. 
At the moment of farm transfer, the financing is a crucial aspect within the farm 
succession cycle. External sources of financing are used to cover the financial costs 
of farm transfer, but the extent of these external sources depend on the type of farm 
transfer (gradual or direct farm transfer), the obsoleteness of the farm and the 
solvency of the leaving PDM. At present, agricultural policy focuses at the moment 
of farm transfer by means of establishment and investment support. But these VLIF 
support measures are more than a stimulus: they determine the timing, amount and 
price of farm transfers. As the maximum amount for establishment support by VLIF 
does not take into account the real present value of the family farms, it stimulates a 
gradual farm transfer of larger family farms. A considerable amount of owner’s 
equity is needed to get loans from the bank, and in general young farmers will need 
the financial help of family members to be able to take over the family farm. As this 
(gradual) transfer of the family farm takes a number of years, clear arrangements 
should be made between all involved parties in order to finish the process in a 
harmonious way. 
8.3. The legal aspects of farm transfer 
The majority of the Flemish family farms are farms in sole proprietorship. A 
comparison of the different legal structures in Belgium, the Netherlands and France 
shows that alternative legal structures in Belgium seem to have fewer advantages to 
the farmers than in the neighbouring countries. There seems to be scope for further 
adjustment and improvement of the legal structures in agriculture, taken into account 
the Dutch and French example. So in the first place, public authorities should 
reconsider the legal structures in agriculture and try to optimise them to the needs of 
the farmers, in order to make them more competitive in the European market.  
Within the Belgian context, the family farm in sole proprietorship has some 
disadvantages related to e.g. taxes, personal liability and farm transfer, compared to 
different forms of business entities with separate legal personality (BLP). In the ideal 
situation, farmers should be able to choose the legal farm structure that fits the best 
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their personal farm situation. In reality however, the objective knowledge of the 
different legal structures is insufficient to make a considered choice and subjective 
perception of the farmer enhances this process. In particular, BLPs are perceived as 
very administrative. The fiscal and other advantages are not clear or pronounced. In 
particular, the fact that the LV – specially designed for farms – is not very well 
perceived is illustrative for this. Public authorities may therefore take stock of these 
results and try to adapt this specific form or create a new form more adapted to the 
needs of farms. 
In general, farmers operating under the NP structure acknowledge the fiscal and 
property advantages of adopting BLPs, but the complexity of these forms, both in 
administration and legislation, limits the transition to alternative legal structures. 
Farmers already working under BLP acknowledge the advantages of this legal 
structure, but do not stuck to this form and are flexible to change if this would 
improve their situation.  
Depending on the farm situation, a considered choice has to be made between sole 
proprietorship, and a specific kind of BLP. In spite of it all, BLPs are and will mainly 
be adopted by farmers who are able to evaluate all effects of alternative legal 
structures and for whom the higher administrative burden is compensated by a lower 
financial risk and other advantages. On the other hand, more efforts on informing 
farmers could be made in order to decrease the barrier of transition: this is a task of 
both the extension services as the agricultural education. 
8.4. General conclusions and further research 
Farm transfer is not obvious in the current society. It is a complex long term process 
that is capital intensive, takes a lot of administration, and has major implications for 
the social environment. However young people who are willing and have the 
competences to take over a viable and competitive family farm should be stimulated 
to continue as farmer. This research holds important lessons for farmers, policy 
makers and other involved stakeholders.  
At farm level, it is important to regard the farm business as a long-term process and 
to assess the succession possibilities in a relative early stage of the farm life cycle. A 
higher openness towards alternative legal farm structures is a necessity, as farming 
becomes more capital intensive, the globalisation of the agricultural production 
entails higher price variation and the family farm bears more risk as natural person. 
The intergenerational transfer of the family farm has to be considered as business 
transaction, with clear arrangements for all involved parties, in order to reduce family 
conflicts, especially in case of a gradual farm transfer.  
At policy level, policy regulations should be further adapted to the increasing capital 
needs of young family farms, as family farms have to grow further in order to stay 
  General discussion and conclusions 
175 
competitive and viable. Related to farm transfer, the current governmental measures 
and policy regulations focus mainly on the moment of farm transfer, and measures 
such as the VLIF support want to enhance the farm transfer and stimulate a viable 
and competitive farm business. However the following measures or specific focuses 
could increase the transfer of family farms:  
• Government should reconsider the alternative legal farm structures in 
agriculture. More specific the Flemish ‘landbouwvennootschap’ does not 
meet the needs of the current agriculture. Legal farm structures have to help 
farmers to overcome the high financial burden, to improve the personal 
liability and to facilitate the transfer of capital-intensive family farms.  
• The transparency of policy regulations related to farm transfer and legal farm 
structures should be increased, in combination with a decrease of the 
administrational burden. The main objective of young farmers is to be 
involved in farming, but the complex regulations forces them to dedicate an 
increasing amount of time on administration. This administrative burden is 
an obstruction in the intention to farm succession.  
• A competitive Flemish agricultural sector will only remain possible if land, as 
limited resource, can be optimal allocated to innovative farmers. Therefore 
retired farmers should be stimulated to transfer their land to young farmers, 
instead of continuing farming in a sub-optimal way.  
A good and clear communication between government and farmers is essential for 
the survival of the Flemish agricultural sector. Education and extension services play 
a vital role in translating government regulations into a comprehensible message to 
(potential) young farmers. Education has to put more emphasise on the different 
aspects of farm transfer, beside the technical orientation of their students. Extension 
services have to stress the importance of a timely designation of the successor by the 
PDM. 
The farm succession cycle is a complex process that involves a high number of 
stakeholders. Therefore future research can focus on the following aspects: 
• Within the social aspects of farm transfer, we focused mainly on the potential 
successor, but further research can elaborate the succession intention model 
by including the other involved stakeholders such as parents, brothers and 
sisters, and partners. In particular the influence of the partner in the process 
of farm transfer can give more insight in the sociological process of farm 
transfer. 
• The model related to the TFA as indicator for farm transfer, can also be fine-
tuned by adding farm type specific elements such as quota for dairy 
production. TFA can also be used to model the influence of policy changes 
on farm transfer. 
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• Within our research related to investments, we did not focus on uncertainty 
about future benefits. However a farmer will take uncertainty about future 
benefits into account when he decides on investments. Future research can 
work on this factor by using the real options theory. 
• Within the legal farm context, further research has to focus on the 
characteristics of a legal farm structure that fits the needs of a competitive 
farm business, within the general legal context.  
The future of Flemish agriculture will probably consist of a limited number of 
competitive farmers, but government should create a stimulating environment in 
order to use all available resources in an efficient way.  
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Het familiale landbouwbedrijf23 is één van de hoekstenen van de Vlaamse land- en 
tuinbouw. Statistieken geven aan dat 87 percent van de landbouwbedrijven in 
Vlaanderen familiale bedrijven zijn, maar ook dat het totale aantal 
landbouwbedrijven de laatste 20 jaar gehalveerd is. De overname van leefbare 
familiale landbouwbedrijven is niet vanzelfsprekend, maar wel cruciaal voor de 
verdere ontwikkeling van de land- en tuinbouwsector. Dit onderzoek bestudeert 
daarom welke factoren van belang zijn in het proces van familiale bedrijfsovername 
binnen de land- en tuinbouwsector en dit in een lange termijn perspectief. De 
sociale, economische en wettelijke aspecten van bedrijfsovername komen aanbod 
met nadruk op de waarde-evolutie en financiering van bedrijven en de gevolgen voor 
het bedrijfsmanagement. 
In de literatuur wordt de overname van het familiale landbouwbedrijf meestal gezien 
als een proces dat een beperkt aantal jaren duurt. Dit standpunt houdt echter geen 
rekening met de volledige dynamiek van de bedrijfscyclus. Men kan eigenlijk stellen 
dat de voorbereiding van een bedrijfsovername start wanneer de voorafgaande 
bedrijfsovernamecyclus beëindigd is. Verschillende generaties zijn betrokken bij de 
landbouwbedrijfcyclus. Dit voortdurende proces wordt weergegeven in een 
opvolgingscyclus die centraal staat in dit onderzoek. Aangezien de bedrijfsovername 
van een familiaal landbouwbedrijf een proces is dat zowel sociale, economische als 
wettelijke gevolgen heeft, moet met al deze aspecten rekening worden gehouden. De 
opvolgingscyclus start met de motivatie en de intentie van kinderen om het 
ouderlijke landbouwbedrijf verder te zetten. Een meerderheid verlaat de 
opvolgingscyclus echter al in één van de eerste stadia, en dit omwille van redenen 
zoals gebrek aan interesse, een niet-geïnteresseerde partner, andere 
beroepsmogelijkheden, ... 
Het onderzoek toont aan dat een vroege zekerheid over deze interesse een 
belangrijke invloed heeft op de uitbouw van het bedrijf. De 
landbouwkapitaalswaarde van bedrijven begint anders te evolueren in een vroeg 
stadium voor de pensioenleeftijd naargelang bedrijven al dan niet over een opvolger 
beschikken en de mate van zekerheid hiervan. Het tijdig aanduiden van een opvolger 
stimuleert de bedrijfsleider om het landbouwbedrijf verder uit te bouwen zodat een 
leefbaar bedrijf in stand wordt gehouden. De invloed van het aanduiden van een 
opvolger op de investeringsbeslissingen noemen we het ‘opvolgingseffect voor 
                                                 
23 In deze samenvatting verwijzen de termen ‘landbouwbedrijf’ en ‘landbouwer’, zowel naar 
agrarische bedrijven/personen in de land- als tuinbouwsector. 
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overname’. Het doctoraat toont echter ook aan dat dit verschil in 
waardeontwikkeling nog gevolgen heeft in de ontwikkeling na overname. Het 
empirisch onderzoek toont immers aan dat bedrijven die ondanks de onzekerheid 
over opvolging in de pre-ovenameperiode, toch worden opgevolgd, hun achterstand 
in ontwikkeling niet of zeer moeilijk kunnen goed maken en dus een permanente 
ontwikkelingsachterstand kennen, hetgeen eventueel de overnamekansen in een 
volgende generatie kan hypothekeren. We verwijzen naar dit concept als 
‘opvolgingseffect na overname’. 
De overname van het bedrijf kan gebeuren door middel van een directe 
bedrijfsovername, maar in de meeste gevallen is er sprake van een graduele 
bedrijfsovername. Dit heeft gevolgen voor de financieringswijze en bepaalt mede de 
investeringsmogelijkheden na de bedrijfsovername. In het doctoraat wordt ook 
aandacht besteed aan eventuele alternatieve eigendomsstructuren zoals 
vennootschappen en of deze een oplossing kunnen bieden om het overnameproces 
te vergemakkelijken. Uit het onderzoek blijkt een groot kennisgebrek op dit vlak bij 
de ondervraagde land- en tuinbouwers, maar in het algemeen ook een grote scepsis 
over de voordelen van dergelijke alternatieve structuren. 
De bijdrage van dit onderzoek aan de wetenschappelijke kennis rond 
bedrijfsovername situeert zich vooral in het feit dat bedrijfsoverdracht gezien wordt 
op lange termijn, en dat verschillende aspecten simultaan moeten in rekening 
gebracht worden. In de volgende delen worden deze verschillende aspecten van de 
opvolgingscyclus bij landbouwbedrijven geanalyseerd, worden de algemene 
conclusies weergegeven en volgen er aanbevelingen voor verder onderzoek. 
De sociale aspecten bij overname van het landbouwbedrijf 
Bij de overname van het familiale landbouwbedrijf spelen niet alleen de economische 
leefbaarheid van het bedrijf, maar ook persoonlijke mening, visie en doelstellingen 
een rol bij de beslissing om het familiale landbouwbedrijf verder te zetten. Het 
‘model voor de bepaling van de opvolgingsintentie’ dat ontwikkeld werd in dit 
onderzoek toont dat een houding die familie georiënteerd is, problemen door partner 
in verband met bedrijfsovername en beperkingen vanuit het beleid de voornaamste 
bepalende factoren zijn in de vorming van een positieve intentie voor 
bedrijfsovername van het familiale landbouwbedrijf. In combinatie met de 
kenmerken van het landbouwbedrijf zoals beperkte mogelijkheden voor groei van 
het bedrijf, beperkte leefbaarheid van het bedrijf en een vooruitstrevende 
bedrijfsmanagementhouding, samen met het praktische inschatten van de 
bedrijfsovername binnen de familie, bevindt de mogelijke bedrijfsopvolger zich in de 
intentie fase, de overtuigingsfase of de opvolgingsfase. 
Niet alle kinderen van landbouwers staan open voor de overname van het familiale 
landbouwbedrijf en elk van hen volgt zijn eigen pad binnen het model voor de 
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bepaling van de opvolgingsintentie. Dit houdt in dat de doelgroep voor het 
stimuleren van het aantal overnames van landbouwbedrijven bestaat uit een beperkte 
aantal groepen van potentiële opvolgers. Specifieke aanbevelingen voor 
beleidsmaatregelen kunnen deze verschillen groepen helpen om het familiale 
landbouwbedrijf over te nemen: 
• Transparante beleidsmaatregelen die betrekking hebben op de overname van 
een landbouwbedrijf kunnen de perceptie van potentiële bedrijfsopvolgers 
verbeteren. Een vereenvoudiging van de bedrijfsadministratie en de (milieu-) 
maatregelen kan het aantal kinderen van landbouwers met een positieve 
intentie doen toenemen. Een toegankelijk bedrijfsovernamebeleid kan de 
gepercipieerde problemen rond bedrijfsovername doen dalen. 
• Duidelijke informatie rond de verschillende wettelijke bedrijfsstructuren 
helpt jonge landbouwers om te overwegen welke wettelijke structuur het 
beste past bij hun eigen landbouwbedrijf. Hierbij kunnen ze rekening houden 
met de relatie familie – landbouwbedrijf zonder op de familie een last te 
leggen. Landbouweducatie en –voorlichting moeten voldoende aandacht 
geven aan de kenmerken en gevolgen van de wettelijke bedrijfsstructuren. 
• Door het gebrek aan beschikbare landbouwgrond hebben toekomstige 
landbouwers problemen om het bedrijf verder uit te breiden in de toekomst. 
Het landbouwbeleid zou pensioengerechtigde landbouwers die geen 
opvolgers hebben moeten stimuleren om de grond beschikbaar te maken 
voor jonge landbouwers. Het areaal dat op deze manier vrijkomt is 
beschikbaar voor een marktgerichte, concurrerende landbouw waardoor de 
productie zal stijgen. Een goed functionerende landmarkt en specifieke 
steunmaatregelen voor jonge landbouwers die nood hebben aan land, zijn 
hierbij cruciaal. Als voorbeeld kunnen het stimuleren van stopzetting van 
grondgebruik via financiële stimulansen en het prioritair toewijzen van grond 
aan jonge landbouwers gegeven worden. 
Rekening houdend met deze aanbevelingen kunnen potentiële opvolgers minder 
beperkingen ervaren om een leefbaar familiale landbouwbedrijf over te nemen. Maar 
het moet benadrukt worden dat slechts een deel van de kinderen van landbouwers 
gemotiveerd is om het familiale landbouwbedrijf verder te zetten. Deze 
geïnteresseerden kunnen gestimuleerd worden door bovenstaande maatregelen. Een 
belangrijke taak is ook weggelegd voor het landbouwonderwijs. Zij moeten meer 
aandacht geven aan bedrijfsovername en de gerelateerde wetgeving binnen de 
eindtermen. 
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De economische aspecten bij overname van het landbouwbedrijf 
Aangezien de voornaamste doelstelling van het familiale landbouwbedrijf de 
uitvoering van een economische activiteit op het landbouwbedrijf is, is de 
economische context bepalend bij bedrijfsovername. Het bedrijfsmanagement, en 
meer specifiek de investeringsbeslissingen, zijn gekoppeld aan de verschillende fases 
van de landbouwbedrijfcyclus. In de fases van consolidatie en uittrede heeft het 
aanduiden van de bedrijfsopvolger een belangrijke invloed op de 
investeringsbeslissingen van het landbouwbedrijf. Dit geeft de relatie weer tussen het 
langtermijn denken en het huidige bedrijfsmanagement. 
Het tijdig aanduiden van de bedrijfsopvolger stimuleert bedrijfsinvesteringen zodat 
een leefbaar bedrijf kan overgedragen worden naar de volgende generatie. Het 
afwezig zijn van een opvolger zorgt ervoor dat de bedrijfsleider zich zal richten naar 
bedrijfsbeëindiging en er wordt gestreefd om de waarde van het bedrijf op het 
ogenblik van bedrijfsbeëindiging te optimaliseren. 
In de literatuur zijn de indicatoren om de economische context van de 
bedrijfsovername te bestuderen, vooral gericht op bedrijfsoppervlakte en 
bedrijfsinkomen, maar wij zijn van mening dat dit niet de beste indicatoren zijn op 
het ogenblik van bedrijfsovername. Dit onderzoek stelt de ‘totale activa van het 
landbouwbedrijf’ (TFA) voor als indicator voor investeringsbeslissingen op het einde 
van de landbouwbedrijfcyclus. We tonen aan dat in de Vlaamse situatie het 
aanduiden van een opvolger aanleiding geeft tot een stijging van de totale activa van 
het landbouwbedrijf. Deze stijging is niet terug te vinden als er geen opvolger is 
aangeduid. Dit noemen we het opvolgingseffect voor overname. 
Ook na de bedrijfsovername heeft de tijdige aanduiding van een opvolger invloed op 
de investeringsbeslissingen. Zowel op landbouwbedrijven waar de opvolger tijdig is 
aangeduid, als op bedrijven waar de opvolging nog onzeker was, zullen de totale 
activa van het landbouwbedrijf sneller groeien dan indien de bedrijfsleider stelde dat 
er geen opvolger was, maar waar het bedrijf toch is overgenomen. Dit toont dat de 
tijdige voorbereiding van een opvolger ook bepalend is in een succesvolle toekomst 
van het bedrijf. Zelfs indien de opvolging nog niet vast staat, zal de potentiële 
opvolger zich toch – mentaal – voorbereiden op de voortzetting van het bedrijf. Dit 
noemen we het opvolgingseffect na overname. 
De combinatie van het opvolgingseffect voor en na overname geeft aan dat 
opvolgers die slechts op het laatste ogenblik beslisten om het bedrijf verder te zetten, 
moeilijk hetzelfde vooruitgangsniveau als hun collega’s zullen bereiken. Maar ook 
opvolgers die nog onzeker waren over opvolging kunnen de achterstand van het 
opvolgingseffect voor overname moeilijk inhalen. De toekomstvisie van de 
uittredende bedrijfsleider heeft gevolgen voor de huidige en de volgende 
landbouwbedrijfcycli. Volgende beleidsaanbevelingen kunnen hier dan ook gemaakt 
worden. 
   
181 
Op dit ogenblik focust het beleid op de start van de landbouwbedrijfcyclus en steunt 
jonge landbouwers op het ogenblik van overname, en er vlak na. Onze resultaten 
tonen echter aan dat het einde van de landbouwbedrijfcyclus ook van groot belang is 
voor de toekomstige leefbaarheid van het landbouwbedrijf. Op het einde van de 
landbouwbedrijfcyclus kunnen de overheid en voorlichtingsdiensten het belang van 
de tijdige aanduiding van een opvolger en de gevolgen voor de toekomstige 
bedrijfsvoering benadrukken. Zo verhogen ze het bewustzijn van het belang van een 
tijdige aanduiding van een opvolger en wordt het opvolgingseffect voor overname 
gestimuleerd. 
Het VLIF hecht veel aandacht aan het moment van overname en de verdere 
ontwikkeling van het bedrijf door het toekennen van vestigingssteun en 
investeringssteun, maar deze maatregelen zijn meer dan een stimulus: ze bepalen de 
timing en overnameprijs bij bedrijfsovername, maar ook het aantal 
bedrijfsovernames (vooral bij verwachte wijzigingen in het beleid). We stellen echter 
vast dat het door het VLIF vastgelegde maximumbedrag voor vestigingssteun niet 
aansluit bij de waarde van de huidige land- en tuinbouwbedrijven, waardoor een 
graduele bedrijfsovername gestimuleerd wordt. Een aanzienlijk bedrag van eigen 
kapitaal is noodzakelijk om een lening bij de bank te kunnen aangaan, maar in het 
algemeen hebben jonge startende landbouwers hulp nodig van familie om de lening, 
en de bedrijfsovername mogelijk te maken. Aangezien deze (graduele) 
bedrijfsovername een aantal jaren duurt, is het noodzakelijk om duidelijke afspraken 
te maken met alle betrokken familieleden. 
Het juridisch kader bij overname van het landbouwbedrijf 
De meerderheid van de Vlaamse bedrijven zijn familiale bedrijven onder natuurlijke 
persoon. Een vergelijking van de verschillende wettelijke bedrijfsvormen in België, 
Nederland en Frankrijk toont echter dat de Vlaamse vennootschapsvormen in België 
minder voordelen geven aan de bedrijfsleiders dan in de naburige landen. Er is dus 
ruimte voor een verdere aanpassing en verbetering van de verschillende 
vennootschapsvormen binnen de land- en tuinbouw. Zij kunnen geoptimaliseerd 
worden, rekening houdend met de noden van de landbouwers, en zo het Vlaamse 
concurrentievermogen binnen de Europese markt verhogen. 
In België heeft het familiale bedrijf als natuurlijke persoon een aantal nadelen ten 
opzicht van de verschillende vennootschapsvormen (vb. belastingen, persoonlijke 
aansprakelijkheid, bedrijfsovername, …). In de ideale situatie zou de bedrijfsleider 
die wettelijke bedrijfsstatus moeten kiezen die het beste aansluit bij de eigen 
bedrijfssitautie. In praktijk is de objectieve kennis echter onvoldoende om een 
weloverwogen keuze te maken en de subjectieve perceptie versterkt dit proces. Meer 
concreet ervaren bedrijfsleiders vennootschapsvormen als administratief belastend. 
De fiscale en andere voordelen zijn niet duidelijk. Het feit dat de 
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landbouwvennootschap, die speciaal ontworpen is voor land- en tuinbouwbedrijven, 
niet positief ervaren wordt, is hier een kenmerkend voorbeeld van. De overheid kan 
rekening houden met deze resultaten en deze specifieke vorm aanpassen of een 
nieuwe vennootschapsvorm creëren die beter aansluit bij de noden van de 
landbouwers. 
In het algemeen kunnen we stellen dat bedrijfsleiders die actief zijn als natuurlijke 
persoon de fiscale voordelen en voordelen van aansprakelijkheid van 
vennootschapsvormen erkennen, maar de complexiteit van deze vormen, zowel op 
vlak van administratie als wetgeving, beperkt de overgang naar deze 
vennootschapsvormen. Bedrijfsleiders die reeds actief zijn binnen een 
vennootschapsvorm erkennen ook de voordelen, maar ze zitten niet vastgeroest 
binnen deze vorm. Indien er andere vennootschapsvormen beter aansluiten bij hun 
bedrijfssituatie zullen ze overschakelen naar die situatie die hen het meest optimaal 
lijkt. 
Afhankelijk van de individuele bedrijfssituatie moeten landbouwers dus een 
weloverwogen keuze maken tussen de natuurlijke persoon of verschillende vormen 
van vennootschappen. Ondanks alles zullen vennootschapsvormen enkel 
aangenomen worden door bedrijfsleiders die alle voor- en nadelen tegen elkaar 
afwegen en van mening zijn dat de hogere administratieve last gecompenseerd wordt 
door een lager financieel risico en andere voordelen. Maar een goede voorlichting 
van bedrijfsleiders kan ervoor zorgen dat de drempel verlaagd wordt. 
Algemeen besluit en aanbevelingen voor verder onderzoek 
De overname van een leefbaar familiaal landbouwbedrijf is niet meer 
vanzelfsprekend in onze huidige maatschappij. Het is een complex proces dat 
kapitaalsintensief is, heel wat administratie met zich meebrengt, en een belangrijke 
invloed heeft op de sociale omgeving. Toch zijn er nog steeds jongeren die bereid 
zijn en de vaardigheden hebben om het familiaal landbouwbedrijf over te nemen. Er 
moet verder gewerkt worden aan een positief klimaat zodat zij verder gestimuleerd 
worden om het familiaal landbouwbedrijf verder te zetten. Uit dit onderzoek kunnen 
verschillende lessen getrokken worden voor zowel landbouwers, de overheid, als 
andere betrokken partijen. 
Op bedrijfsniveau is het belangrijk om het familiaal landbouwbedrijf als een proces 
op lange termijn te bekijken. Er moet reeds in een relatief vroeg stadium van de 
landbouwbedrijfcyclus gekeken worden naar de mogelijkheden van 
bedrijfsopvolging. Een grotere openheid ten opzichte van vennootschapsvormen is 
nodig aangezien de familiale landbouwbedrijven steeds kapitaalsintensiever worden, 
de globalisatie van landbouwproductie een grotere prijsvariatie met zich meebrengt 
en het familiaal bedrijf een groot risico draagt als natuurlijke persoon. De overdracht 
van het familiale bedrijf tussen twee generaties moet gezien worden als een zakelijke 
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transactie, met duidelijke afspraken tussen alle betrokken partijen, zodat familiale 
problemen vermeden worden, zeker bij een graduele overname. 
Op beleidsniveau moet de regelgeving verder aangepast worden zodat rekening 
gehouden wordt met de stijgende kapitaalsbehoefte van jonge familiale 
landbouwbedrijven. Deze bedrijven moeten immers groeien om te kunnen blijven 
concurreren en leefbaar te blijven. De huidige beleidsmaatregelen rond 
bedrijfsovername op landbouwbedrijven focussen voornamelijk op het ogenblik van 
bedrijfsovername en de daaropvolgende investeringsperiode. Maatregelen zoals de 
VLIF-steun stimuleren bedrijfsovername en de leefbaarheid van het individuele 
bedrijf. Volgende specifieke maatregelen kunnen de bedrijfsovername stimuleren: 
• De overheid zou zich opnieuw moeten buigen over de 
vennootschapsvormen binnen de land- en tuinbouw. De 
landbouwvennootschap voldoet niet aan de noden van de huidige land- en 
tuinbouw. Wettelijke bedrijfsvormen moeten bedrijfsleiders helpen om de 
financiële last te dragen, de persoonlijke aansprakelijkheid te verbeteren en de 
overname van kapitaalsintensieve bedrijven mogelijk te maken. 
• De duidelijkheid van de wettelijke regelgeving rond bedrijfsovername en de 
vennootschapsvormen moet verhoogd worden, en dit samen met een daling 
van de administratieve belasting. De belangrijkste doelstelling van jonge 
landbouwers is om actief te werken op het bedrijf, maar de complexe 
regelgeving dwingt hen om steeds meer tijd te besteden aan administratie. 
Deze administratieve belasting is dan ook een hinderpaal voor vele potentiële 
bedrijfsopvolgers. 
• Een concurrerende Vlaamse land- en tuinbouwsector is enkel mogelijk als 
land op een optimale manier kan toegewezen worden aan innovatieve 
landbouwers. De overheid kan gepensioneerde landbouwers stimuleren om 
hun land beschikbaar te stellen voor jonge landbouwers, in plaats van te 
blijven boeren op een niet-optimale manier. 
Een goede en duidelijke communicatie tussen overheid en landbouwers is 
noodzakelijk voor het overleven van de Vlaamse land- en tuinbouwsector. Onderwijs 
en voorlichting spelen een essentiële rol bij het vertalen van het beleid in een 
verstaanbare boodschap voor (potentiële) jonge landbouwers. Het 
landbouwonderwijs moet meer nadruk leggen op de verschillende aspecten van 
bedrijfsovername, naast de technische opleiding van hun studenten. Voorlichting 
moet het belang van een tijdige aanduiding van de opvolger binnen het bedrijf 
benadrukken. 
De landbouwbedrijfcyclus is een complex proces dat vele verschillende betrokken 
partijen omvat. Verder onderzoek kan daarom op de volgende aspecten toegespitst 
worden: 
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• Binnen de sociale omgeving hebben we vooral de aandacht gevestigd op de 
potentiële opvolger, maar verder onderzoek kan het model voor 
opvolgingsintentie verder uitwerken door andere betrokken partijen zoals 
ouders, broers en zussen, partners, … ook te betrekken. In het bijzonder kan 
sociologische onderzoek de invloed van de partner in het opvolgingsproces 
beter in kaart brengen. 
• Binnen de economische omgeving geven de huidige modellen voor de 
opvolgingseffecten een heel algemeen beeld. Door het opsplitsen in 
verschillende subgroepen kunnen bedrijfsspecifieke effecten die in de huidige 
modellen vervat zitten in de niet-geobserveerde heterogeniteit, naar de 
voorgrond gebracht worden, en kunnen de modellen verfijnd worden. Op 
deze manier kunnen bijvoorbeeld binnen de melkveesector melkquota 
toegevoegd worden. De totale activa van het bedrijf kunnen ook gebruikt 
worden om de invloed van beleidsveranderingen op bedrijfsovername te 
modelleren. 
• De waardering van landbouwbedrijven in een dynamische omgeving is niet 
vanzelfsprekend. De investeringen op landbouwbedrijven worden genomen 
met bepaalde toekomstverwachtingen en rekening houdend met een bepaald 
risico. Verder onderzoek kan ook dit risico in beeld brengen door middel van 
de reële optietheorie waarbij de onomkeerbaarheid van een investering in 
combinatie met de kans dat zich op termijn betere gelegenheden zullen 
voordoen beschouwd wordt. Het risico wordt gezien als een bijzonder soort 
investeringskosten voor de landbouwer. Dit onderzoek kan zich richten op 
sectorniveau. 
• Binnen het juridisch kader kan verder onderzoek zich toespitsen op de 
kenmerken van vennootschapsvormen die het best aansluiten bij een 
concurrerende land- en tuinbouwsector, en dit binnen de algemene wettelijke 
mogelijkheden. 
De toekomst van de Vlaamse land- en tuinbouw zal waarschijnlijk bestaan uit een 
beperkt aantal moderne landbouwers, maar de overheid moet hiervoor een 
stimulerende omgeving creëren zodat alle beschikbare hulpbronnen op een efficiënte 
manier kunnen gebruikt worden. 
Bovenstaande geeft duidelijk aan dat bedrijfsopvolging gezien moet worden vanuit 
een lange-termijn perspectief waarbij alle beïnvloedende factoren in rekening moeten 
gebracht worden. Belangrijkste beleidsconclusie is dan ook dat bedrijven nog beter 
moeten omringd worden om tijdig de bedrijfsovername voor te bereiden en te 
begeleiden. Het systematisch bepalen in een bedrijfsadviessysteem van de in het 
doctoraat ontwikkelde ‘farm asset’ indicator kan hierbij een instrument zijn nuttig 
voor zowel het interne management als voor de bedrijfsadvisering. 
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Below, the printed version of the Internet questionnaire related to the intention-
decision model is given. The use of the Internet makes it possible to forward the 
respondent to specific questions depending on the answers given.  
 
 
Module 1 – General information on the respondent 
1. Woonplaats (postcode) …………….  
2. Geslacht  man vrouw 
3. lager onderwijs  
 middelbaar onderwijs  
 
Hoogste opleiding 
(beëindigd of aan 
het volgen) 
graduaat (hoger onderwijs korte type)  
  hoger onderwijs lange type- buiten universiteit  
  universiteit  
4. Volg je een 
landbouwopleiding? 
ja                            neen  
5. Geboortejaar 19......  
  < 1966       Deze enquête is gericht aan jongeren (< 40 jaar) 
die wonen op een land- of tuinbouwbedrijf. 
Toch bedankt voor de deelname aan deze 
enquête! 
  = >1966 ga naar vraag 6 
6. Woon je op een land- of tuinbouwbedrijf? (omcirkel) 
  ja ga naar vraag 7 
  neen Deze enquête is gericht aan jongeren die wonen 
op een land- of tuinbouwbedrijf. Toch bedankt 
voor de deelname aan deze enquête! 
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7. Aantal broers: ……  
 1 geboortejaar: ………….. 
 2 geboortejaar: ………….. 
 3 geboortejaar: ………….. 
 4 geboortejaar: ………….. 
 5 geboortejaar: ………….. 
 6 geboortejaar: ………….. 
8. Aantal zussen …….  
 1 geboortejaar: ………….. 
 2 geboortejaar: ………….. 
 3 geboortejaar: ………….. 
 4 geboortejaar: ………….. 
 5 geboortejaar: ………….. 
 6 geboortejaar: ………….. 
9. Is er een vader aanwezig binnen het 
gezin? (1 antw) 
ja ga naar vraag 10. 
  neen ga naar vraag 15 
10. Geboortejaar vader: 19…...                            geen idee 
11. Hoogste opleiding vader (1 antw)  lager onderwijs  
   middelbaar onderwijs  
   graduaat (hoger onderwijs korte type)  
   hoger onderwijs lange type- buiten 
universiteit 
 
   universiteit  
   geen idee  
12. Volgde je vader een landbouwopleiding? (1 antw) ja       neen geen 
idee 
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13. Beroepsactiviteit vader (1 
antwoord) 
voltijds werkzaam op het land- of 
tuinbouwbedrijf 
 
  deeltijds werkzaam op land- of 
tuinbouwbedrijf 
 
  voltijds werkzaam buiten het land- of 
tuinbouwbedrijf  
 
    
14. man is bedrijfsleider    
 man leidt samen met partner het bedrijf  
 
Wat is de functie van de man 
binnen het huidige ouderlijke 
bedrijf? (1 antwoord) 
man werkt mee op het bedrijf als helper   
  man regelt de administratie en financiën 
maar werkt niet fysisch mee op het 
bedrijf 
 
  man doet het huishouden, maar is niet 
betrokken binnen het landbouwbedrijf 
(geen andere beroepsactiviteit) 
 
  man werkzaam buiten het bedrijf  
15. ja ga naar vraag 16 
 
Is er een moeder aanwezig binnen 
het gezin? (1 antw) 
neen ga naar vraag 21 
16. Geboortejaar moeder: (1 antw) 19…...                      geen idee  
17. lager onderwijs  
 middelbaar onderwijs  
 
Hoogste opleiding moeder  
(1 antw) 
graduaat (hoger onderwijs korte type)  
  hoger onderwijs lange type - buiten 
universiteit 
 
  universiteit  
  geen idee   
18. Volgde je moeder een landbouwopleiding? (1 antw) ja           neen geen 
idee 
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19. Beroepsactiviteit moeder (1 antw) voltijds werkzaam op het land- of 
tuinbouwbedrijf 
 
  deeltijds werkzaam op land- of 
tuinbouwbedrijf 
 
  voltijds werkzaam buiten het land- of 
tuinbouwbedrijf  
 
    
20. vrouw is bedrijfsleider    
 vrouw leidt samen met partner het 
bedrijf 
 
 vrouw werkt mee op het bedrijf als 
helper  
 
 
Wat is de functie van de vrouw 
binnen het huidige ouderlijke 
bedrijf? (1 antwoord mogelijk) 
vrouw regelt de administratie en 
financiën maar werkt niet fysisch mee 
op het bedrijf 
 
  vrouw doet het huishouden, maar is niet 
betrokken binnen het landbouwbedrijf 
(geen andere beroepsactiviteit) 
 
  vrouw werkzaam buiten het bedrijf  
 
Module 2 – Farm characteristics 
21. a. Totale bedrijfsgrootte (ha) …. ha…. a  
 b. Aantal ha in eigendom … ha … a  
 c. Aantal ha in pacht: … ha … a  
22. Bedrijfstype (combinatie) a. groenten - vollegrondsteelt  
  b. groenten - serreteelt  
  c. sierteelt  
  d. akkerbouw  
  e. rundveehouderij   
  f. melkveehouderij  
  g. varkenshouderij  
  h. pluimveehouderij  
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  i. andere (specificeer):  
    
23. a. runderen  
 
Aantal (moeder)dieren op bedrijf 
(combinatie) b. melkvee  
  c. varkens  
  d. pluimvee  
  e. andere (specificeer):  
    
24. a. vader  
 b. moeder  
 
Gemiddeld aantal arbeidsuren per 
week op bedrijf (combinatie) 
c. kinderen  
  d. andere  
 
25. ja, langs vaders kant  
 ja, langs moeders kant  
 
Hebben uw ouders het huidige 
bedrijf zelf overgenomen van hun 
ouders?  (1 antw) 
ja, zowel langs vaders als moeders kant  
  neen, ze zijn zelf gestart met een bedrijf  
26. Hoeveel jaar geleden zijn ze gestart 
/ hebben ze het bedrijf 
overgenomen? 
± …………jaar geen 
idee 
 
Module 3 – Intention to farm succession 
27. ja  ga naar vraag 28 
 
Zou je zelf het land- of 
tuinbouwbedrijf willen overnemen? 
(1 antw) 
neen ga naar vraag 30 
28. Waarom zou je het bedrijf willen overnemen? (meerdere mogelijkheden)  
 a. omdat de ouders dit willen  
 b. bedrijf biedt mogelijkheden om concurrentieel te blijven  
 c. het sluit aan bij mijn studies  
 d. bedrijf biedt mogelijkheden om koploper te zijn binnen 
sector 
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 e. dit lijkt me de ideale job  
 f. het is een kinderdroom  
 g. bedrijf voldoet aan de milieureglementeringen  
 h. verbrede activiteiten zijn mogelijk binnen het bedrijf  
 i. andere (specificeer):  
. j.  geen idee  
29. Welke problemen zouden er volgens jou zijn bij de overname van het bedrijf? 
(meerdere mogelijkheden) 
 
 a. problemen om in orde te zijn met (milieu)reglementeringen  
 b. door de ligging heeft het bedrijf weinig of geen 
groeimogelijkheden 
 
 c. het zal moeilijk zijn om de administratie rond te krijgen  
 d. voldoende geld bijeenkrijgen om ouders te vergoeden  
 e. de verdeling van het bedrijf onder de kinderen zal niet 
eenvoudig zijn 
 
 f. het zal moeilijk zijn om een lening te verkrijgen voor de 
nodige aanpassingen / investeringen 
 
 g. de machines zijn verouderd  
 h. het zal moeilijk zijn om broers en zussen te vergoeden  
 i. de ouders zullen zich nog steeds inmengen in de 
bedrijfsvoering 
 
 j. de gebouwen zijn verouderd  
 k. de wetgeving rond bedrijfsovername is te complex  
 l. de ouders gaan niet akkoord met de overname  
 m. de partner gaat niet akkoord met de overname  
 n. het zal moeilijk zijn om voldoende arbeidskrachten te 
vinden 
 
 o. andere (specificeer): 
 
 
 p. geen problemen  
 Ga naar vraag 31  
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30. Waarom zie je het niet zitten om het bedrijf over te nemen? (meerdere 
antwoorden mogelijk) 
 
 a. de (milieu)reglementeringen zijn te streng  
 b. door de ligging heeft het bedrijf weinig of geen 
groeimogelijkheden 
 
 c. de administratie van een land- of tuinbouwbedrijf is te 
zwaar 
 
 d. de verdeling van het bedrijf onder de kinderen geeft 
problemen 
 
 e. het overnamebedrag dat ik zou verschuldigd zijn aan de 
ouders is te hoog 
 
 f. een lening te verkrijgen voor de nodige aanpassingen / 
investeringen is moeilijk 
 
 g. de machines zijn verouderd  
 h. ik zie het niet zitten om broers en zussen uit te betalen  
 i. de ouders zullen zich nog steeds inmengen in de 
bedrijfsvoering 
 
 j. de gebouwen zijn verouderd  
 k. de wetgeving rond bedrijfsovername is te complex  
 l. de ouders gaan niet akkoord met de overname  
 m. de partner gaat niet akkoord met de overname  
 n. voldoende arbeidskrachten te vinden is moeilijk  
 o. andere (specificeer):  
 
Module 4 – Designation of the successor 
31. ja ga naar vraag 33 
 
Is er al een bedrijfsopvolger 
aangeduid? (omcirkel) 
neen / geen idee ga naar vraag 32 
32. a. bedrijf wordt niet overgelaten: het is 
niet leefbaar voor een volgende generatie 
 
 b. geen interesse van kinderen  
 
Waarom werd er (nog) geen 
bedrijfsopvolger aangeduid? 
(meerdere antwoorden 
mogelijk) 
c. verschillende kinderen zijn 
geïnteresseerd 
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  d. ouders denken nog niet aan overname  
  f. er is een conflict binnen het gezin over 
de overname 
 
  g. geen idee  
  h. andere (specificeer)  
 Ga naar vraag 47   
33. a. ikzelf  
 b. oudere broer  
 
Wie is (zijn) de toekomstige 
bedrijfsopvolger(s)? (verschillende 
antwoorden mogelijk) 
c. jongere broer  
  d. oudere zus  
  e. jongere zus  
  f. andere (specificeer):  
34. Indien het bedrijf zal overgenomen worden door meerdere kinderen: hoe wordt dit 
praktisch geregeld? 
 
 
35. a. oudste kind  
 b. oudste zoon  
 c. oudste dochter  
 
Hoe is het aanduiden van de 
bedrijfsopvolger(s) geregeld binnen 
het gezin? (meerdere antwoorden 
mogelijk) 
d. jongste kind  
  e. jongste zoon  
  f. jongste dochter  
  g. kind(eren) met 
landbouwopleiding 
 
  h. kind(eren) met interesse  
  i. door onderling gesprek  
  j. dit is door de jaren heen gegroeid  
  k. ouders hebben dit beslist, maar 
niet alle kinderen gaan hiermee 
akkoord 
 
  l. geen idee  
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  m. andere (specificeer):  
36. Gaan de andere gezinsleden akkoord met deze 
opvolger? (omcirkel) 
ja      neen geen 
idee 
37. Binnen welke periode zal het bedrijf volledig 
overgedragen worden aan opvolger(s)? 
±……… jaar geen 
idee 
38. pensioen  
 
Wat gaan ouders beroepsmatig doen na overname? 
(kruis aan) 
meehelpen op het 
bedrijf 
 
  buiten het bedrijf gaan 
werken 
 
  geen idee  
 
Module 5 – Farm transfer 
39. ja     Ga naar vraag 40 
 
Ga je zelf het bedrijf overnemen? 
(omcirkel) 
Neen  Ga naar vraag 47 
  geen idee Ga naar vraag 47 
40. bedrijf wordt afgestemd op 1 arbeidskracht  
 
Hoe zal je na de overname de 
arbeid invullen binnen het bedrijf? 
(1 antw) 
arbeid zal geleverd worden door bedrijfsleider 
en partner 
 
  naast bedrijfsleider zal er nog familiale arbeid 
zijn (ouders, broers, zussen e.d.) 
 
  naast bedrijfsleider zal er nog gehuurde 
arbeid zijn 
 
  geen idee  
41. a. geen  
 b. investeringen gericht op milieu  
 c. investeringen gericht op productie  
 
Welke veranderingen zal je 
aanbrengen in de bedrijfsvoering na 
de overname? (meerdere 
antwoorden mogelijk) 
d. uitbreiding van oppervlakte  
  e. inkrimpen van de oppervlakte  
  f. invoeren / uitbouwen van verbrede 
landbouwactiviteiten (thuisverkoop, 
hoevetoerisme, …) 
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  g. verandering in soorten gewassen / dieren  
  h. verandering in productiemethode  
  i. verandering in management  
  j. geen idee  
  k. andere (specificeer):   
 
42. partner is bedrijfsleider    
 
Hoe zie je de functie van de partner 
binnen het toekomstige bedrijf? (1 
antw) 
partner leidt samen met jou het bedrijf: 
beiden werken actief op het bedrijf  
 
  partner werkt mee op het bedrijf als helper   
  partner regelt de administratie en financiën 
maar werkt niet fysisch mee op het bedrijf 
 
  partner doet het huishouden, maar is niet 
betrokken binnen het landbouwbedrijf (geen 
andere beroepsactiviteit) 
 
  er zal geen partner zijn op het toekomstige 
bedrijf 
 
    
43.  Betaling van rekeningen  
 lange termijn planning  
 technische beslissingen  
 
Welke taken voer je nu al uit binnen 
het land- of tuinbouwbedrijf van je 
ouders? (kruis aan) 
tewerkstelling en management van bedrijf  
  financiële beslissingen  
  organisatie van werk  
  dagelijkse planning  
  geen  
44. In welke volgorde worden onderstaande taken overgedragen van ouders op kind(eren) 
bij de overname van een land- of tuinbouwbedrijf volgens jou?  
Nummer van 1 (eerst overgedragen) tot 7 (laatst overgedragen) 
 betaling van rekeningen  
 lange termijn planning  
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 technische beslissingen  
 tewerkstelling management van 
bedrijf 
 
 financiële beslissingen  
 organisatie van werk  
 dagelijkse planning  
 
45. Duid aan welke doelstellingen belangrijk zullen zijn in je toekomstige bedrijfsvoering 
(omcirkel) 
 
 
helemaal 
niet 
belangrijk 
  
neutr
aal 
  
heel 
belang- 
rijk 
a. Imago van het bedrijf -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
b. Flexibiliteit -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
c. Uitbreiden van het bedrijf -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
d. Productiviteit -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
e. Milieuvriendelijke productie -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
f. Kwaliteit van de productie -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
g. Kostenvermindering -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
h. Beperken van risico’s -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
i. Creativiteit en innovatie -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
j. Diversificatie van  productie -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
k. Financiële onafhankelijkheid  -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
l. Specialiseren van het bedrijf -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
m. Gezonde liquiditeitspositie -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
n. Invoeren of uitbreiden van 
verbrede landbouwactiviteiten 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
 
46. heel gemakkelijk  
 gemakkelijk  
 
Indien je buiten het bedrijf zou moeten 
gaan werken, hoe schat je het vinden van 
werk buiten het land- of tuinbouwbedrijf 
gewoon  
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 moeilijk  
 
in? (1 antw) 
heel moeilijk  
 Ga naar vraag 48   
47. Als je het bedrijf niet overneemt of nog 
niet weet of je het bedrijf gaat overnemen, 
binnen welke sector zou je dan werk 
zoeken? (1 antw) 
binnen landbouwsector 
(toelevering, verwerking, 
voorlichting, onderzoek, …) 
 
  buiten landbouwsector  
Module 6 – Personal objectives 
48.  Duid aan hoe belangrijk je volgende persoonlijke doelstellingen vindt (omcirkel) 
 
 
helemaal 
niet 
belangrijk 
  
neutraa
l 
  
heel 
belangrijk 
a. Persoonlijke 
onafhankelijkheid 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
b. Voldoening in het geleverde 
werk 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
c. Zaak opbouwen voor familie -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
d. Plezier in werk dat ook je 
hobby is 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
e. Het beter doen dan anderen -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
f. Interesses hebben buiten de 
landbouw 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
g. Samenwerken met andere 
gezinsleden 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
h. Vrije tijd doorbrengen met 
mijn familie en vrienden 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
i. Een hoog inkomen -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
j. Zelfontplooiing (volgen van 
cursussen, opleidingen,…) 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
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Below, the printed version of the questionnaire related to the business legal structure 
of the farm is given. The questionnaire was hold during the Flanders’ agricultural fair 
(7-8-9 January 2005, Flanders Expo Gent).   
 
Module 1 – General farm characteristics 
Postcode van uw gemeente    ……   (v2) 
Bedrijfsgrootte     … ha     … a  (v3) 
Bedrijfstype (kruis aan, eventueel combinatie)      
tuinbouw: vollegrondsteelt    (v4a) 
tuinbouw: serreteelt    (v4b) 
akkerbouw    (v4c) 
rundveehouderij (vlees + melk)    (v4d) 
varkenshouderij    (v4e) 
pluimveehouderij    (v4f) 
andere: …………………………    (v4g) 
 
Aantal equivalenten van voltijdse arbeidskrachten op het bedrijf? …… (v5) 
Waarvan aantal equivalenten voltijdse familiale arbeidskrachten …… (v6) 
Waarvan aantal equivalenten voltijdse niet-familiale arbeidskrachten……  (v7) 
 
Baat u het bedrijf uit op voltijdse basis?  (omcirkel)  
Ja   Neen, deeltijds  (……...%)  (v8) 
 
Leeftijd bedrijfsleider (geboortejaar)   19……  (v9) 
 
Appendix 2 – Questionnaire related to the business legal 
structure of  the farm 
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Hoogst behaalde diploma bedrijfsleider  (kruis aan)   (v10) 
Lager onderwijs   
Secundair onderwijs   
Hoger onderwijs buiten universiteit   
Universiteit   
 
Aantal kinderen      ……  (v11) 
 
Is er een bedrijfsopvolger aanwezig?  (omcirkel)   (v12) 
Neen    Ja   Geen idee  
 
Fiscaal regime voor belastingen (kruis aan)     (v13) 
Forfaitair   
Volledige aangifte   
 
In welke mate zijn onderstaande bedrijfsdoelstellingen voor U van belang? (omcirkel) 
 
  Helemaal 
niet 
belangrijk 
 Neutraal  Zeer 
belangrijk 
(v14) Zaak opbouwen voor 
familie 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
(v15) Beperken van risico’s -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
(v16) Uitbreiden van het bedrijf -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
(v17) Beperken van 
bedrijfsadministratie 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
(v18) Financiële 
onafhankelijkheid van het 
bedrijf 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
(v19) Beperken van schulden -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
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Module 2 – Knowledge level of different Belgian legal structures 
Komen volgens U volgende bedrijfsvormen voor binnen de Vlaamse land- en tuinbouw? 
(kruis aan) 
  ja, op 
relatief 
kleine 
bedrijven 
ja, op 
relatief 
grote 
bedrijven 
ja, op 
zowel 
kleine als 
grote 
bedrijven 
neen geen idee 
/ nooit 
van 
gehoord 
(v20) Natuurlijke persoon - 
éénmanszaak 
     
(v21) Vennootschap onder 
firma (VOF) 
     
(v22) Gewone commanditaire 
vennootschap (CommV) 
     
(v23) Naamloze vennootschap 
(NV) 
     
(v24) Landbouwvennootschap 
(LV) 
     
(v25) Besloten vennootschap 
met beperkte 
aansprakelijkheid 
(BVBA)  
     
(v26) Eenpersoons BVBA 
(EBVBA) 
     
(v27) Commanditaire 
vennootschap op 
aandelen (CommVA) 
     
(v28) Coöperatieve 
vennootschap met 
beperkte 
aansprakelijkheid 
(CVBA) 
     
(v29) Coöperatieve 
vennootschap met 
onbeperkte 
aansprakelijkheid 
(CVOA) 
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Module 3 – Perception of business legal structure of the farm 
 
Geef uw mening over volgende stellingen (omcirkel) 
 
Natuurlijke persoon 
(v30) Bij natuurlijke personen in het niet-
forfaitair belastingsstelsel is er sprake 
van hogere belastingsschijf als men 
meer verdient 
Niet akkoord Akkoord Geen idee 
(v31) Bij natuurlijke personen kan het 
bedrijf volledig worden overgelaten 
aan de opvolger, onafhankelijk van 
de mede-erfgenamen 
Niet akkoord Akkoord Geen idee 
(v32) Bij een natuurlijke persoon is er 
bescherming van het privé-vermogen 
Niet akkoord Akkoord Geen idee 
 
BVBA 
(v33) De oprichtingsakte van een BVBA 
kan onderhands gebeuren 
Niet akkoord Akkoord Geen idee 
(v34) De BVBA kan belast worden volgens 
het principe van de forfaitaire BTW - 
landbouwregeling  
Niet akkoord Akkoord Geen idee 
(v35) De BVBA is aangepast aan een aantal 
bijzondere landbouwwetgevingen 
zoals de pachtwet en het VLIF 
Niet akkoord Akkoord Geen idee 
(v36) In de BVBA is er een verplichte 
boekhouding 
Niet akkoord Akkoord Geen idee 
(v37) Het oprichten van een BVBA kan 
kosteloos gebeuren 
Niet akkoord Akkoord Geen idee 
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Landbouwvennootschap 
(v38) Bij een landbouwvennootschap is er 
geen bescherming van het privé-
vermogen 
Niet akkoord Akkoord Geen idee 
(v39) De landbouwvennootschap komt in 
aanmerking voor VLIF-steun met 
betrekking tot investeringen op land- 
en tuinbouwbedrijven 
Niet akkoord Akkoord Geen idee 
(v40) De landbouwvennootschap wordt 
altijd belast volgens het principe van 
de vennootschapsbelasting 
Niet akkoord Akkoord Geen idee 
(v41) In de landbouwvennootschap is er een 
wettelijk verplichte boekhouding 
Niet akkoord Akkoord Geen idee 
(v42) Het oprichten van een 
landbouwvennootschap kan kosteloos 
gebeuren 
Niet akkoord Akkoord Geen idee 
 
Geef aan hoe U volgende kenmerken waarneemt bij zowel de bedrijfsvorm ‘natuurlijke 
persoon’ als bij de vennootschapsvorm (landbouwvennootschap, BVBA, …). Omcirkel het 
getal dat volgens u best aansluit bij de betreffende bedrijfsvorm 
 
Natuurlijke persoon 
weinig 
administratief werk 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 veel administratief 
werk 
(v43) 
management 
beperkt in belang 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 management 
belangrijk 
(v44) 
niet- flexibele 
bedrijfsvorm 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 flexibele 
bedrijfsvorm 
(v45) 
juridisch complexe 
vorm 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 juridisch 
eenvoudige vorm  
(v46) 
fiscaal niet voordelig -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 fiscaal voordelig (v47) 
kapitaalsintensief -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 slechts beperkt 
kapitaal 
noodzakelijk  
(v48) 
hoog kapitaalsrisico -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 laag kapitaalsrisico (v49) 
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Vennootschapsvorm (landbouwvennootschap, BVBA, …) 
weinig 
administratief werk 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 veel administratief 
werk 
(v50) 
management 
beperkt in belang 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 management 
belangrijk 
(v51) 
niet- flexibele 
bedrijfsvorm 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 flexibele 
bedrijfsvorm 
(v52) 
juridisch complexe 
vorm 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 juridisch 
eenvoudige vorm  
(v53) 
fiscaal niet voordelig -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 fiscaal voordelig (v54) 
kapitaalsintensief -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 slechts beperkt 
kapitaal 
noodzakelijk  
(v55) 
hoog kapitaalsrisico -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 laag kapitaalsrisico (v56) 
 
Module 4 – Own business legal structure of the farm 
 
Juridische vorm van uw bedrijf (kruis aan)    (v57) 
natuurlijke persoon   
landbouwvennootschap   
BVBA   
andere: …………………………   
weet niet   
 
Hoe lang werkt u binnen uw bedrijf al volgens deze juridische vorm? (omcirkel)  (v58) 
 
minder 5 jaar 5-10 jaar 11-20 jaar meer dan 20 jaar 
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Waarom hebt u voor deze juridische vorm gekozen? (omcirkel) 
  Helemaal 
niet van 
toepassing 
 Neutraal Helemaal van 
toepassing 
(v59) deze bedrijfsvorm was 
reeds aanwezig bij de 
overname van het bedrijf 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
(v60) in deze bedrijfsvorm kan 
ik gemakkelijk VLIF-steun 
ontvangen bij 
investeringen 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
(v61) deze bedrijfsvorm heeft 
een beperkte administratie 
(minder 4 uur / week) 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
(v62) deze bedrijfsvorm biedt 
mij fiscale voordelen 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
(v63) deze bedrijfsvorm laat een 
vlotte overname van het 
bedrijf toe 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
(v64) met deze bedrijfsvorm kan 
ik het risico beperken 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
(v65) andere:  
 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
 
Bent u recent overgeschakeld van een andere naar deze bedrijfsvorm?  (omcirkel) (v66) 
Neen    ja, in ……………… (jaartal)  
 
Indien neen, hebt u al overwogen om een andere bedrijfsvorm aan te nemen? (kruis 
aan)      (v67) 
Neen   
Ja, in beperkte mate   
Ja, in sterke mate   
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Module 5 – Information gathering 
Omcirkel bij de volgende vragen het antwoord dat voor U van toepassing is 
 
Leest u artikels over andere bedrijfsvormen? Nooit Soms Vaak (v68) 
Volgt U studiedagen, cursussen over andere 
bedrijfsvormen? 
Nooit Soms Vaak (v69) 
Sprak U reeds met collega landbouwers of 
medewerkers op het bedrijf over andere 
bedrijfsvormen? 
Nooit Soms Vaak (v70) 
Sprak U reeds met voorlichters (banken, 
beroepsorganisaties, …) over andere 
bedrijfsvormen? 
Nooit Soms Vaak (v71) 
Informeerde U zich reeds wat omschakeling naar 
een andere bedrijfsvorm voor uw bedrijf zal 
betekenen? 
Neen Ja  (v72) 
Zou u bij de overname van uw bedrijf dezelfde 
juridische structuur aanbevelen of gaat u bij de 
overname van het bedrijf dezelfde juridische 
structuur behouden? 
Neen Ja 
Geen 
idee 
(v73) 
 
Indien u nog belangrijke redenen hebt tot omschakeling naar een andere bedrijfsvorm of 
bijkomende opmerking hebt over bedrijfsvormen in land- en tuinbouw dan kan u deze hier 
neerschrijven (v74) : 
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Appendix 3.1. Analysis of variance of the difference in TFA between the different 
succession intentions (successor designated, successor not yet designated, no successor 
designated) within a given accounting year of the FADN dataset 
 
Year F-value p-value Number of 
observations 
1989 15.719 0.000 402 
1990 17.437 0.000 378 
1991 20.052 0.000 370 
1992 20.993 0.000 338 
1993 22.337 0.000 317 
1994 36.617 0.000 302 
1995 29.731 0.000 294 
1996 18.628 0.000 260 
1997 19.611 0.000 255 
1998 28.330 0.000 250 
1999 23.588 0.000 239 
2000 17.581 0.000 245 
2001 17.041 0.000 243 
2002 20.670 0.000 236 
2003 17.173 0.000 235 
 
Appendix 3 – Analysis of  variance  
Appendix 3 
220 
Appendix 3.2. Analysis of variance of the difference in TFA development (∆TFAt-2) between 
farm types, related to age of PDM 
 
Age F-value p-value Number of 
observations 
45 0.795 0.665 234 
46 1.360 0.188 219 
47 1.092 0.369 202 
48 1.913 0.031 202 
49 1.945 0.028 201 
50 0.694 0.756 200 
51 0.547 0.881 193 
52 0.484 0.922 193 
53 1.020 0.439 196 
54 0.947 0.502 195 
55 0.768 0.683 186 
56 0.703 0.735 193 
57 1.354 0.193 186 
58 0.780 0.671 171 
59 0.725 0.713 155 
60 0.891 0.551 124 
61 1.304 0.234 109 
62 0.831 0.618 94 
63 1.093 0.383 68 
64 0.462 0.916 55 
65 1.366 0.250 37 
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Variable Mean SD 
Perception related to farm transfer   
Problems to meet the environmental regulations 0,275 0,447 
The farm has no possibilities to grow 0,174 0,380 
The administration is too difficult to cope with 0.232 0.423 
Not enough money to compensate the parents 0.241 0.428 
The division of the farm between the children is not easy 0.234 0.424 
Difficult to get a loan from the bank for investments 0.148 0.356 
The buildings and machinery got dated 0.118 0.323 
Difficult to compensate the brothers and sisters 0.181 0.385 
The parents will still be involved in the management 0.073 0.261 
The policy regarding farm transfer is too difficult 0.163 0.370 
Difficult to find enough labour 0.082 0.274 
Partner doesn't agree with the farm transfer 0.086 0.281 
Parents don't agree with the farm transfer 0.049 0.217 
Parents don't agree with the choice of partner 0.017 0.130 
Personal objectives   
Personal independence 0.419 0.494 
Satisfaction in the work that's done 0.740 0.439 
Set up a firm for the family 0.178 0.383 
Enjoy the work that is also a hobby 0.654 0.476 
Perform better than other people 0.103 0.305 
Having interests outside agriculture 0.144 0.352 
Colaborate with other family members 0.142 0.349 
Spend free time with family and friends 0.327 0.470 
A high income 0.200 0.400 
Self-development 0.275 0.447 
Appendix 4 – Descriptive statistics 
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Perceptions related 
to farm transfer 
       
The farm has problems 
to meet the 
environmental 
regulations 
-0.165 0.649 -0.119 0.112 0.108 0.159 0.100 
The farm has no 
possibilities to grow 
0.224 -0.202 0.028 0.093 0.538 -0.006 0.163 
The farm administration 
is too difficult to cope 
with 
-0.131 0.682 -0.101 0.002 -0.058 0.160 -0.169 
There will not be not 
enough money to 
compensate the parents 
-0.011 -0.329 -0.014 -0.016 -0.451 0.229 -0.050 
The division of the farm 
between the children is 
not easy 
-0.180 -0.216 -0.011 0.319 -0.383 0.239 0.368 
It will be difficult to get 
a loan from the bank for 
the necessary 
investments 
-0.084 0.081 0.399 -0.027 -0.256 0.258 0.541 
The buildings and 
machinery of the farm 
got dated 
0.038 -0.064 0.125 -0.023 0.271 -0.115 0.443 
Appendix 5 – Factor analysis 
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It will be difficult to 
compensate the brothers 
and sisters 
-0.192 -0.392 -0.032 -0.163 -0.364 0.321 -0.050 
The parents will still be 
involved in the 
management 
0.086 -0.225 -0.290 -0.467 0.149 0.033 -0.121 
The policy regarding 
farm transfer is too 
difficult 
-0.083 0.471 -0.047 -0.041 -0.212 0.255 -0.130 
It will be difficult to find 
enough labour after farm 
transfer 
0.219 0.100 0.143 -0.188 0.207 0.491 0.069 
The partner doesn't 
agree with the farm 
transfer 
-0.120 -0.136 0.600 0.278 0.062 -0.005 -0.391 
The parents don't agree 
with the farm transfer 
-0.085 -0.111 -0.004 0.082 0.333 -0.035 0.282 
The parents don't agree 
with the choice of 
partner 
0.061 -0.121 0.349 -0.069 -0.028 0.102 -0.529 
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Personal objectives        
Personal independence 0.078 -0.147 0.280 -0.140 0.254 0.211 -0.021 
Satisfaction in the work 
that's done 
-0.213 -0.109 -0.150 0.134 -0.105 -0.447 0.063 
Set up a firm for the 
family 
0.335 -0.043 -0.160 0.377 0.277 0.422 -0.083 
Enjoy the work that is 
also a hobby 
0.550 0.175 0.115 -0.225 -0.379 -0.192 0.190 
Perform better than 
other people 
0.060 -0.075 -0.078 0.376 -0.065 0.230 0.036 
Having interests outside 
agriculture 
0.053 0.216 0.200 -0.110 0.079 0.322 0.135 
Collaborate with other 
family members 
0.498 0.060 -0.254 0.320 -0.159 0.077 -0.160 
Spend free time with 
family and friends 
-0.042 0.413 0.240 -0.099 0.030 -0.248 0.004 
A high income -0.246 -0.143 -0.270 -0.286 0.151 0.443 -0.001 
Self-development -0.498 -0.007 -0.044 0.137 0.269 0.070 -0.092 
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